THE ARTIFICER OF DISCOURSE: HOMERIC SPEECH AND THE ORIGINS OF RHETORIC

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

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

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

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

Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between literary speech in the Homeric epics and ancient rhetoric as a theoretical and practical discipline. Since the inception of literary theory in the works of Plato and Aristotle, the realms of poetry and formal rhetoric have been treated as separate. My dissertation addresses this disconnect by contending that rhetoric—even in its delimited definition as speech employing specific, learned techniques of persuasion—arose out of poetry, specifically Homeric poetry. Based on a close analysis of persuasive speeches in the *Iliad*, I argue that Homeric epic displays a systematic and technical conception of rhetoric—a possibility acknowledged by several ancient critics, although neglected by modern scholars. Iliadic speeches, in fact, display specific techniques that closely resemble the theorized system found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as I demonstrate in my central chapter. Recent scholarly accounts of the history of rhetoric (e.g. Kennedy, Cole, Schiappa, and Pernot) dismiss Homer's attention to the characterization of speech in his epics as "native eloquence" (Cole 1991:40). They identify the invention of rhetoric as occurring much later: in the fifth or fourth centuries B.C.E., when the practice of speech-making was first given the technical label *rhêtorikê* (in Plato's *Gorgias*) and instructive handbooks on the subject first appeared, a formalizing process that culminated in Aristotle's authoritative treatise in the mid-fourth century B.C.E. The discrepancy between a diverse but often overlooked collection of ancient sources that credit Homer as the first practitioner of rhetoric, and the modern dismissal of this idea, is the subject of Chapter 1 of my dissertation.

The central claim of my project—that a latent theory of rhetoric exists in Homer—is supported by textual data that I present and analyze in Chapter 2: direct speeches in the *Iliad* which are intended to persuade. These speeches bear the closest correspondence to the oratory of Aristotle's time, and to the narrowest usage of the word "rhetoric" in modern parlance. I do not include in my analysis speeches which solely consist of commands in the imperative, but rather those which bring some type of strategy to bear on the desired outcome, such as logical reasoning, shaming, flattery, or incentives, for example. Using the detailed categories of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a

definitional framework, I have unearthed 45 "rhetorical" speeches in the *Iliad*. The range, complexity, and combination of persuasive techniques (including logical argumentation) employed by Iliadic speakers lead me to conclude that a rule-governed system of persuasion was understood and represented by the composer(s) of the Homeric epics.

Chapter 3 of the dissertation traces the "literary lineage" of rhetoric between Homer and Aristotle. It examines where else in Archaic Greek literature rhetorical sophistication comparable to Homer's is in evidence, and proposes the notion of a cultural transmission of rhetoric—that is, the example of represented persuasion in certain Archaic poetry (Homer above all) filtered down to and informed rhetorical theory in the Classical era. I have found that on the few occasions where complex rhetoric does occur in non-Homeric Archaic literature, it tends to be in works that bear an affinity to Homer in genre and/or in narrative content. Thus certain *Homeric Hymns*, and the military exhortation elegies of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, are the Archaic works that I found to most closely resemble Homeric speech in terms of rhetorical sophistication. It is these works that propagate rhetoric from Homer down through tragedy and certain sophistic works, and thence to the theories of Plato and Aristotle. Chapter 4 discusses Aristotle's treatment of Homeric material in the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle's failure to acknowledge Homeric roots for rhetoric can be explained, I argue, by larger trends in the Classical era towards locating authoritative discourse and technical knowledge in philosophical and scientific prose treatises, rather than in divinely-inspired poetic forms. Aristotle himself is the greatest ancient proponent and practitioner of separations between genres and disciplines, which I believe has contributed to the neglect, even in modern times, of the possibility that poetry can inform and embody rhetoric. Finally, in a coda to the dissertation, I explore one example of the potential implications of Aristotle's genre-compartmentalization with regard to rhetoric and poetry: direct speech Apollonius' *Argonautica*, a work that provides the most obvious post-Aristotelian counterpart to Homer. In the *Argonautica*, the quantity and quality of rhetorical speeches are dramatically reduced from their Homeric levels—a phenomenon due in part, I argue, to Aristotle's delimitation of rhetoric within the boundaries of oratorical prose.

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Introduction

We encounter it frequently in our everyday existence: "If I'm old enough to go to war, I should be old enough to drink." "With great power comes great responsibility." "I've never done anything like that before. Why would I start now?" "Wheaties: Breakfast of champions." Rhetoric—that oft-maligned and vaguely-defined mode of communication—has long permeated the discourses of politics, advertising, law, education, entertainment, and interpersonal relations. In modern-day parlance, it possesses three major connotations: it may refer disparagingly to the polished, superficial appeal of the diction of set speeches (such as those of a politician or lecturer), implying that this appeal masks vacuous or deceitful content; it may refer to a narrow, ossified set of stylistic tropes found in literature, bearing little relevance beyond the high-school English or composition classroom[1]; or it may be broadly applied, particularly in academic contexts, to the type of discourse peculiar to a subject (e.g., "the rhetoric of economics," "the rhetoric of reggae music," "the rhetoric of freedom"). While the numerous ways of defining rhetoric make it impossible to posit a universally-accepted understanding, rhetoric has historically been credited with much broader significance and power than it possesses in modern usage: the power to achieve change in a listener's actions or attitudes through words—in short, persuasion. Although this project focuses on the ancient origins of rhetoric, and in particular its relationship to poetry, I believe it is worth keeping in mind what insights the traditional, "technical" sense of rhetoric (discussed below) can offer to modern society and scholarship—namely, an awareness of the nuts and bolts of persuasive speech, rather than the mere varnish that the term "rhetoric" now commonly denotes.

In speaking of a traditional, "technical" sense of rhetoric, I am attempting to distance my use of the term from one of its academic definitions, the broad sense of

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[1] As Vickers (1988) observes, rhetoric in the modern understanding has been drastically reduced from its ancient compass: the modern tradition "has reduced rhetoric not just from a primary to secondary role—from oral to written communication—but to *elocutio* alone, now detached from its expressive and persuasive functions, and brought down finally to a handful of tropes." (26)

communication in general that Kennedy calls "mental and emotional energy" exerted towards others,[2] and to assume the narrower sense of consciously-exercised arguments or techniques aimed at persuasion—a sense that can be traced back to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. I intend to examine in particular the origins of this phenomenon and its early relationship to literature, a perhaps unexpected locus for rhetoric in this strict sense. I begin with a simple question: when, exactly, did such rule-governed crafting of speech arise? Where do we see rhetoric first occurring in literary and social history as an identified practice? In my investigation, I shall leave aside manifestations of rhetoric-type phenomena in non-Western traditions for the most part. Kennedy has ably treated this material in his *Comparative Rhetoric*, and has collected enough comparative data to observe that, while ancient China, India, and the Near East all have literary traditions that represent persuasion, these rely for the most part on commands, aphorisms, and the speaker's authority (*êthos*), rather than venturing into logical argumentation; in this, Greco-Roman rhetoric is unique. Kennedy also concludes that none of the ancient non-Western traditions has transmitted a "fully developed system of rhetorical terminology" to modern culture in the way that Greco-Roman rhetoric has done.[3] It is thus assumed that the invention of rhetoric, as defined and deployed for the purposes of this project, can be traced back to ancient Greek society.

It is not my aim in this dissertation to rewrite completely the history of rhetoric; but it is my aim to consider (or to reconsider) a different starting point than is usually identified by historians of rhetoric, and to examine the implications of that difference. Therefore, I find it worthwhile to summarize the generally agreed-upon account of rhetoric's beginnings. Already in the works of Plato and Aristotle, the invention of rhetoric as a technical, taught discipline was being attributed to the fifth-century Syracusans Corax and Tisias (possibly one and the same person, according to Cole and

[2] Kennedy (1998) 3.
[3] *Ibid*, 5. Outside the Western tradition, Kennedy particularly recognizes and analyzes rhetoric from ancient Chinese and ancient Indian literature.

Kennedy (1994, 2007b)).[4] Corax and Tisias initiated the discipline of rhetoric, according to the standard account, by identifying "the parts of forensic speeches and the theory of the 'argument from probability.'"[5] The craft of persuasive speaking through instruction and performance of set speeches began to be popularized when another Syracusan, Gorgias, introduced it to Athens in 427 B.C.E. Handbooks with instruction in persuasive techniques (so-called τέχναι λόγων) began to circulate in this period, later to be subsumed under the exhaustive Aristotelian treatise on the subject.[6] The term *rhêtorikê* is first attested in Plato's *Gorgias* (449a5), written around 385 B.C.E., and it is this term that is seen by most scholars today as indicative of the invention of rhetoric as a *technê*.[7]

But this account is the product of a modern reconstruction of the discipline, drawing on a narrow range of ancient references to rhetoric, and neglecting what is in fact a richer tradition that does not so strictly demarcate boundaries between the literary and the critical, or indeed even between poetry and prose. In fact, many ancients saw poetry and rhetoric as having symbiotic relationship—a phenomenon that Struck discusses in his work on ancient literary criticism. "Many in the ancient world thought rhetoric and poetry share a great deal," Struck observes; the prime example of this is Quintilian, who "produces literary commentary nearly always within the context of rhetorical investigation."[8] This notion of a close relationship between rhetoric and poetry is one that has been gradually lost since antiquity—a tendency instigated by Aristotle, with his fondness for division and categorization.

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[4] On Corax and Tisias as the traditional inventors of rhetoric, see Kennedy (1963) 58ff. and (1994) 11ff.; Pernot (2005) 10 ff..

[5] Schiappa (1999) 4.

[6] Kennedy (1959 and 2007b) provides a survey of the early development of rhetoric via these semi-legendary figures and the technical handbooks that preceded the rhetorical works of Plato and Aristotle. Cole (1991) argues for Plato and Aristotle as the true founders of rhetoric, because of the "radical clarity" with which they established the philosophical/theoretical underpinnings of the discipline (28-9). Ford (2002) treats the rise of rhetoric as part of a broader movement in the fifth century—linked with textualization—that began to see both poetic texts and persuasive speech as objects for interpretation and analysis (155, 161, *et passim*).

[7] See e.g. Schiappa, 11ff.; and Nicholson, who in his work on Plato's *Phaedrus* comments that "the term *rhētorikē* does not just mean the practice of making speeches—we saw speech-making in Homer, for instance, and of course we know that people made speeches in the assemblies and courts—but rather the art, the *technē*, of fashioning speeches consciously according to norms. Likewise, the *rhētōr*, the practitioner of the art, is not merely someone who happens to be able to speak well, but one who has the mastery of a conscious art, who can explain what constitutes eloquence, and who can teach the art to others." (36)

[8] Struck (2004) 11.

My first task, then, is to revisit the diverse body of ancient testimony on the subject of rhetoric that identifies Homer as its first practitioner—even when "rhetoric" is defined not merely as natural eloquence, but as *a learned and deliberately-practiced skill, involving the deployment of tropes and techniques, and aimed at winning an audience's approval or assent* (which will be the operative definition of rhetoric for this project). Among the ancient sources which attest to rhetoric in Homer are Antisthenes (a contemporary and associate of Socrates), Plato, Eratosthenes (late-third–early second-centuries B.C.E.), Philodemus (first-century B.C.E.), Longinus (first-century C.E.), Pseudo-Plutarch (late-second-century C.E., according to Keaney and Lamberton), and other Greek critics of the Hellenistic period and the Second Sophistic; on the Roman side, Cicero and Quintilian also recognized Homer as the first explicator of rhetoric. It may be tempting to brush aside such a notion as romantic or anachronistic; indeed, this is what most modern scholars have done.[9] But when these ancient scholarly claims are examined in conjunction with my primary investigation—comparing persuasive direct speech in Homer with the theory of rhetoric as propounded by Aristotle (see Chapter 2)—they gain a new credibility. In what follows, I trace a persistent ancient attitude that may turn out to have possessed significant insight, and that provides corroboration for my argument: that Homer's poetry constitutes the earliest representation of rhetoric, including both its practice and its underlying theory.[10]

---

[9] See, for example, Kennedy (1957): "Grammarians and scholiasts were the first to note the existence of formal rhetoric in Homer, since they would have training in rhetorical systems and quite likely would be lacking the historical sense which might have told them that Homer was innocent of the rules which he seems to illustrate." (23)

[10] Of the following passages, several are gleaned from Radermacher's edition of the *Artium Scriptores*, a collection of ancient accounts of the foundations of rhetoric, many of them dating to before Aristotle; others from the *Prolegomenon Sylloge* of Rabe, which focuses on works of the Greek grammarians and rhetorical commentators primarily from the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.. All other sources will be individually noted. On the topic of Homer's reception in antiquity (of which my investigation is a subset), much work has been done and there is much still to do. A sampling of relevant scholarship includes J.F. Kindstrand, *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik* (1973); D.A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity* (1981); Keaney and Lamberton, *Homer's Ancient Readers* (1992); essays by N.J. Richardson and A.A. Long in Laird, ed., *Ancient Literary Criticism*; and Kim's recent dissertation, *Supplementing Homer* (2001).

Chapter 1: Re-thinking the Origins of Rhetoric

I. Homer as Rhetorician: Ancient Opinions

The most extensive and detailed ancient claims about the existence of rhetoric in Homer come from the *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer*, a work erroneously attributed to Plutarch by manuscript tradition. This well-preserved text has only recently received scholarly attention, primarily through the editions of Kindstrand (1990) and Keaney and Lamberton (1996). It was preserved as part of "a large body of ancient Homer interpretation that has defied analysis and is largely impossible to date," according to Keaney and Lamberton, who postulate a composition in the late-second century C.E.[11] Pseudo-Plutarch argues for Homer's priority in the discovery and practice of various philosophical notions and literary devices (the latter including "tropes" (τρόποι) and "figures" (σχήματα)). Among the claims of the *Essay* are that Homeric characters display irony and sarcasm in their speeches (e.g. Achilles in 9.391-2, 9.346-7; Achilles in 9.335-7), as well as allegory and hyperbole (sections 68-71). Most pertinently, a considerable portion of the *Essay* is devoted to demonstrating Homer's awareness and employment of rhetoric:

> ὁ δὲ πολιτικὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ τέχνῃ, ἧς ἐντὸς Ὅμηρος πρῶτος γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις τοῦ πιθανῶς λέγειν, τίς μᾶλλον Ὁμήρου ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ταύτῃ καθέστηκεν, ὃς τῇ τε μεγαλοφωνίᾳ πάντας ὑπεραίρει ἔν τε τοῖς διανοήμασι τὴν ἴσην τοῖς λόγοις ἰσχὺν ἐπιδείκνυται;
>
> Political discourse is a function of the craft of rhetoric, which Homer seems to have been the first to understand, for if rhetoric is the power to speak persuasively, who more than Homer has established his preeminence in this? He

[11] Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 2.

surpasses all others in grandiloquence and his thought displays the same power as his diction.[12] (161)

Significant here is the author's recognition of a connection between Homer's "thought" (διανόημα) and "diction" (λόγος). Homer is credited with not merely eloquent diction, but also intention—suggesting a systematic understanding of the "power to speak persuasively." From the level of general praise for Homer's rhetorical abilities, Pseudo-Plutarch quickly moves to the specific, and in particular highlights his ability to adapt speech patterns to the individual character speaking:

> πολλὰ δὲ τῶν εἰσαγομένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προσώπων λέγοντα ποιῶν ἢ πρὸς οἰκείους ἢ φίλους ἢ ἐχθροὺς ἢ δήμους **ἑκάστῳ τὸ πρέπον εἶδος τῶν λόγων ἀποδίδωσιν**.
>
> Many of the characters he introduces he causes to speak, whether to relatives or friends or enemies or to the people, and **he gives to each the appropriate form of speech.**[13] (164)

He follows this observation with an analysis of the speeches of Chryses, Achilles, and Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1 according to their calculated effect on the audience: Achilles, he says, affiliates himself with the rest of the Greek soldiers in his diatribe against Agamemnon "in order to make the others feel well disposed (εὐνουστέρους) toward him as they listened" (164). Such an attempt to put the audience in a favorable frame of mind is one of the three primary techniques identified by Aristotle as the "proofs" of persuasive speech in his treatise on rhetoric, composed in the mid-fourth century:

> Of the proofs [πίστεις] provided through speech there are three species; for some are in the character [ἦθος] of the speaker, and **some in disposing [διαθεῖναι] the listener in some way**, and some in the speech [λόγος] itself, by showing or seeming to show something.[14] (*Rhetoric* I.2.3)

[12] Text of Pseudo-Plutarch from Kindstrand (1990); translation from Keaney and Lamberton (1996).

[13] The language Pseudo-Plutarch uses to describe Homer's speech-craft here resembles (whether consciously or unconsciously) Thucydides' famous statement that he represents the characters in his history as saying "the things that were necessary/appropriate for the circumstances" (ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν…οὕτως εἴρηται) (1.22.1).

[14] Translation adapted from George A. Kennedy (2007), *Aristotle: On Rhetoric* (Oxford).

The act of "disposing the listener in some way"—achievable through a variety of means, but hinging on a knowledge of and sensitivity to the particular audience addressed—is a key rhetorical technique for both the Homeric characters (as Pseudo-Plutarch recognized) and Aristotle. I will henceforth refer to it as *diathesis*, a term derived from the verb that Aristotle uses in this passage; the concept and its deployment will be discussed at greater length at the beginning of Chapter 2.

In addition to claiming that Homer is an expert in all manner of rhetorical devices, Pseudo-Plutarch credits him with creating nuanced characterization through speech, even borrowing the term "prosopopoeia" from oratorical terminology to describe this phenomenon:

> ἔστι παρ' αὐτῷ πολὺ καὶ ποικίλον τὸ τῆς προσωποποιίας. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ διάφορα πρόσωπα εἰσάγει διαλεγόμενα, οἷς καὶ ἤθη παντοῖα περιτίθησιν.
>
> The figure prosopopoeia ("character-making") is abundant and varied in Homer, for he brings in many different characters to whom he gives all sorts of qualities. (66)

Keaney and Lamberton observe that Pseudo-Plutarch makes a characteristically idiosyncratic critical move by attributing this technique—"one of the most broadly exploited ornaments in oratory"—to Homeric poetry. "That the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* should be thought of in these terms underlines the oddness of this presentation of Homer-as-rhetor," they note.[15] However "odd" such a presentation may be, though, Pseudo-Plutarch supports it with examples from the text. He does not elaborate further on Homer's prosopopoeia at this point in the *Essay*, in the midst of a section (7-73) that summarily lists the rhetorical tropes to be found in Homer's "diction" (λέξις), such as neologism, metonymy, pleonasm, paronomasia, etc. But he returns to the concept later, in the more analytical and example-based section (161-74) on rhetorical "discourse" (λόγος) in Homer, from which I have drawn most of the passages cited above. In 172, Pseudo-Plutarch provides further insight into his earlier claim about Homer's prosopopeia:

[15] Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 133.

> οὐκ ἠμέλησε δὲ οὐδὲ **χαρακτηρίσαι τοὺς ῥήτορας**. τὸν μὲν γὰρ Νέστορα ἡδὺν καὶ προσηνῆ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εἰσάγει, τὸν δὲ Μενέλαον βραχυλόγον καὶ εὔχαριν καὶ τοῦ προκειμένου τυγχάνοντα, τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα πολλῇ καὶ πυκνῇ <καὶ> πληκτικῇ τῇ δεινότητι τῶν λόγων κεχρημένον.
>
> He was concerned **to give each orator a particular character** and makes Nestor sweet and saying things pleasing to the listeners, Menelaus brief and winning, coming right to the point, and Odysseus using many complex ingenuities of language. (172)

This trio of characters is commonly cited among ancient critics as representing the three registers or styles of rhetorical speech, with Odysseus traditionally illustrating the grand and complex style, Nestor the middle and balanced style, and Menelaus the plain style.[16] This sort of retrojection of Hellenistic and Imperial rhetorical categories onto Homeric speakers is certainly anachronistic; but Pseudo-Plutarch avoids such terminology, merely observing that Homer creates and distinguishes his characters, at least in part, according to their modes of speaking. What is of more import is the way that he fits this observation into his larger matrix of argumentation for Homer's awareness and implicit articulation of rhetorical theory. To this end, Pseudo-Plutarch devotes sections 167-170 of the *Essay* to characterizing and analyzing the speech of Nestor, Diomedes, and the three members of the *Iliad* 9 embassy to Achilles. "[Homer] shows the orators in the embassy itself using various techniques" (ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ πρεσβείᾳ ποικίλαις τέχναις ποιεῖ χρωμένους τοὺς ῥήτορας (169)), he claims. He then identifies these techniques: Odysseus aims to evoke pity in Achilles for the suffering Greek army (169)—a clear instance of Aristotle's notion of *pathos* as rhetorical device, though Pseudo-Plutarch never mentions Aristotle in connection with his *Rhetoric*, here or elsewhere. Additionally, Odysseus appeals to the authority of Peleus (recalling Aristotle's argument from *êthos*); and in general he tries to downplay Agamemnon's role in the negotiations in order to placate Achilles, displaying mindfulness of his audience's disposition (Aristotle's notion of *diathesis*). Phoenix, in Pseudo-Plutarch's analysis, takes

[16] For earlier statements of this opinion, D.A. Russell (1981) 137, fn. 21 has catalogued the following occurrences: Cicero *Brutus* 40 (*ALC* 222); Quintilian 12.10.64 (*ALC* 414); Gellius 6.14.7; Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* 6 ff. (some of which I will be discussing subsequently).

the "kitchen-sink" approach: "as he proceeds he leaves out nothing that might persuade him, rhetorically summarizing all the main points" (169), including appeal to his own fatherly relationship to Achilles, argument for the nobility of yielding to persuasion, and presentation of the cautionary example of Meleager. Ajax takes the route of directness, employing "tactful rebukes (εὐκαίρως ἐπιπλήττων) mixed with polite requests (εὐγενῶς παρακαλῶν) ...appropriate to one who had military prowess" (169). Having made his case for Homer's prosopopoeia, Pseudo-Plutarch caps his larger argument that Homer had a conception of rhetoric by appealing to the passage most commonly cited for this purpose among ancient critics, namely *Iliad* 9.440-43 (in which Phoenix claims to have taught Achilles to be a μύθων ῥητῆρ). "In Phoenix' speech Homer also indicates that rhetoric is an art" (ἐν δὲ τοῖς τοῦ Φοίνικος λόγοις κἀκεῖνο παρίστησιν, ὅτι τέχνη ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορική (170)), concludes the critic.[17]

The *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer* is admittedly a biased source, one which doggedly pursues its project of tracing all contemporary intellectual pursuits (philosophy, rhetoric, politics) to Homeric origins.[18] As such, it does not propound a coherent ideology, but rather presents a litany of examples and arguments for an encomiastic purpose—it is a highly didactic instantiation of the epideictic tradition, as it were. There is little evidence that Pseudo-Plutarch favors any of the competing philosophical schools of thought prominent in the Imperial milieu; as Buffiere puts it, "la *Vie* est presque une doxographie: on y résume à larges traits l'opinion d'une école ou d'un philosophe sur une question, pour montrer aussitôt l'accord avec Homère. Or, le

[17] Buffiere's (1973) comment on passage 170 of the *Essay* recapitulates in more explicit terms Pseudo-Plutarch's contention that Homer recognized rhetoric as a τέχνη: "Homère est un incomparable professeur de rhétorique. Et son art n'est pas purement intuitif, il est conscient et étudié. Homère sait que la parole est une science qui s'apprend : Phénix était chargé d'en instruire Achille, il devait faire du fils de Pélée, selon sa propre expression, « un bon diseur de paroles »." (352)

[18] See Keaney and Lamberton (1996) 10ff. for elaboration of this insight. For further discussion of the philosophical contributions of Pseudo-Plutarch, see De Lacy (1948); for general but less exhaustive overviews of the *Essay* than that of Keaney and Lamberton, see Buffiere (1973) 72-77 and Kindstrand's introduction (1990). What little scholarship exists on this work has focused heavily on the identity of the author, perhaps because of the difficulty of pinning down its content in a way that sustains comment (e.g. Buffiere, "[L'auteur] combat Aristippe et Epicure, énonce souvent les positions stoïciennes sans rien blâmer ni louer, mais donne en maint endroit la palme de la vérité à Platon et à Pythagore, notamment pour la croyance à l'immortalité de l'âme...Ces données composent un portrait assez flou; et l'on comprend l'hésitation des critiques sur le nom de l'auteur." (74)).

style doxographique ne permet guère à un auteur d'affirmer sa personnalité."[19] Its value to modern scholarship, I would argue, is not in its broad, "doxographic" project (which is common enough in this and later eras), but in the flashes of idiosyncratic insight that it provides in the course of analyzing certain Homeric phenomena—in particular, its astute observation of the aspects of τέχνη present in Homeric characters' speech. The *Essay* is remarkable for the range and detail of its presentation of rhetoric in Homer, in close reliance on the text of the *Iliad* (very few of its examples come from the *Odyssey*). Its assertions on the subject can be summarized by this characteristically enthusiastic statement:

> καὶ ὅτι μὲν **τεχνίτης λόγων Ὅμηρος** οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως τις εἴποι εὖ φρονῶν· δῆλα γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς ἀναγνώσεως.
>
> No reasonable person will deny that **Homer was an artificer of discourse**, for this much and more is clear simply from reading him. (171)

The *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer* is not unique in its claims; it is merely the most sustained treatment of the question of rhetoric in the Homeric poems. As early as the fourth century B.C.E., ancient critics of Homer had been making similar arguments. One of these was Antisthenes, a philosopher, rhetorician, and associate of Socrates, credited with founding the Cynic school.[20] He also produced some of the earliest attested critical interpretations of Homer. In one of the surviving fragments of his work, Antisthenes tackles a controversy over whether the epithet *polutropos*—as applied to Odysseus in the Homeric poems—had a positive or negative connotation:

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[19] Buffiere (1973) 75; cf. Keaney and Lamberton (1996): "His is an unpretentious but voracious intellect, unencumbered by any commitment to a particular philosophical school, engaged in a work that is essentially a popularization—a doxographer who focuses his doxography on the glorification of Homer." (12)

[20] Antisthenes' work survives only in fragments, collected in a modern edition by Caizzi (1966). Although only limited critical attention has been bestowed upon Antisthenes, Navia's *Antisthenes of Athens: Setting the World Aright* (2001) offers an extensive and contextualized view of the philosopher in what Navia calls his "various stages of intellectual development, beginning with a Sophistical and rhetorical stage, from which he moved on to come under the influence of Socrates, until eventually he turned himself into a Cynic." (vii-viii) A more specialized treatment can be found in Pépin's article "Aspects de la lecture Antisthénienne d'Homère" (1993), which discusses the role of Antisthenes' Homeric exegesis in laying the groundwork for later non-literal and even allegorical interpretations of Homer.

> εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ <ἀνθρώποις συνεῖναι> ἀγαθοί εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσέα Ὅμηρος σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς παῖδας ἀξιωθεὶς ποιήσασθαι λόγους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικούς, καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναιξὶν ἁρμοδίους, καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικούς, καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς· τὸν γὰρ ἑκάστοις πρόσφερον τρόπον τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν.
>
> If the wise are also good at "dealing with men" (ἀνθρώποις συνεῖναι), by this Homer says that Odysseus, being wise, is "polutropos," because in fact he knew how to deal with many types of men. Thus also Pythagoras is said to have been esteemed for crafting speeches for children, to set childlike speeches for them; and for women speeches appropriate to women, and for leaders, leader-like speeches; and for ephebes, ephebic speeches: for it is a characteristic of wisdom to discover the proper type of wisdom for each.[21] (*Antisthenis Fragmenta* 51 (Caizzi), Porphyr. schol. ad Od. I, 1)

Antisthenes highlights Odysseus' and Pythagoras' use of the rhetorical technique of adapting their speech to fit the particular audience in order to gain favor—another instance of *diathesis*, the technique that Pseudo-Plutarch also noted in the speech of a Homeric character (Achilles, in that case; see above, p. 6).

The suggestion that Homeric characters practice oratory can be found in several of Plato's works as well. In the *Cratylus*, a middle-period dialogue concerning the nature of language and naming, Plato makes an indirect comment on the subject in the way that he frames his speculative etymology of the term "hero." Although he does not specifically name any Homeric characters in the following passage from the *Cratylus*, Plato surely takes into account the most extensive literary depiction of the heroic age, the poems of Homer. The name "hero," Socrates asserts, may derive from the heroes' evident skill in speaking:

> ὅτι σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοί, ἐρωτᾶν ἱκανοὶ ὄντες· τὸ γὰρ "εἴρειν" λέγειν ἐστίν. ὅπερ οὖν ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ φωνῇ λεγόμενοι οἱ ἥρωες ῥήτορές τινες καὶ ἐρωτητικοὶ συμβαίνουσιν, ὥστε ῥητόρων καὶ σοφιστῶν γένος γίγνεται τὸ ἡρωικὸν φῦλον.

[21] Text of Antisthenes from Caizzi (1966); translation my own.

> [It is] because they were sophists, clever speech-makers and dialecticians, skilled questioners—for *'eirein'* is the same as *'legein'* ('to speak'). And therefore, as we were saying just now, in the Attic dialect, the heroes turn out to be speech-makers and questioners. Hence the noble breed of heroes turns out to be a race of speech-makers and sophists.[22] (398d-e)

Plato leaves this tantalizing suggestion un-elaborated in the remainder of the work, but he does seem to take for granted that the heroic age had produced orators, dialecticians, and sophists—a curious mixture of skills for Plato, considering that elsewhere (most prominently in the *Gorgias*) he disparages rhetoric and sophistry, while promoting the activities of dialectic and questioning (see *Phaedrus* 276e-277a). Plato's *Phaedrus* also attests the influence of Homeric characters' speech on the rhetorical handbooks that were popular in the fifth and fourth centuries: in response to Phaedrus' assertion that artful speaking is found primarily in the lawcourts, Socrates asks,

> ἀλλ' ἢ τὰς Νέστορος καὶ Ὀδυσσέως τέχνας μόνον περὶ λόγων ἀκήκοας, ἃς ἐν Ἰλίῳ σχολάζοντες συνεγραψάτην, τῶν δὲ Παλαμήδους ἀνήκοος γέγονας;
>
> Well, have you only heard of the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—those they wrote in their spare time in Troy? Haven't you also heard of the works of Palamedes?[23] (261b)

Once again, it is Nestor and Odysseus who serve as the prototypical representatives of rhetorical speech (along with the non-canonical figure of Palamedes, renowned in legend as a clever trickster).[24] Plato even characterizes their supposed "rhetorical

[22] Text of the *Cratylus* from Duke et al. (1995); translation from Reeve (1998). For critical treatment of the *Cratylus*, see among others Barney (2001), who provides a broad interpretive (re-)reading of the dialogue, addressing the question of Plato's seeming oscillation between conventional and naturalistic accounts of naming; as well as Baxter (1992) and Sedley (2003), both of whom focus more particularly on the extensive section in the dialogue devoted to etymologies (often viewed as incongruous with the rest of the dialogue), in order to defend it as important to and consistent with Plato's larger philosophy of language.

[23] Text of the *Phaedrus* from Burnet (1903); translation from Nehamas and Woodruff (1995). For commentaries on the *Phaedrus*, see de Vries (1969), and Rowe (1986); for treatment of its themes, and especially of the interplay between philosophy and rhetoric, see Ferarri (1987). For discussion of the *Phaedrus* specifically in connection with rhetoric, see among others D. White (1993), whose concern is to bring together the elements of love and rhetoric in the dialogue under a unified heading, as "a concentrated discourse on metaphysical considerations, both in substance and method" (3); and Nicholson (1999), 35-55.

[24] Palamedes, though not mentioned in the Homeric epics, is a figure connected by tradition (beginning with the *Cypria* in the epic cycle) with qualities of linguistic cleverness and inventiveness. He was the subject of plays by Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and of a defense speech by Gorgias (DK B11a). Hyginus' *Fabulae*, a second-century A.D. handbook of mythology, reports Palamedes' two most well-known

treatises" as τέχνας περὶ λόγων, the contemporary terminology used for instructional handbooks on the subject (Aristotle makes reference to τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων at the beginning of the *Rhetoric* (1.1.3)). Phaedrus, nonplussed by Socrates' question, responds by attempting to interpret the figures of Nestor and Odysseus as contemporary orators (Gorgias and Thrasymachus or Theodorus); Socrates then abandons the point and moves on. But White sees significance in Socrates' seemingly offhand reference to the Homeric characters:

> Why then did he name Nestor and Odysseus as producing such treatises when there is no evidence in Homer that they ever contemplated doing such a thing? Recall, however, that both Nestor and Odysseus were extremely eloquent. Thus, their treatises on rhetoric are their speeches. Socrates is pointing to the fact that skilled rhetoricians—even mythic ones—must have some sort of theoretical glimmer of what they are doing before they speak. So in their idle moments, i.e., when not actually speaking, Nestor and Odysseus are envisioned as reflecting on, and writing about, how to be eloquent. Whether or not they were ever depicted as actually doing so is irrelevant....Nestor and Odysseus are no less theoretical for being only expert rhetoricians than those rhetoricians who have studied, and written about, this art.[25]

This hint of recognition by Plato (via Socrates) that the speeches of Homeric heroes could constitute "rhetorical treatises" ties him into a strain of thought that continues throughout antiquity.[26]

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achievements: he was responsible for revealing Odysseus' true identity when the latter was feigning madness to avoid the Trojan expedition; and he was credited with inventing the letters of the Greek alphabet. This reputation for cleverness, reflected in the etymology of his name, is likely what made Palamedes a natural candidate for the tradition of putting rhetorical speeches in the mouths of mythical figures, to which Plato here refers (on which see note 27 below). (Nightingale (1996) 149-54; Nehamas and Woodruff (1995) xi, n.1 and 56, n.139; *OCD* (1996) entries on Palamedes and Hyginus (1099, 735).)

[25] D. White (1993) 195-6.

[26] A tradition of placing exemplary speeches in the mouths of mythical figures arose in the rhetorical instruction of the fifth century, for example Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* (spoken by Palamedes) and Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. This suggests that actual Homeric speeches may have been viewed as (or, at any rate, adapted into) instructional treatises (*technai*). Even earlier, the lost poem Χείρωνος Ὑποθῆκαι, attributed to Hesiod, purportedly contained the centaur Chiron's wisdom and instructions for Achilles. Kurke (1990) explains that the Χείρωνος Ὑποθῆκαι belonged to a genre known as *hypothēkai* in Archaic Greece (at times treated as synonymous with the later category of *parainesis*); citing the work of P. Friedländer (1913), she writes that "The genre of *hypothēkai* would be characterized by a proem, an address to a specific addressee, sometimes by mythological material, but mainly by a collection of injunctions and traditional wisdom, loosely strung together with gnomic material." (90) (The connection between Greek wisdom literature and the development of rhetoric will be further explored in Chapter 3 below.)

While Aristotle cites a number of Homeric passages in his *Rhetoric*, he does not recognize Homer as a rhetorician or participant in the development of the discipline that he is describing in the treatise. I will discuss Aristotle's relationship to Homer with regard to rhetoric at length in Chapter 4. For now, it must suffice to say that Homer is included in Aristotle's account of rhetoric primarily to illustrate minor figures of speech, such as metaphor (*Rhetoric* 3.11.2-4), asyndeton (3.12.4), and emotional gestures (3.16.10).

Proceeding chronologically to the Hellenistic period, we next find the testimony of Eratosthenes, a literary critic, mathematician, geographer, philosopher, and the successor to Apollonius as head of the Library of Alexandria in the third century B.C.E. Eratosthenes continues in the tradition of identifying rhetoric in Odysseus's diction, observing that

> ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ φρόνησίς ἐστι δήπου περὶ λόγους, ἣν ἐπιδείκνυται παρ' ὅλην τὴν ποίησιν {Ὀδυσσεὺς} ἐν τῇ διαπείρᾳ, ἐν ταῖς λιταῖς, ἐν τῇ πρεσβείᾳ, ἐν ᾗ φησιν· ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἵη καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν, οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆί γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος.
>
> Rhetoric is knowledge concerning speech, which Odysseus demonstrated through the whole poem in the trial, in supplications, and in the embassy, in which [Homer] says: "but when indeed there was a great voice from his chest and words like wintery snowflakes, then no other mortal would quarrel with Odysseus [*Iliad* 3.221-23]."[27] (*Eratosthenes apud Strabonem* A 2.5 (C. 17))

What emerges from this passage is the notion that the Homeric characters were self-conscious about speech—that they possessed specialized knowledge and intention (φρόνησις) about the craft. This strain of thought is also evident in the Homeric commentary of Philodemus, a first-century B.C.E. poet, critic, and Epicurean philosopher whose work on a broad range of literary and philosophical subjects survives only in fragments.[28] The first two books of his work *On Rhetoric* focus primarily

[27] Text of Eratosthenes from Radermacher (1951) 6; translation my own.

[28] For further scholarship on Philodemus' rhetorical work, see Chandler's (2006) translation and exegetical essays on the fragments of *On Rhetoric*, and Blank's (1995) article "Philodemus on the Technicity of Rhetoric." Chandler notes that one of Philodemus' aims seems to be to refute the view—common in his time among both Epicureans (to whose philosophy he subscribed) and others—that Epicurean philosophy was incompatible with rhetoric. (13-17) He also observes that, in keeping with the Epicurean approach, Philodemus believes that of the three branches of rhetoric laid out by Aristotle, only epideictic (which he

on the question of whether rhetoric is an art.[29] In a fragmentary discussion on whether rhetoric is possible without the existence of formal training, Philodemus invokes the heroes of the past and refers intriguingly to an "account" (λόγος) of their grasp of this skill:

> οὐ κρείνω δὲ παλινλογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τῆς ἀποδείξεως κατά γε τὴν δύναμιν οὐθὲν διαφερούσης τοῦ διδάσκοντος λόγου ἥρωας ἤτοι [ἰδιώτ]ας; μὴ μαθόντας τὴν ῥητορικὴν δυν[α]το[ὺς ῥητορεύειν γεγονέν]αι.
>
> I do not judge it to be necessary to deny the proof, differing not at all in its force from the account teaching that the heroes—although they were non-professionals, not having learned rhetoric—became capable of speaking rhetorically.[30] (Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς II)

What is this λόγος that Philodemus mentions? Is it a strand of tradition attending the canonical legends, otherwise unattested? Or does it refer to the Homeric poems themselves, which "teach" through their narrative and representation of the characters' speech that the heroes possessed skill in rhetoric? In either case, this passage seems to fall in with the pattern already established by Antisthenes, Plato, and Eratosthenes that attributes either conscious persuasive techniques or explicit use of "rhetoric" to the Homeric heroes.

A further indication of Philodemus' support for the notion (evidently much debated by "critics and philosophers" of his time) that Homer was the inventor of rhetoric comes in the following statement:

> ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀσύνετοί τινές ἐσμεν, ὥστε φιλοσοφίας μὲν αὐτὸν εὑρετὴν λεγόμενον ἀκούειν, οὐχί τε τῶν κριτικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ μιᾶς μόνον αἱρέσεως ἀλλὰ πασῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικῆς εὑρ[ετὴν νομί]ζεσθαι τέρας [ὑπολαμβάνειν].
>
> But some of us are so unintelligent that we hear this man being called the inventor of philosophy—not only by the critics but by the philosophers

calls "sophistic") counts as a τέχνη: "Philodemus systematically and repeatedly denies that forensic and political rhetoric have any efficacy at all." (16) Various essays in Obbink's (1994) *Philodemus and Poetry* (whence Blank's article comes) provide a view into Philodemus' thought on other subjects, in particular the relationship between poetry and Epicurean philosophy.

[29] See Chandler, 13ff.

[30] Text of Philodemus from Radermacher (1951) 5, following and emending Sudhaus (1896) 71-2; translation my own.

themselves, and not of one school only but of all—and yet assume that it is a monstrosity for him to be considered the inventor of rhetoric.[31] (Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς II)

Although the fragmentary passage is somewhat ambiguous, Philodemus seems to be taking a position similar to that adopted by Pseudo-Plutarch: that Homer is the source of both philosophy and rhetoric. At the very least, he argues that critics cannot claim to find a philosophical foundation in Homer's works without acknowledging the presence of a rhetorical foundation as well.

The Greek-speaking world of the Roman empire produced its own representatives of the Homer-as-inventor-of-rhetoric school, most prominently Pseudo-Plutarch, as detailed above.[32] But other literary critics touched on the theme as well. Pseudo-Longinus, whose *On the Sublime* dates to the first century C.E., finds multiple examples of the rhetorical device of "sublimity" (ὕψος) in Homer. Although most of these examples come from the narrative voice rather than from the direct speech of Homeric characters, there are some of the latter. Pseudo-Longinus quotes a desperate battlefield prayer of Ajax (*Iliad* 17.645-7), for example, to illustrate a familiar rhetorical technique: Homer's ability to craft speech appropriate to the individual character. "These are the true feelings of an Ajax" (ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ πάθος Αἴαντος), he observes;

> οὐ γὰρ ζῆν εὔχεται (ἦν γὰρ τὸ αἴτημα τοῦ ἥρωος ταπεινότερον), ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐν ἀπράκτῳ σκότει τὴν ἀνδρείαν εἰς οὐδὲν γενναῖον εἶχε διαθέσθαι, διὰ ταῦτ' ἀγανακτῶν ὅτι πρὸς τὴν μάχην ἀργεῖ, φῶς ὅτι τάχιστα αἰτεῖται, ὡς πάντως τῆς ἀρετῆς εὑρήσων ἐντάφιον ἄξιον.

[31] Text from Radermacher (1951) 9 and Sudhaus (1896) 111.

[32] The Second Sophistic movement drew on Homer, but more for his themes, plotlines, and even philosophical implications than for rhetorical instruction, according to the findings of Kindstrand in *Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik*. Kindstrand looks at three major authors of the Second Sophistic—Dio Chrysostom, Maximus of Tyre, and Aelius Aristides—and examines what each has to say on the subject of "Homer als Philosoph, Lehrer und Rhetor." Of Dio, he remarks: "Wenn es sich um Homer als Rhetor handelt, kann man die Zurückhaltung Dions bemerken, da für ihn andere Aspekte seines Homerbildes erheblich wichtiger sind." (128) Maximus acknowledges no rhetoric in Homer whatsoever, which Kindstrand postulates is due to the conflict that Maximus perceives between viewing Homer as a philosophical exemplar (for which he makes strong claims), and as a rhetorician (171-2). Aristeides, on the other hand, acknowledges the rhetorical ability of Homeric characters, but presents this as a natural gift or divine inspiration—an attitude which Kindstrand summarizes as follows: "a) die Rhetorik ist bei Homer vorhanden und b) sie ist nicht eine τέχνη, was jedoch ihren Wert nicht verringert." (200-201)

> He does not plead for his life: such a prayer would demean the hero: but since the ineffectual darkness robbed his courage of all noble use, therefore, distressed to be idle in battle, he prays for light on the instant, hoping thus at the worst to find a burial worthy of his courage.[33] (9.10)

In this passage, Pseudo-Longinus offers a refinement of earlier literary analysis: he highlights Homer's strategic manner of representing speech to reflect the way Ajax is elsewhere characterized. It is an aspect of Homeric invention that Pseudo-Plutarch will explore further. In a broader sense, Pseudo-Longinus' contribution to the increasingly-sophisticated practice of ancient literary criticism is a lack of prejudice about the capacity of poetry to display rhetoric, at a time when categorization of and compartmentalization between genres was already well on the way to general acceptance. "Longinus cuts across traditional distinctions of genre and style to analyse and show how we too may attain one particular quality," observes Innes.[34]

The tradition of attributing rhetoric to Homer continued throughout later antiquity, although critics of this period—like Aristotle, Longinus, and to a lesser extent Pseudo-Plutarch before them—were more concerned with the "rhetoric" of Homer's narrative voice and its illustration of stylistic tropes such as metaphor and "sublimity" than with the rhetoric of Homer's characters and their persuasive argumentation. Treatments of the latter do exist, however; they can be found in the rhetorical theory of Hermogenes, a critic of the late second century C.E., as well as in later commentaries on Hermogenes' influential work.[35] In his treatise *On Types of Style* (*Peri Ideon Logou*),

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[33] Text of Pseudo-Longinus from Russell (1964); translation from Fyfe (1927). For Longinus' place in the history of literary criticism, see Russell (1981). For discussion of the structure of *On the Sublime* and a detailed commentary, see Innes (1995), who argues that the structure of Longinus' "five sources most productive of sublimity" discussed in section 8.1 (i.e. solid thrust of conception, intense and enthusiastic emotion, molding of figures in a certain way, noble phrasing, and dignified and lofty composition) "is subverted in ways which emphasise a view of sublimity as an organic whole" (114).

[34] D.C. Innes, "'Longinus' and others" in Easterling and Knox (1989) 86.

[35] For more on Hermogenes' place in the history of ancient criticism, especially his position at the culmination of ancient theories of style, see Russell (1981). "[Hermogenes] comes as near as any ancient author ever does to giving articulate expression to his sense of stylistic nuance and colour," Russell observes (143).

Hermogenes estimates Homer and Demosthenes at the top of their respective genres in rhetorical ability.[36] While acknowledging the differences between poetic and prose categories in the following passage, he nevertheless articulates the transcendence of formal distinctions that Homer achieves with his speech-craft:

> ὅπερ γὰρ ἦν ὁ Δημοσθένης ἡμῖν κατὰ τὸν πολιτικὸν λόγον ἔν τε τῷ συμβουλευτικῷ καὶ δικανικῷ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ πεζῷ πανηγυρικῷ, τοῦτ' ἂν Ὅμηρος εἴη κατὰ τὴν ποίησιν, ἣν δὴ πανηγυρικὸν λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ λέγων εἶναί τις οὐκ οἶμαι εἰ διαμαρτήσεται...ἀρίστη τε γὰρ ποιήσεων ἡ Ὁμήρου, καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιητῶν ἄριστος, φαίην δ' ἂν ὅτι καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ λογογράφων, λέγω δ' ἴσως ταὐτον· ἐπεὶ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποίησις μίμησις ἁπάντων, ὁ δὲ μετὰ τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν κατασκευῆς ἄριστα μιμούμενος καὶ ῥήτορας δημηγοροῦντας καὶ κιθαρῳδοὺς πανηγυρίζοντας ὥσπερ τὸν Φήμιον καὶ τὸν Δημόδοκον καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πρόσωπά τε καὶ πράγματα ἅπαντα, οὗτος ἄριστός ἐστι ποιητής, ἐπειδὴ οὖν ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τάχ' ἂν ταὐτὸν εἰρηκὼς εἴην, εἰπὼν εἶναι ποιητῶν ἄριστον, ὡς εἰ καὶ ῥητόρων ἄριστον καὶ λογογράφων ἔλεγον. στρατηγῶν μὲν γὰρ ἢ τεκτόνων ἢ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως οὐκ ἄριστος...οὐ λόγος ἐκείνοις ἡ τέχνη οὐδὲ ἐν λόγοις· οἷς δ' ἔστιν ἐν λόγῳ τὸ ἔργον, οἷον ῥήτορσι λέγω καὶ λογογράφοις, ὁ τούτους ἄριστα μιμούμενος καὶ λέγων, ὥσπερ ἂν ὁ ἐκείνων ἄριστος εἴποι, πάντως ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκείνων ἄριστος. ἄριστος οὖν κατὰ πάντα λόγων εἴδη καὶ ποιητῶν ἁπάντων καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ λογογράφων Ὅμηρος.
>
> What, in our opinion, Demosthenes is to practical oratory, both deliberative and judicial, and Plato is to panegyric oratory in prose, Homer is to poetry. If anyone says that poetry is panegyric in meter, I cannot say that he is mistaken...The best poetry is that of Homer, and Homer is the best of poets. I would say that he is also the best of orators and speech-writers, although perhaps this is implicit in what I have already said. Poetry is an imitation of all things. The man who best imitates, in a suitable style, both orators delivering speeches and singers singing panegyrics, such as Phemius and Demodocus and other characters engaged in every pursuit, this man is the best poet. Since this is the case, perhaps by saying that Homer is the best of poets I have made a statement that is tantamount to saying that he is also the best of orators and the best of speech-writers. He is perhaps not the best general or craftsman or other such professional...Their skill does not reside in the use of speech and words. But as for those whose business is with the use of speech, such as orators and speech-writers, the one who represents them best and describes how the best of them would speak, is surely

[36] *Peri Ideon* 1.260 (Rabe).

himself the best of them. Thus of all poets and orators and speech-writers Homer is the best at using every kind of style.[37] (*PI* 2.374-75)

Hermogenes does not simply and glibly call Homer the most knowledgeable figure in every field of expertise—he admits that the poet is no general or craftsman. But he does identify Homer's representation of speech as the supreme paradigm for oratory, citing Homer's diversity of styles. For Hermogenes, Homer puts into practice the rhetorical handbook.

The commentators on Hermogenes add further to such a rhetorical reading of Homer. Sopatros, writing in the fourth century, declares in his commentary that

> φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς παντοῖα εἰδὼς ῥητορικῆς παραδείγματα. τὸν μὲν γὰρ ταχὺν καὶ σύντομον καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸν ῥήτορά φησι λέγειν νιφάδεσσιν ὅμοια, καὶ τὸν πυκνὸν καὶ σύντομον, οὐδὲν δὲ ἧττον ἀποδεικτικὸν παῦρα μὲν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως. οἶδεν δὲ τὴν ἀταξίαν τῆς δημαγωγίας καὶ τοὺς ἀδιακρίτως καὶ ἐντέχνως λέγοντας, ὁποῖοί ποτέ εἰσιν, ὥσπερ τὸν Θερσίτην, ὅς ῥ' ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδει. [*Iliad* 2.213]
>
> The poet [Homer] reveals that he knows all sorts of *paradeigmata* of rhetoric. For he says that the one [Odysseus], a swift and concise and demonstrative speaker, says things like snowflakes, and the other [Menelaus] is both compact and concise, and says few things no less demonstratively, but with great fluency. But he knew the disorder of demagoguery and those speaking indiscriminately and artificially, what sort they are—such as Thersites, "who knew many and disorderly words in his mind."[38] (Commentary on Hermogenes' Περὶ Στάσεων, Walz V.6)

Again we see the theme of certain Homeric speakers being singled out as exemplary, and as is often the case, Odysseus and Menelaus are cited. Sopatros draws on the vocabulary of rhetorical theory when he describes Odysseus and Menelaus as "demonstrative" (ἀποδεικτικός) speakers.[39] His addition of Thersites as an example of unappealing rhetorical qualities is more unusual; not even Pseudo-Plutarch's *Essay* discusses Thersites in this capacity. Although Walz amends the manuscript reading of

[37] Text of Hermogenes from Rabe (1969); translation from Wooten (1987).

[38] Text of Sopatros from Radermacher (1951, following Walz (1832-6)); translation my own.

[39] Aristotle uses the adjective ἀποδεικτικὸς seven times (and the adverb ἀποδεικτικῶς once) in the *Rhetoric*, applying it to speech (λόγος), proofs (πίστεις), or enthymemes (ἐνθυμήματα); it is always translated as "demonstrative."

ἐντέχνως ("artificially," i.e. "artistically") to ἀτέχνως ("unskillfully") in describing Thersites' speech, I join Radermacher in printing the rarer adverb ἐντέχνως. I find the manuscript reading, however jarring, to give a more provocative, and indeed Homeric, reading of Thersites: in *Iliad* 2, Homer characterizes him as a speaker with unharnessed (ἄκοσμα) artifice, but a degree of artifice nonetheless.[40]

> Θερσίτης δ' ἔτι μοῦνος ἀμετροεπὴς ἐκολῴα,
> ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶ ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη...
> τῷ δ' ὦκα παρίστατο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
> καί μιν ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν χαλεπῷ ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
> "Θερσῖτ' ἀκριτόμυθε, λιγύς περ ἐὼν ἀγορητής..."
>
> But one man, Thersites of the endless speech, still scolded, who knew within his head many words, but disorderly... But brilliant Odysseus swiftly came beside him scowling and laid a harsh word upon him: "Fluent orator though you be, Thersites, your words are ill-considered..." [*Iliad* 2.212-13 and 244-46]

Interestingly, the adjective/adverb cluster ἐντέχνος/-ως comes up on numerous occasions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in his effort to distinguish the rhetorical argumentation with which he is concerned—which he describes as ἐντέχνος—from "inartistic" means of persuasion such as witnesses, documents, and the like. Sopatros' use of the word to describe Thersites' speech (if indeed ἐντέχνως is the correct reading, which I believe is interpretively plausible and has the claim of *lectio difficilior*) is then another example of vocabulary from rhetorical analysis being applied to the speech of Homeric figures.

Like Sopatros, the fifth-century rhetorician and Neoplatonist philosopher Syrianus wrote extensive commentaries on the Hermogenic corpus. In the following passage, he too identifies Homeric characters as exemplars of rhetoric:

> σύνδρομος γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ψυχῶν, καὶ πρὸ Νέστορός τε καὶ Φοίνικος Παλαμήδους τε καὶ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ ῥητόρων ἠσκεῖτο παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἡ ῥητορική, εἴ γε καὶ τὸν Τροιζήνιον Πιτθέα φασὶν ἔνιοι λόγων ἐν Τροιζῆνι τέχνας γράφειν τε καὶ διδάσκειν ἀνθρώπους...
>
> For rhetoric is an accompaniment to the reasoning power (*logos*) of souls, and before Nestor and Phoenix and Palamedes and Odysseus and the other

[40] As Roisman (2007) puts it, Thersites' speech is "an example of verbal dexterity put to wrong purposes." (431)

rhetoricians in Troy, rhetoric was practiced among men, if indeed [it is as] certain people say that Troizenian Pittheus wrote handbooks of speeches in Troizen and taught men...[41] (Commentary on Hermogenes' Περὶ Στάσεων, Rabe II.7)

Although Syrianus' initial statement sounds something like a theory of universal rhetoric, his subsequent mention of Pittheus' "handbooks of speeches" (τέχναι λόγων) makes it clear that he has a more formalized notion of rhetoric in mind. The question of when rhetoric originated takes him into pre-Homeric territory; he treats it as a given fact that the Homeric heroes (again, Nestor and Odysseus headline the examples) were ῥήτορες. Here again, as in the passage from Plato's *Phaedrus* treated above, there are hints of a lost tradition that attributed actual sixth- or fifth-century *technai* to mythic/heroic characters.

Finally, at the late end of antiquity, we find the following discussion by an anonymous author. It appears in Rabe's *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, a collection of "introductions" to rhetoric (many of them drawn from Walz's earlier collection *Rhetores Graeci*) which Kennedy dates to the fourth and fifth centuries C.E. [42] Its presentation of rhetoric among the Homeric heroes touches some by-now familiar themes, but it fleshes out these themes in explicit and vehement fashion, thus providing a fair summation of ancient commentary on the subject:

> Δεύτερον δέ ἐστι κεφάλαιον, ἐν ᾧ ἐλέγχομεν, εἰ καὶ ἐν ἥρωσιν ἡ ῥητορική. ἔδει γὰρ καὶ καλῶς ἔδει τὰ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργήματα τοὺς ἐκ θεῶν φανέντας πρώτους καρπώσασθαι. ἔστω τοίνυν τούτων ἁπάντων μάρτυς ὁ θεσπέσιος ἡμῖν καὶ ἱεροφάντης Ὅμηρος, ὃς εἰς φανερόν τε καὶ σαφὲς ἤγαγε τὰς περὶ τούτων ζητήσεις ἡμῖν. **οὗτος γὰρ βουλόμενος σημᾶναι ἡμῖν, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἥρωσιν ἑκατέρα ποιότης τῆς ῥητορικῆς εὕρηται, εἰσάγει τὸν Νέστορα σύμβουλον ὄντα**, περὶ οὗ λέγει
>
> "τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ
> ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε, λιγὺς Πυλίων ἀγορητής,
> τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή."
>
> **καὶ τὸ μὲν γλυκὺ καὶ προσηνὲς τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχειν τὸν Νέστορα ἐξέφηνεν ὁ ποιητής· τὸ δὲ σύντονον καὶ ἐπίχαρι διὰ τοῦ Μενελάου ἐνδείκνυται**, εἰπὼν περὶ αὐτοῦ
>
> "ἀλλ' ἤτοι Μενέλαος ἐπιτροχάδην ἀγόρευε

[41] Text of Syrianus from Rabe (1893); translation my own.
[42] Kennedy (1957) 23.

παῦρα μέν, ἀλλὰ μάλα λιγέως."

εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τὸ τροχαλὸν καὶ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν τῆς ῥητορικῆς δι' αὐτοῦ εἰκονίσαι βουλόμενος, λέγων περὶ αὐτοῦ

"ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὄπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἵη
καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίῃσιν,
οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆι γ' ερίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος."

ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἦν ἐγνωσμένον τοῖς ἥρωσι, φέρει τὸν Φοίνικα πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λέγοντα

"τοὕνεκά με προέηκε διδασκέμεναι τάδε πάντα,
μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων."

But there is a second main point on which we argue: whether in fact there was rhetoric among the heroes. For it was necessary, and rightly necessary, that they, having appeared first from the gods, should make use of the crafts of the gods. Let Homer therefore be the divine witness to us of all these things, since he led the investigations for us concerning these things both into evidence and into clarity. **For he, wishing to mark for us that among the heroes was found each individual [type] of the quality of rhetoric, presented Nestor as a counselor,** about whom he says:

"But Nestor the sweet-speaker rose up among them, the fluent assembly-speaker of the Pylians, from whose tongue poured a voice sweeter than honey." [Il. 1.247-9]

And the poet displayed that Nestor possessed the sweetness and the attractive quality of rhetoric: but he demonstrated earnestness and winsomeness through the rhetoric of Menelaus, saying about him:

"But Menelaus spoke out swiftly, few things, but very sweetly." [Il. 3.213-14]

And he presents Odysseus, wishing to depict through him the swiftness and sharpness and vehemence and brilliance of rhetoric, saying about him:

"But when he let loose his great voice from his chest, and words resembling wintry snowflakes, then no other mortal could compete with Odysseus." [Il. 3.221-3]

And the fact that the name of rhetoric was known to the heroes, he transmits [by means of] Phoenix saying to Achilles:

"For this reason he sent me to teach these many things: that you should be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds." [Il.9.442-3][43] (*Prolegomena Artis Rhetoricae,* Rabe 22-23; emphasis added)

Like Pseudo-Plutarch, this author treats the subject as a (rhetorically-structured) argument, progressing logically from one point to the next and providing examples

[43] Text of this anonymous *prolegomenon* from Rabe (1931); translation my own.

from the text of the *Iliad* in support of his claims. "It was necessary," he insists, for the heroes to have had access to the crafts (δημιουργήματα) of the gods; he implies that as an intermediate generation between gods and mortals, they were endowed with heightened skills, one of which was the ability to speak rhetorically. This ability, he emphasizes, was systematically depicted by Homer: our anonymous author conspicuously uses seven different verbs to express the poet's work of rhetorical representation (σημᾶναι, εἰσάγει, ἐξέφηνεν, ἐνδείκνυται, εἰσφέρει, εἰκονίσαι, φέρει). Like other commentators, this author identifies Nestor, Menelaus, and Odysseus as the *Iliad*'s three stylistic exemplars; in contrast to others, however, he does not make them headline the three conventional registers of style (grand, middle, and plain), but characterizes the distinctive speech of each by means of descriptive nouns. His final contention brings the argument to its culmination: not only the concept, but indeed the very term "rhetoric" (or at least its related agent noun) was known to the heroes, as evidenced by Phoenix' phrase μύθων ῥητῆρ'.

Nor is it only Greek-speaking critics who observe and comment on the question of Homeric rhetoric. Cicero discusses the history of oratory in the *Brutus*, composed in 46 B.C.E., and seeks to answer the following questions concerning orators: *quando esse coepissent, qui etiam et quales fuissent* (20). Curiously, Cicero seems to give two accounts of the origins of rhetoric in Greece in quick succession: the first, sections 26-39, claims that orators and written records of oratory first appeared in Athens, with Pericles and Themistocles being the first practitioners. Having completed a brief history of Greek oratory, however, Cicero returns the discussion of origins to an earlier point in time with the statement *nec tamen dubito quin habuerit vim magnam semper oratio* in section 40. He continues:

> *neque enim iam Troicis temporibus tantum laudis in dicendo Ulixi tribuisset Homerus et Nestori, quorum alterum vim habere voluit, alterum suavitatem, nisi iam tum esset honos eloquentiae; neque ipse poeta hic tam [idem] ornatus in dicendo ac plane orator fuisset.*

> Surely even in Trojan times Homer would not have allotted such praise to Ulysses and Nestor for their speech unless even then eloquence had enjoyed

honour—to the one, you will recall, he attributed force, to the other charm—nor indeed otherwise had the poet himself been so accomplished in utterance and so completely the orator.[44] (40)

Cicero's inclusion of Homeric figures in his catalogue of oratorical history would seem to place him within the tradition that I have been tracing. He identifies the same exemplars of eloquence—Odysseus and Nestor—as do his Greek counterparts, and introduces Latin equivalents to some of the desirable qualities of speech that we have seen in the Greek sources, such as *vis* for τὸ σφοδρόν (the term applied to Odysseus' speech in the anonymous *prolegomenon* above) and *suavitas* for τὸ προσηνές (applied to Nestor above). He locates *eloquentia* in "Trojan times," and labels Homer an "orator." But it is not clear that Cicero views this Homeric instantiation of "eloquence" on a par with the historical orators and written handbooks that he had cited in his first survey of Greek oratory. By providing these two parallel histories, Cicero may indeed represent the beginning of an opinion that is now well-entrenched in modern histories of rhetoric, one that I will explore in section II below: that Homer and his characters were capable of *eloquence*, but possessed no notion of rhetoric as a theory or technical discipline.

Quintilian, writing his *Institutio Oratoria* at the end of the first century C.E., notes that the *Iliad* depicts both instruction in rhetoric as well as different registers of rhetorical style:

> *...apud Homerum et praeceptorem Phoenicem cum agendi tum etiam loquendi, et oratores plures, et omne in tribus ducibus orationis genus, et certamina quoque proposita eloquentiae inter iuvenes invenimus, quin in caelatura clipei Achillis et lites sunt et actores.*
>
> Even in Homer we find Phoenix as an instructor not only of conduct but of speaking, while a number of orators are mentioned, the various styles are represented by the speeches of three of the chiefs and the young men are set to contend among themselves in contests of eloquence: moreover lawsuits and pleaders are represented on the shield of Achilles.[45] (2.17.8)

[44] Text of the *Brutus* from Malcovati (1970); translation from Hendrickson (1971).
[45] Text of the *Institutio* from Winterbottom (1970); translation from Butler (1921).

"The speeches of three of the chiefs" refers, of course, to Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus, the by-now well-established representatives of the three *genera dicendi* (to use Gellius' phrase).[46] Later in his treatise, Quintilian makes perhaps the strongest statement yet concerning rhetoric in Homer, claiming that Homer displays "every department of eloquence" and "all the rules of art" for the different genres of rhetoric:

> *omnibus eloquentiae partibus exemplum et ortum dedit...tum copia tum brevitate mirabilis, nec poetica modo sed oratoria virtute eminentissimus. nam ut de laudibus exhortationibus consolationibus taceam, nonne vel nonus liber, quo missa ad Achillem legatio continetur, vel in primo inter duces illa contentio vel dictae in secundo sententiae omnis litium atque consiliorum explicant artes?...iam similitudines, amplificationes, exempla, digressus, signa rerum et argumenta †ceteraque quae probandi ac refutandi sunt† ita multa ut etiam qui de artibus scripserunt plurima earum rerum testimonia ab hoc poeta petant.*
>
> [Homer] has given us a model and an inspiration for every department of eloquence...remarkable at once for his fullness and his brevity, and supreme not merely for poetic, but for oratorical power as well. For, to say nothing of his eloquence, which he shows in praise, exhortation and consolation, do not the ninth book containing the embassy to Achilles, the first describing the quarrel between the chiefs, or the speeches delivered by the counselors in the second, display all the rules of art to be followed in forensic or deliberative oratory?...Then consider his similes, his amplifications, his illustrations, digressions, indications of fact, inferences, and all the other methods of proof and refutation which he employs. They are so numerous that the majority of writers on the principles of rhetoric have gone to his works for examples of all these things. (10.1.46-49)

This litany of rhetorical devices allegedly employed by Homer is impressive, but less illuminating than is Pseudo-Plutarch's similar treatment, as Quintilian fails to provide any but the most vague of examples. It is left to the reader to infer which parts of the Homeric speeches mentioned display the "rules of art to be followed in forensic or deliberative oratory." Clearly, however, examples (*testimonia*) drawn from Homer were common in the rhetorical commentaries of Quintilian's day. Quintilian returns to Homer's primacy in the history of rhetoric at several points in his work, citing Priam's supplication to Achilles in Book 24 as an example of the use of an epilogue-speech

[46] For more on Quintilian's *Institutio*, see Reinhardt and Winterbottom's (2006) commentary on Book 2, which includes an up-to-date bibliography on the work.

(*epilogus*) (10.1.50), and the familiar threesome of Odysseus, Nestor, and Menelaus to illustrate the different registers of oratorical style (12.10.64).

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This survey of ancient views on the existence of rhetoric in Homer is certainly not exhaustive, but it is my hope that it has sufficiently established the fact of a tradition making such a claim, with various degrees of elaboration. Along with these extant references, there is evidence for discussion of the subject in lost works from antiquity. Among the latter are two treatises by the second-century C.E. Stoic grammarian Telephos of Pergamon, attested in the Suda: Περὶ τῶν παρ̕ Ὁμήρῳ σχημάτων ῥητορικῶν (in two books), and Περὶ τῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ῥητορικῆς, titles which tantalize with their suggestion of an analytical investigation of rhetorical "figures" in Homer. But for all the energy devoted in ancient scholarship to this notion, it is one that has largely disappeared from modern analysis of both Homer and ancient rhetoric. Even the modern understanding of how the ancients viewed rhetoric in Homer is impoverished, as few historians of rhetoric seem to have tracked the diachronic breadth and critical depth of these ancient claims.[47] Kennedy examines a few of them in his article "The

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[47] Buffiere (1973) is a partial exception, although his focus is on ancient views of Homer, not on the history of rhetoric. His brief survey of the subject in question (in a section within the chapter "La Cité selon Homère" entitled "L'art oratoire" (349-54)) is the most sustained attention given to the subject that I have found in modern scholarship. The narrow scope of modern classicists' interest in and study of ancient literary criticism generally has been observed by Lawrence Kim (2001), whose dissertation concerns the practice of exegetical "supplementing" by ancient readers of Homer. Kim notes that in modern study of ancient literary criticism (analogous, I would argue, to modern study of ancient rhetoric), much has been omitted or ignored because of the "incompatibility between ancient and modern ways of treating poetry." (13) For instance, Kim writes,

> surveys of Archaic and Classical literary criticism concentrate on theories about poetry—*mimesis*, poetic inspiration, *psuchagogia*—and give the impression that we possess virtually no interpretation of specific poetic passages except for sections of Aristophanes' *Frogs* and Plato's *Protagoras* (neither of which concern Homer), until we reach Aristotle's *Poetics* in the late fourth century. But there is a considerable body of Homeric interpretation that survives from this period—in historians, rhetoricians, and philosophers, among others. Much of this criticism is admittedly not what we would characterize as 'literary'; each treats Homeric poetry in the context of other matters: history, theology, linguistics, etc., and not *qua* poetry, that is, not as literature...The much broader range of interpretive techniques and concerns—engaging with and reading Homer in the light of extra-literary interests—is effaced, with the result that modern conceptions of ancient poetic interpretation are heavily distorted. Surely it is significant that, despite [ancient] intellectuals' lack of interest in poetry *per se*, they felt that the interpretation of Homer was of serious importance for ethics, rhetoric, history, etc. (13-14)

Ancient Dispute Over Rhetoric in Homer," but sees this notion as a late (Hellenistic and beyond) development, arising out of the erstwhile polemic between rhetoric and philosophy as an argument (on the part of the philosophical schools) against the rhetoricians' claim that rhetoric was a τέχνη.[48] Not surprisingly, then, Kennedy is dismissive of the actual claim that rhetorical theory can be discovered in Homer's speeches, as evidenced in the following sentiment: "One would suspect that grammarians and scholiasts were the first to note the existence of formal rhetoric in Homer, since they would have training in rhetorical systems and quite likely would be lacking the historical sense which might have told them that Homer was innocent of the rules which he seems to illustrate."[49]

Is the view represented by the preceding variety of ancient authors—that rhetoric can be found in the speeches of Homeric characters—indeed merely the product of later grammarians' misguided zeal? Before offering my own theory and turning to the Homeric text itself, I will briefly review the state of modern scholarship concerning rhetoric's origins and history.

II. Homer as Rhetorician: Modern Opinions

This robust showing of ancient testimony on the subject of rhetoric in Homer is in contrast with nearly all modern accounts of the history of rhetoric. These accounts (Kennedy (1963), Cole (1991), Schiappa (1999), and Pernot (2000) being the primary examples) vary in emphasis and approach, but all generally agree on the role of Homeric poetry in their histories: it is a role innocent of any theory or

While my project differs from Kim's in that it is primarily focused on the Homeric text, with ancient readers summoned to provide a degree of corroboration rather than as the central argument, I find Kim's efforts to treat ancient criticism seriously and on its own terms to be a valuable alternative to much of the existing treatment of the subject.

[48] Kennedy (1957).

[49] *Ibid*, 23. Similarly, Pernot briefly reviews some of the same passages that I have introduced here, but concludes, "Quelles que soient la vigueur et la précision avec lesquelles les Anciens ont développé le thème de « la rhétorique d'Homère », il n'est évidemment pas question pour nous, Modernes, de les suivre dans cette voie."(19)

systematic craft, and summed up by Cole's use of the phrase "native eloquence" to account for sophisticated patterns of speech that occur in Homer.[50]

Kennedy and Pernot both mention Homer in their introductory chapters, which cover Greek history and literature up to the fifth century B.C.E.—before the "invention" of rhetoric, by their calculation. Kennedy's chapter is entitled "Persuasion in Greek Literature before 400 B.C.E.;" Pernot's is "La rhétorique avant la rhétorique." In describing the attitude of the Homeric epics toward speech, Pernot draws upon Detienne's notions of "parole magico-religieuse" ("magico-religious speech") and "parole-dialogue" ("dialogue-speech"):

> Certains passages s'apparentent à la conception d'une efficace intrinsèque, la parole des « maîtres de vérité », qui sont aussi maîtres de tromperie...Cette parole-dialogue est porteuse de réflexion, mais aussi d'émotion ou de ruse. Elle recourt à des arguments, à des effets de structure et de style. *Cependant, elle n'a pas de formes codifiées (comme seront codifiées plus tard les formes du discours rhétorique).*[51] (Emphasis added)

Pernot does no more than speak in vague terms about Homer's depiction of speech; he goes on to say that the poems may exhibit "une pratique de la parole et une importance accordée au discours."[52] What they do not do, according to Pernot, is betray any knowledge of formal elements of persuasive speech ("formes codifiées"). Presumably, any persuasion effected by Homer's characters is due to the mysterious quality of "intrinsic efficaciousness," and is brought about by "emotion and trickery" rather than by systematic deployment of rhetorical techniques. Kennedy is slightly more open than is Pernot to the notion of a Homeric awareness of rhetoric on some level, although he attributes this to a universal consciousness of "certain critical principles":

> When study of rhetoric began in the fifth century B.C.E. much of what was said was merely a theorizing of conventional practice. Techniques of rhetorical theory are already evident in the speeches of the Homeric poems to such a degree that later antiquity found formal rhetoric everywhere in Homer and on the basis of *Iliad*, 15.283 f., even conjured up a picture of practice declamations among the

[50] Cole (1991) 40.
[51] Pernot (2000) 20.
[52] *Ibid*, 20.

Homeric heroes.[53] *Speech in epic is generally treated as an irrational power, seen in the ability to move an audience and in its effect on a speaker himself, and is thus inspiration, a gift of the gods. But it is difficult to believe that there did not exist in all periods certain critical principles, generally, if tacitly, accepted.* The fact that Phoenix in the *Iliad* (9.442 f.) claims to have been sent to teach Achilles to be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds is an indication of the existence of some kind of rhetorical training."[54] (Italics added)

As we have seen in several passages from antiquity quoted above, the ancients did much more than treat speech in the Homeric poems as "an irrational power" bestowed by the gods (a notion that, if anything, is more Hesiodic than Homeric).[55] We have seen above that Plato calls the heroes "sophists, clever speech-makers and dialecticians" (σοφοὶ ἦσαν καὶ ῥήτορες δεινοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ), Eratosthenes attributes "knowledge concerning speech" (φρόνησίς περὶ λόγους) to Odysseus, and Pseudo-Plutarch refers to the embassy to Achilles as "orators" who use "various techniques" to persuade their listener (ποικίλαις τέχναις ποιεῖ χρωμένους τοὺς ῥήτορας). These critics seem to be taking a more robust view of Homer's knowledge of rhetoric than does Kennedy, who views speech in the Homeric poems as more than irrational, but less than systematic. Kennedy's attitude towards Homer shows a tendency typical among modern scholars of rhetoric, namely to characterize him as the unsophisticated but artistically-gifted bard. The attitude is summarized by Kennedy's claim that "the most interesting aspects of Homeric rhetoric are its native vigor and its relation to the concept of the orator which was later to develop."[56]

Cole takes a more radical position than other historians of rhetoric in claiming that the "true founders" of the discipline were Plato and Aristotle, not their fifth-century predecessors Corax, Tisias, Gorgias, and the writers of technical handbooks on the

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[53] Kennedy cites Quintilian 2.17.8 and Radermacher's (1951) collection of passages on Homeric rhetoric—many of which I discussed in section I above—as support for this claim.
[54] Kennedy (1963) 35-6.
[55] See Solmsen (1954): "Effective speech is for Hesiod not one of the two outstanding excellences of man [as it is in Homer, according to *Iliad* 9.443] but one of the two gifts of the Muses." (5) I will discuss further the differences between Homer's and Hesiod's conceptions of speech in Chapter 3.
[56] Kennedy (1963) 39.

subject. He sees literacy as essential for producing analytical thinking about rhetoric,[57] and consequently posits the "basically 'arhetorical' character of early Greek views of artistic discourse," given the oral nature of that discourse.[58] Speech in Archaic poetry, according to Cole, has no connection to or knowledge of technique. He draws a strong distinction between the "eloquence" that occurs in Homer, and the rhetoric of the Classical era:

> What does come out in Homeric speech is eloquence: a combination of volubility, native gift for holding the attention of an audience, and a mind well stocked with accurate memories and sound counsels...Possession of "a tongue that speaks sweetly" (Tyrtaeus 12.8) is simply another instance...of a natural quality or external possession that is not worth having unless accompanied by bravery in battle.[59]

The theories of Plato and Aristotle, for Cole, represent a clear break with the past because it is in their work that a "metalanguage" for analyzing rhetoric first comes into play. According to the definitional parameters that Cole has set for rhetoric—that it involves written, explicit theory with its own technical terminology—Plato and Aristotle may indeed be the first practitioners. Whether this definition is sufficient to describe rhetoric in ancient Greece is a question I will take up in the following section.

In his 1999 work *The Origins of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*, Schiappa advocates a rethinking of current notions about the emergence of rhetorical theory, based on the late (Platonic) dating of the coinage of the technical term *rhêtorikê*. This coinage, he argues, imposed a radical change on the concept of persuasive speaking: as with all emerging disciplines, the creation of a technical vocabulary indicates the theorizing of a particular practice.[60] Like Cole, Schiappa points to the shift from an oral

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[57] "Written eloquence [is] the prerequisite for an analysis of the working of eloquence in general." Cole (1991) 112.

[58] Cole (1991) 41.

[59] *Ibid*, 40.

[60] Schiappa (1999) 11ff.; in constructing this argument, he cites among others the work of Havelock, who has asked, "May not all logical thinking be a product of Greek alphabetic literacy?" (Havelock (1986) 39) But Halverson's critique of Havelock reasoning applies to Schiappa and Cole as well: "The problem is that [Havelock] seems to want to make alphabetic literacy the *sole* cause of the change [in Greek thought during the classical period], as if written language in and of itself created thought. As is so often the case, Havelock's arguments rest on a *post hoc propter hoc* fallacy: if writing preceded logical though it must have

to a literate culture as critical to the development of a theorized understanding of disciplines in fourth-century Greece. Schiappa thus asserts that "it is somewhat anachronistic to talk of 'theories of rhetoric' prior to that time [the fourth century]."[61]

Important to the discussion of the place of rhetoric in Homer is Schiappa's definitional distinction between rhetoric as theory and rhetoric as practice:

> A distinction needs to be made between the use of the word *rhetoric* to denote the practice of oratory and the use of the word to denote a specific domain of theorizing. The first sense, rhetoric as persuasive speaking or oratory...obviously occurred long before Plato, but is distinct from the second sense, the history of rhetorical theory. Since traditional rhetoric is as old as civilization, rhetoric as a practice is coextensive with the history of society (Kennedy 1980, 8)...This book is concerned with the status of conceptual or metarhetoric that attempts to theorize about oratory (cf. Kennedy 1994, 3)."[62]

Though using a different methodology and approach, Schiappa makes the same argument that Cole does: that "metarhetoric," rhetoric as theory, did not arise until explicit terminology and treatises describing it arose, namely in the works of Plato and Aristotle. I would argue that Schiappa and Cole—along with other modern scholars of rhetoric—have overlooked the presence of a systematic and strategic employment of rhetoric, indicative of theoretical understanding (although not an overtly technical "meta-vocabulary"), occurring much earlier than the fourth century.

III. Introduction to thesis: methodology, definitions, parameters

That Homer was the "father" or "inventor" of rhetoric is not an original claim; its proponents were numerous in the ancient world, as we have seen. The claim of this dissertation is more pointed: that Homer not only demonstrates an awareness of rhetoric via the speech of his characters, but that the patterns of persuasion which he depicts enact, in very specific ways, the rhetorical theory that arose in Classical Greece, most

caused it...He observes, astutely enough, that written texts permitted reflective perusal and retrospective topicalization that led, or could lead, to the development of logical categories; but then he leaps to the conclusion that this would be impossible under acoustic conditions. This is certainly a false conclusion, for it is quite possible to reflect in the same way on an oral presentation." (Halverson (1992) 160)

[61] Schiappa (1999) 11.

[62] *Ibid*, 21-22.

fully expressed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Contrary to the characterization of Homeric speech found in the modern histories of rhetoric that we have just surveyed—that it consists of "native" eloquence or inspiration—I will argue that the Homeric narrator presents speaking as a technical skill, one that must be taught and learned, and one that varies according to speaker, situation, and audience. And while numerous critics have analyzed or commented on the phenomenon of direct speech in Homer, their interest has tended to focus on the way that speech reflects the characters' personalities and the poet's powers of characterization (e.g. A. Parry, Friedrich and Redfield, Frobish, Griffin, Gill, Martin). Few scholars, if any, have examined direct speech in light of the supposedly later development of formal rhetoric.[63] In a sense, then, I am arguing for the need to revisit the ancient opinion of Homer's relationship to rhetoric—albeit with a comprehensive methodological approach, rather than as a doxographical exercise. I am aware of the pitfalls of such an undertaking; as Pernot cautions when dismissing the ancients, "il faut se garder d'une interprétation rétrospective, qui plaque *a posteriori* l'art rhétorique sur des textes qui ne le connaissaient pas encore."[64] I believe that the way to avoid such anachronism is to approach the issue with a comprehensive look at speeches throughout the whole text of a Homeric poem, and to analyze them according to a consistent standard for ancient rhetoric. This will be the task of Chapter 2.

There are many indications in the *Iliad* that the Homeric composer—and the Homeric heroes themselves—conceive of speech as a craft, something that can be taught, learned, and improved upon. The most basic evidence for this is the frequent comparison made between two different heroes in terms of their speaking prowess. The character of Antenor, in conversation with Helen during the *teikhoskopia*, compares the

[63] Karp (1977) is an exception. In his article "Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric," Karp contends that Homer had "an implicit theory, or at least a set of consistent claims, about how effective persuasion functions, and on whom it functions." (237) Although the scope of Karp's evidence and analysis of Homeric passages is limited, and he offers few comparisons between Homeric rhetoric and the formal system developed by Aristotle, some of his observations are similar to my own. I disagree, however, with Karp's conclusion that the presence of rhetoric in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* implies that Homer "subscribed" to certain philosophical views, such as "paternalism, for the practice of which rhetoric is a primary instrument." (239)
[64] Pernot (2000) 19.

speech styles of Menelaus and Odysseus in the famous passage in Book 3.[65] The narrator, in 18.252, contrasts the abilities of two Trojan heroes thus: "But he [Polydamas] was better in words (μύθοισιν. . .ἐνίκα), the other [Hector] with the spear (ἔγχει) far better." The embassy to Achilles in Book 9 presents the widely divergent styles and strategies of three characters trying to achieve the same goal, inviting the hearer or reader to compare the persuasive power of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax. Phoenix himself claims that he has taught Achilles to be a "speaker of words" (μύθων ῥητῆρ) as well as a "doer of deeds" (9.443)—the passage most often quoted by ancient critics as evidence of rhetoric in Homer. One of the most explicitly meta-rhetorical expressions in the *Iliad* is the following line, put in the mouth of Aeneas: "The range of words is wide, and their variance (**ἐπέων** δὲ πολὺς **νομὸς** ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα)..." (20.249)[66] The choice of the phrase νομὸς ἐπέων indicates a recognition of speech as having an enclosed area, with boundaries and rules; but also as "broad" (πολύς) and ranging (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα). This *sententia*, and particularly the word νομός ("range, district"), attributes qualities of delimitation, order, and thus calculation to speech. Indeed, the scholia on this passage catalogue some of the activities denoted by the phrase πολὺς νομός, and they are what would later be considered the functions of rhetoric: "to distribute and to scan many things; to blame and to praise" (πολλὰ νεμηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιδραμεῖν, καὶ ψέξαι καὶ ἐπαινέσαι).[67] The accumulated evidence of such meta-rhetorical passages (of which more are catalogued at the end of the chapter below), combined with the persuasive techniques evident in many of the direct speeches in the *Iliad* (detailed in Chapter 2), suggest that Homer was operating from a theoretical conception of rhetoric.[68]

The driving questions for this project are twofold: first, does the Homeric composer indeed employ a system of speech that includes conscious techniques of persuasion and a deliberate variation of registers? And second, how can we account for

[65] For a more extended discussion of this passage, see Martin (1989) 15-17, 95-6.
[66] Text of Homer from Allen and Munro (1920); translation from Lattimore (1951), unless otherwise noted.
[67] Schol. A ad *Il.* 20.249.
[68] I use the term "theoretical" here to denote the deployment of a conscious and rule-governed system. To be sure, not all speech that occurs in real life or is depicted in literature is consciously calculated according to rules of persuasion in order to achieve a desired outcome. But some is; and such speech is generally deemed "rhetorical," with the understanding that a system underlies that label.

such a system, if present: was it a wholesale invention of the composer, or one born out of an observation of the speech patterns of real-life individuals? Attending these questions are several others, which I will address in Chapters 3 and 4. Namely, is Homer a major (and largely unacknowledged) source for or influence on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*? How did the thread of rhetoric get passed down from Homer to Aristotle, crossing lines of time, genre (poetry to prose), and medium (oral to written)?[69] What effect did the explicit rhetorical theory of the fourth century have on Greek poetry, particularly epic, post-Aristotle? To answer these questions, I must necessarily deal with theories about the nature of rhetoric, invoking the ancient tension between natural and learned skill—φύσις and τέχνη.

In arguing that rhetoric exists in Homeric poetry, I will not present the entirety of the Homeric corpus as evidence, for I do not consider the poetic/narrative voice to be rhetorical in this robust sense (with technical connotations prescient of Aristotle). A lack of distinction between this narrative voice and direct speech leads to many of the comments about Homer's rhetorical genius from ancient enthusiasts; likewise, the narrative voice is almost exclusively the focus of any modern scholarship referring to the "rhetoric" of Homer.[70] Instead, my argument will focus on direct speeches in the *Iliad*

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[69] Although the dating of the composition of the Homeric epics is subject to debate, the period at which they began to be circulated in written versions is perhaps more relevant to the question of Homer's influence on rhetorical theory, and Aristotle in particular. See Nagy (2003) on the textualization debate; his "evolutionary model" for the formation of Homeric poetry locates a "definitive period, centralized in Athens, with potential texts in the sense of *transcripts*, at any or several points from the middle of the sixth century B.C.E. to the later part of the fourth; this period starts with the reform of Homeric performance traditions in Athens during the regime of the Peisistratidai." (2) The fact that Aristotle quotes Homer at numerous points in the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* (following the precedent of Plato, Isocrates, and the *artium scriptores*, who in the generation(s) before Aristotle all quoted and commented on aspects of the Homeric poems) demonstrates that these poems had already achieved at least the status of "transcript"—"a record of performance," in Nagy's terminology—by the fifth century.

[70] Bakker (1997), for example, sees a connection between Homeric poetry and ancient rhetoric, but is clearly referring to Homer's narrative voice when he observes that "both Homeric poetry and classical rhetorical prose are, each in their own specific and very different ways, the rhetorical enhancement and manipulation of the basic properties of ordinary speech. Both are special speech, based on strategies that are reserved for special performance occasions and meant, in a truly rhetorical sense, to have a special effect on an audience." (129) Likewise Scodel's (2002) discussion of what she calls the "rhetorics" or "rhetorical positions" of Homer—namely, traditionality and disinterestedness—are concerned with the narrative voice, not character speech (65 ff.); and Ford (2002) speaks of "rhetoric" and "rhetorical elements" in early Greek literature in terms of a literary work's total strategy—its persuasiveness or effectiveness in the face of its listening or reading audience (3, *et passim*).

which are intended to persuade; direct speeches provide the most relevant examples for they bear the closest correspondence to later oratory. My definition of "speeches which are intended to persuade" does not include those speeches which consist simply of commands in the imperative, but rather those which bring some type of argument to bear on the desired outcome: logical reasoning, shaming, the offering of incentives, etc.

The first task in presenting this argument is to establish my parameters for defining "rhetoric." There are myriad ways in which rhetoric can be, and has been, defined, from Kennedy's sweepingly general notion of rhetoric as "a form of mental and emotional energy" prior to and more basic than speech[71], to Pernot's relatively specific definition as "a way to produce persuasive speech based upon a certain know-how and even on recipes," behind which lies "a profound and systematic reflection on the nature and functioning of the spoken word."[72] For my purposes, I will operate from a definition based on Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* as that treatise both provides a highly detailed and structured explanation of rhetoric, and represents the most wide-ranging ancient treatment of the subject, having collected and codified the various *technai* that preceded it. Aristotle's short definition is that rhetoric is "the faculty (δύναμις) of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever" (*Rhetoric* I.2.1), and the rest of the *Rhetoric* is the technical and practical expansion of this definition.[73] My working definition, in turn (restated from pages 3-4 above), holds that *Rhetoric is a learned and deliberately-practiced skill, involving the deployment of tropes and techniques, and aimed at winning an audience's approval or assent.*

As my primary data, I have chosen the text of the *Iliad,* which I will hold up to the mirror of the *Rhetoric.* Why, it may be asked, have I chosen the *Iliad*—not other

[71] Kennedy (1998) 3.

[72] Pernot (2005) x.

[73] It might be objected that using Aristotle's definition of rhetoric will lead to circularity, given my contention that Homer constitutes a precursor to Aristotelian rhetoric. This might have been the case if my project were concerned primarily with definitions; but instead, it focuses on the similarities in content and construction of speech in these two authors. Insofar as a working definition of rhetoric is a useful and necessary tool for my project, Aristotle's short definition has the virtue of being fairly universally accepted throughout posterity. The core of my argument will grapple not with this definition, but with the detailed instructional content of *Rhetoric.*

works of Archaic poetry, and not also (or instead) the *Odyssey*? First of all, the Homeric epics provide the largest data set from Archaic literature for the phenomenon that is most analogous to Classical oratory, and hence to rhetoric: direct speeches represented within a narrative frame. Homeric speeches are longer and much more numerous than the speeches found in other Archaic texts (although such speeches—in Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and Pindar, for example—will be examined for their role in the development of rhetoric in Chapter 3), and thus are uniquely able to constitute a significant sample size for testing my claim that there is a systematic employment of rhetorical techniques prior to the so-called "invention" of rhetoric. Pernot articulates some of the properties of embedded speech in Homer that make it a particularly fruitful subject for such analysis:

> L'épopée homérique ne contient pas seulement un usage assidu du discours, mais aussi une réflexion sur le discours...le fait que les discours des personnages sont insérés dans une frame narrative amène un recul critique par rapport à ces discours ; tantôt c'est un autre personnage qui juge le discours qui vient d'être prononcé ; tantôt c'est l'action elle-même qui se charge de montrer, par la suite des événements, si un discours était juste ou non, approprié ou non. Il y a également des cas où plusieurs personnages prononcent à tour de rôle un discours sur le même sujet, ce qui conduit implicitement à une comparaison entre diverses formes d'éloquence.[74]

The second reason for my choice to focus on speeches in the *Iliad*, and refer to the *Odyssey* only incidentally, is because the former provides a sufficiently large body of evidence for my claims about rhetoric in Homer, while the latter adds comparatively little to this evidence. It is clear from even a cursory reading of the *Odyssey* that its speeches are generally of a different nature than those of the *Iliad*, due to the difference in subject matter. There is very little "public" speaking in the *Odyssey*—that is, speeches made for the benefit of an audience, in the setting of an assembly or a battlefield—aside from the obvious set-piece of Odysseus' four-book travel narration at the center of the poem, which, in both form and function, bears more resemblance to narrative than to direct speech. Instead, speech in the *Odyssey* centers on private, conversational

[74] Pernot (2000) 15-16.

interactions, most often between two individuals; it is thus well-suited to structural analyses such as that found in Beck's *Homeric Conversation* or Larrain's *Struktur der Reden in der Odyssee 1-8*, but less relevant to an analysis of rhetorical speech. Beck notes that whereas the *Odyssey* makes extensive use of one-on-one conversation, "the *Iliad* depicts its characters engaged in a wide range of speech exchange systems other than one-on-one conversation. These systems, which include vaunts, challenges, assemblies, athletic games, and laments, either do not appear in the *Odyssey* or appear in a very limited way."[75] In addition, the *Iliad* is a poem filled with opportunities for and attempts at persuasion by virtue of its setting in war; the military struggle is mirrored in a constant dialectical exchange between the warring sides, as well as among them.

Because of the two intertwined aspects of this project, I have two major aims in mind. On the one hand, I am attempting to build on the current state of scholarship on ancient rhetoric, probing the boundaries that currently demarcate its origins, history, and relationship to poetry (particularly Homeric poetry). On the other hand, I seek to refine and extend scholarship treating direct speech in Homer by suggesting the dimension of a consistent rhetorical awareness and technique on the level of both style and argument within these speeches. Most significant for this aim is the demonstration of consistent patterns of relationship between ancient rhetorical theorists and earlier poetry (Chapter 2), patterns that have gone previously undetected. Along with using comparative evidence for rhetoric in several societies to shed light on my examination of speech and its relationship to persuasion, I look diachronically at the awareness and use of rhetoric in ancient Greek poetry (Chapter 3), and consider the possible reasons for and implications of Aristotle's failure to acknowledge Homer as a major influence on the practice of rhetoric (Chapter 4). Any discussion and analysis of the speech of individuals in a literary text must take into account how that speech is being crafted by the author or composer to depict and differentiate his characters (*ethopoiia*); I will touch on this issue in my examination of Homer's representation of rhetoric. Finally, this project reexamines the history of rhetoric through the fourth century B.C.E., asking what role Homer played

[75] Beck (2005) 149.

in this history. It questions the conceptual boundaries that have been erected between poetry and prose, and between genre categories such as "poetry" and "rhetoric," beginning with Aristotle and continuing into the present.

IV. Examples of rhetorical awareness in the *Iliad*

To conclude this chapter, I present a collection of instances in the *Iliad* that suggest an awareness, on the part of both the narrator and the characters, of strategies of persuasive speech. This awareness generally shows itself in reflective analysis of speech; as such, the following constitute what I would call "metarhetorical" passages in the *Iliad*. Some of them have long been used to support the argument that Homer knew and employed rhetoric (they will be familiar from the ancient testimony discussed above); others have gone previously unremarked in connection with this topic, to my knowledge:

1) Odysseus' use of different exhortation strategies based upon the particular audience, 2.188-206:

> Whenever he encountered **some king, or man of influence** (τινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα), he would stand beside him and **with soft words** (ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν) try to restrain him: "Excellency! It does not become you to be frightened like any coward. Rather hold fast and check the rest of the people..." When he saw **some man of the people** (δήμου τ' ἄνδρα) who was shouting, **he would** strike at him with his staff, and **reprove him** (ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ) also: "Excellency! Sit still and listen to what others tell you, to those who are better men than you, you skulker and coward..."

Odysseus tailors his approach to persuasion according to the social class of the addressee, not only verbally—using soft words and reasoned arguments ("it does not become you...") for the kings, but imperative commands and insults for the common soldiers—but also physically. He literally stands on equal footing (παραστάς) with the kings, and beats the soldiers into action. The narrator's characterization of the speech-act involved in each rhetorical approach reinforces the status hierarchy at play: Martin's work has shown that "the word muthos implies authority and power; epos implies

nothing about these values."[76] It is no surprise, then, that Odysseus is depicted as using ἔπεα to address the kings and a μῦθος to command the commoners.

2) Antenor's description of the contrast between Menelaus' and Odysseus' speech, 3.212-224:

> Now before all when both of them **spun their speech and their counsels** (μύθους καὶ μήδεα ὕφαινον), Menelaos indeed spoke rapidly, in few words but exceedingly lucid, since he was no long speaker nor one who wasted his words, though he was only a young man. But when that other drove to his feet, resourceful Odysseus, he would just stand and stare down, eyes fixed on the ground beneath him, nor would he gesture with the staff backward and forward, but hold it clutched hard in front of him, like any man who knows nothing. Yes, you would call him a sullen man, and a fool likewise. But when he let the great voice go from his chest, and the words came drifting down like the winter snows, then no other mortal man beside could stand up against Odysseus. Then we wondered less beholding Odysseus' outward appearance.

More a eulogy for the forcefulness and eloquence of these two speakers than a detailed analysis, Antenor's observations nevertheless bespeak an attentiveness to differences in speech qualities and the effect produced by speakers on an audience. In addition, his use of the verb ὑφαίνω ("to weave," "to contrive") with regard to speech suggests calculation and craft on the part of the speaker.

3) Nestor's commentary on Diomedes' speaking and persuasive ability, 9.53-62:

> Son of Tydeus, beyond others you are strong in battle, and in counsel also are noblest among all men of your own age. Not one man of all the Achaians will belittle your words nor speak against them. Yet **you have not made complete your argument** (οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων), since you are a young man still and could even be my own son and my youngest born of all; yet still **you argue in wisdom** (πεπνυμένα βάζεις) with the Argive kings, since **all you have spoken was spoken fairly** (κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες). But let me speak, since I can call myself older than you are, and **go through the whole matter** (πάντα διίξομαι), since there is none who can dishonor the thing I say, not even powerful Agamemnon.

Nestor critiques Diomedes' failure to achieve a τέλος μύθων and contrasts this with his own ability to "go through the whole matter" (that is, both encouraging the disheartened Achaean army and at the same time humoring the cowardly Agamemnon)

[76] Martin (1989) 22-3.

in his speech. I will discuss the significance of this speech in greater depth in Chapter 2 (72 ff.); in the present context it is simply worth noting that Nestor—as Antenor had done in the previous passage—applies qualitative and comparative judgments to speech. Nestor's words indicate an *awareness* of what elements are successful and unsuccessful for persuasion, and a conception of speech as a skill—a skill that, according to Nestor, increases with practice and experience.

4) The wary introductory comments of Achilles in response to Odysseus' embassy speech, 9.309-314:

> **Without consideration** for you (ἀπηλεγέως, "forthrightly"[77]) I must make my answer...[so] that you may not come one after another, and sit by me, and **speak softly** (τρύζητε). For as I detest the doorways of Death, I detest that man who hides one thing in the depths of his heart, and speaks forth another. But I will speak to you the way it seems best to me.

The use of speech for deceit and manipulation will be one of Plato's major complaints against rhetoric in the Gorgias; but Achilles recognized this as a problem long before the rise of the Sophists. The distinction between open, forthright speech and guileful, manipulative speech is one that recurs in the *Iliad*, and the latter type is especially associated with Odysseus. Antenor's Book 3 observations had pitted the "exceedingly lucid" Menelaus against the πολύμητις Odysseus, with his snowstorm-shower of words; the Book 9 embassy draws an implicit contrast between the three speakers (crafty Odysseus, rambling Phoenix, and straightforward Ajax); and the prominent Odyssean epithet πολύτροπος has been seen to refer to his wily speech (as in Antisthenes' analysis above).

5) Phoenix's words to Achilles, 9.442-3:

> Therefore he sent me along with you to teach you of all these matters, **to make you a speaker of words and one who accomplished in action** (μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων).

This is the most commonly-cited statement for ancient commentators making the argument for rhetoric in Homer, as it provides a tidy summation of evidence. There is

[77] Hainsworth (1993) 103: "ἀπηλεγέως is 'forthrightly' (< ἀπό in a negative sense + ἀλεγ-ω)."

the vocabulary of oratory/rhetoric, seen in the term ῥητήρ; and there is indication that Homeric characters viewed speaking as a matter for *didaxis*, and therefore as a *technê*.

6) Nestor urging Patroclus to convince Achilles to rejoin the battle, 11.792-3 (repeated by Patroclus to Eurypylos, 15.403-4):

> Who knows if, with God helping, **you might trouble his spirit with entreaty** (θυμὸν ὀρίναις παρειπών), since the **persuasion** (παραίφασίς) of a friend is a strong thing.

Nestor's gnomic statement about the persuasion of a friend (παραίφασίς carries the connotations of "encouragement" as well as "beguilement" (*LSJ*)) again points to a conception among the Iliadic characters of the power of speech. In addition, it acknowledges that the relationship between speaker and addressee is of critical importance to persuasion—something that Aristotle will establish at length in his *Rhetoric* when discussing the orator's *êthos*.

7) The exchange between Polydamas and Hector, 12.211-250: Polydamas begins his speech by saying "Hektor, somehow in assembly you move ever against me **though I speak excellently** (ἐσθλὰ φραζομένῳ)" (211-12). Hector begins his response with the words, "**Your mind knows how to contrive a saying better than this one** (οἶσθα καὶ ἄλλον μῦθον ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοῆσαι)" (232); and ends it with a threat of death if Polydamas turns any soldier away from fighting by "**beguiling him with your arguments** (παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν)" (249). This exchange, with its dynamics of power and persuasion, will receive fuller treatment in Chapter 2 (28 ff.). Of interest here is the two Trojans' clash over the use of speech. Polydamas cites his own excellence in speaking as reason for Hector to assent to his plans; Hector keeps the quarrel centered on speaking prowess, but finds fault with Polydamas on two somewhat contradictory counts: at the beginning, he decries the poor quality of Polydamas' speech (because he had criticized Hector's plan); at the end, he accuses Polydamas of abusing his persuasive power by "beguiling" the soldiers to cowardly action. Persuasive speech, in this exchange, is a locus for debate among the characters, an abstract concept about which qualitative (if disputed) judgments can be made.

8) The Homeric narrator's comments on the respective strengths of Polydamas and Hector, 18.252:

> But he [Polydamas] was better in words, the other [Hector] with the spear far better (ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἂρ μύθοισιν, ὁ δ' ἔγχεϊ πόλλον ἐνίκα).

This statement reinforces what we have already seen, namely the fact that standards of speech (good, bad; better, worse; persuasive, unpersuasive) exist in the minds of both characters and narrator.

9) A legal dispute (occurring in a marketplace) depicted in one of the scenes on the shield of Achilles, 18.498-508:

> Two men were disputing over the blood price for a man who had been killed...**[They] took turns speaking their cases** (ἀμοιβηδὶς δὲ δίκαζον), and between them lay on the ground two talents of gold, to be given to that judge who in this case **spoke the straightest opinion** (δίκην ἰθύντατα εἴποι).

This case is complete with arguments from both sides and a decision (δίκη) by a judge. Notably, the verb δικάζειν is the same one that Aristotle uses to speak of forensic oratory in the *Rhetoric*.

10) Agamemnon's approval of Odysseus' proposal to rest before battle (a sensible alternative to the reckless approach of Achilles), 19.185-6:

> Hearing **what you have said** (τὸν μῦθον), son of Laertes, I am pleased with you. **Fairly have you gone through everything and explained it** (ἐν μοίρῃ γὰρ πάντα διίκεο καὶ κατέλεξας).

It is another example of the internal evaluation of speech in the *Iliad*. Agamemnon's praise is reminiscent of Nestor's words to Diomedes in Book 9, cited above, when he had said that the young man "spoke fairly" (κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες, 9.59). In addition, Agamemnon uses the same verb (διϊκνέομαι) for the act of "going through" or "covering" everything in speech that Nestor had applied to himself (πάντα διίξομαι, 9.61).

11) Aeneas' battlefield challenge to Achilles, 20.201-2 (repeated by Hector to Achilles, 20.432-3):

> I myself understand well enough how to speak in vituperation and how to make insults. (σάφα οἶδα καὶ αὐτὸς/ ἠμὲν κερτομίας ἠδ' αἴσυλα μυθήσασθαι.)

12) Again from Aeneas' battlefield challenge to Achilles, 20.248-56:

> **The tongue of man is a twisty thing** (στρεπτὴ δὲ γλῶσσ' ἐστὶ βροτῶν), **there are plenty of words there of every kind** (πολέες δ' ἔνι μῦθοι παντοῖοι), **the range of words is wide, and their variance** (ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα). The sort of thing you say is the thing that will be said to you. But what have you and I to do with the need for squabbling and hurling insults at each other...You will not **by talking turn me back** (ἐπέεσσιν ἀποτρέψεις) from the strain of my warcraft.

Aeneas makes several observations about the nature of speech: he characterizes the tongue as "twisty" or "flexible" (other metaphorical uses of this adjective in Homer describe the gods (*Il.* 9.497) and "good men" (*Il.* 15.203) to refer to their capacity for adaption and compromise); and he describes words as abundant, diverse, and able to provide the material for wide-ranging expression. He also acknowledges the limitations of persuasive speech; in this particular situation—a duel with Achilles—words will be of no avail.

A summary of the meta-rhetorical features contained in this list is as follows: 1) evaluation of speech quality according to standards such as completeness of argument, adherence to order or propriety (μοῖρα), forthrightness/authenticity of voice, and ability to persuade (a capability viewed in both positive and negative terms); 2) discrimination between speakers with regard to their ability (e.g. the comparisons made between Menelaus and Odysseus, Nestor and Diomedes, Hector and Polydamas) and discrimination between audiences with regard to the rhetorical approach taken (e.g. Odysseus' exhortations to the Greek chiefs and the common soldiers); and 3) references to instruction in speaking (e.g. Phoenix to Achilles) and practical knowledge about speaking (e.g. Hector to Polydamas, οἶσθα καὶ ἄλλον μῦθον...νοῆσαι; Aeneas to Achilles, οἶδα...κερτομίας ἠδ' αἴσυλα μυθήσασθαι). The cumulative force of this list suggests that the Homeric composer possesses an over-arching awareness of what constitutes persuasively effective speech. But this list alone is only a fraction of the argument; a greater body of evidence is to be found in the *Iliad*'s persuasive speeches

themselves. As we proceed to examine these speeches in Chapter 2, it will be useful to keep in mind the framework provided by the meta-rhetorical passages above. They are key in illustrating consistency between the practice and the underlying "theory," or systematic conception, of rhetoric in Homer.

Chapter 2: A Catalogue of Homeric Rhetoric

I. Methodology

Rhetoric is, in the classical Greek conception of the term, a *technê*. It is a skill—learned, taught, and employed with calculation and intention. Its pursuit involves first gathering information; in the case of rhetoric, one needs information about 1) human nature and its points of susceptibility to persuasion; 2) the particular audience and (if possible) its points of susceptibility to persuasion; and 3) the techniques of speech that tend to induce persuasion in any given situation. Equipped with this data, the rhetorician may then proceed "scientifically": he makes a prediction about what words will best achieve the desired effect or incite the desired action in his audience, and then crafts his speech accordingly. The success or failure of the speech—judged by favorable or unfavorable audience response—constitutes the outcome of his experiment. The variables, of course, are myriad: since rhetoric deals with human nature and behavior, its reception is subject to the whims of human emotion, psychology, temporary state of mind, present circumstances, and past associations (among other things), all of which may or may not be known to the speaker. Nevertheless, the most successful rhetoric—according to Aristotle's foundational theory—manages to draw upon the three touchstones (literally "proofs," *pisteis*) of speaker's character (*êthos*), audience's disposition/state of mind (*diathesis*), and speech's argumentation (*logos*), producing from this triangulation the most convincing set of words possible for a given situation.

Because these three touchstones of Aristotelian rhetoric are integral to my analysis of the rhetoric of Homer, I will say a few more words about my use of them as concepts and terms. The foundational passage which establishes them is *Rhetoric* 1.2.3:

> Of the *pisteis* produced through speech there are three species; for some are in the character [*êthos*] of the speaker, and some in disposing the listener in some way, and some in the speech [*logos*] itself, by showing or seeming to show something.[78]

[78] All translations of the *Rhetoric* from Kennedy (2007) unless otherwise noted.

I have chosen to use the term *diathesis* to refer to the manipulation of audience disposition by a speaker, rather than the more conventional term *pathos* (literally, "suffering, emotion, condition"), for several reasons.[79] The first reason involves faithfulness to Aristotle's text and choice of vocabulary: in the passage above, he makes no mention of *pathos*, but instead provides the somewhat-unwieldy phrase τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι ("disposing the listener in some way") as the second species of proof. I substitute the noun *diathesis* (with its lexical definitions of "arrangement, disposition, means of disposing") for the infinitive verb form. The second and related reason is that the use of the term *pathos* to describe this technique is, in fact, a mis-representation of the full scope of Aristotle's description of it in this passage. While he later speaks at length of arousing the emotions (*pathê*) in connection with this technique (*Rhetoric* 2.1-11), Aristotle clearly intends *diathesis* to include any strategy that is calculated to create sympathy in the audience, whether by appealing to emotions or by knowing the particular audience and adapting one's argumentative strategy according to what will best effect their acquiescence. The term *diathesis* conveys this broader notion of sensitivity to audience psychology, I believe, more accurately than does the term *pathos*. Indeed, it is a rhetorical category that can be seen to encompass not only *pathos*, but in some cases *êthos* and *logos* as well: an appeal to the character of the speaker, like an appeal to the emotions, falls under the notion of disposing the audience favorably to the speaker. This alternative understanding of the three-part division of persuasion (with the narrower *pathos* replacing the broader *diathesis*) is borne out in the next three paragraphs of the *Rhetoric*, which state that

> [There is persuasion] through character [*êthos*] whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence (ἀξιόπιστος)...[There is persuasion] through the hearers when they are led to feel emotion [*pathos*] by the speech...Persuasion occurs through the arguments [*logoi*] when we show the truth or the apparent truth from whatever is persuasive in each case. (1.2.4-6)

[79] For the convention of translating this concept as "pathos," see for example Kennedy (1963): "Aristotle's second kind of proof, that resulting from putting the audience into a certain state of mind, is known as pathos."

In my use of these terms for analyzing Homeric rhetoric, then, I draw a distinction between the techniques of *diathesis* and *pathos* by limiting the latter term to instances in which a speaker targets particular emotions to evoke in his audience: anger, calm, fear, pity, shame, and the like (all of which Aristotle treats in his discourse on the emotions in 2.2-11). When the speaker uses other means to gain favor with the audience—for example, making an appeal based on what he knows of the audience's susceptibilities or preferences, or employing flattery to engender goodwill—I will identify this as *diathesis*.

My aim in this chapter is to identify and analyze the widespread occurrence of rhetoric (in the relatively narrow, Aristotelian definition of the term) represented in the direct speeches of Homer's *Iliad*. The fact that Iliadic speeches occur in a literary representation, rather than being free-standing (as are Classical orations) adds another layer of variables to the analysis of these speeches' effectiveness. Moving beyond the dimension of the relationship between speaker and audience, any analysis of literary speech must take into account the narrative implications of the relationship between speeches and plot necessity, as well as between speeches and characterization. These two relationships will be examined at the end of the chapter, with specific reference to the text of the speeches I have identified as rhetorical.

My methodology in analyzing speeches in the *Iliad* has been to compare Homer's presentation of rhetoric through the mouths of characters with a system based largely, but not exclusively, on Aristotle's techniques for effective persuasion in the *Rhetoric*. Given the occasional unevenness of the *Rhetoric* and the areas in which it may not give a complete picture of rhetorical possibilities, I have made certain clarifications of or adjustments to Aristotle's system. By this means, I have aimed to create a sensible division of rhetorical categories and sub-categories; these I have schematized into three "levels" of increasing detail and sophistication (explained below, p. 6ff.). In collecting speeches for analysis, my first-order selection process was to examine all the direct speeches in the *Iliad* and find those whose intent was to persuade—to cause the listener(s) to perform some action or take some attitude in response. This precludes both vaunting speeches on the battlefield, and speeches that consist exclusively of flyting or

blame (i.e., when such speeches are not employed in the service of persuasion, but are spoken merely to criticize). From the resulting field of speeches intended to elicit some behavior, I have distinguished between those speeches which employ solely command or instruction, and those which summon argumentation or give reasons in their attempt to convince the listener(s). The former class of speeches—simple commands or instructions—are generally brief, and are unaccompanied by any persuasive elements (appeals, reasons, arguments, examples, invocations to figures of authority, evocations of the past, etc). Although they are uttered with the intent of getting the listener to do something or take some attitude, they cannot be categorized as *rhetorical* since they rely solely on the imperative mood of the verbs, rather than on the speaker's arguments, to affect the listener's behavior. They are also generally uncontroversial (i.e., unlikely to be contested by the listener). I have included a list of these speeches in Appendix A at the end of this chapter.

It is the latter type of speeches—those that summon argumentation and reasons—that are of interest to me, as suggesting an awareness of rhetorical technique. The level of sophistication in these persuasive speeches is the more significant for being only a subset of all the persuasive attempts among the Iliadic speeches. The fact that some speeches (used in certain situations, spoken by certain characters) do *not* make use of devices that would later (by Aristotle) be classed as "rhetoric," while others do, both provides a basis for comparison, and suggests a degree of intentionality in the placement of these devices. This in turn implies an awareness on the part of the narrator of something like a system of rhetoric. Even within this smaller class of what I will call "rhetorically persuasive" speeches, there are several levels of elaborateness. There are speeches of short or medium length that employ one or two rhetorical devices—most commonly, the *enthymeme* structure (as Aristotle would label it), in which the object of persuasion is accompanied by a reason (premise), either particular or generalized/gnomic. But there are also a healthy number of longer speeches which expand upon the first two "levels" of persuasive speech that I have just described; they exhibit several rhetorical devices in combination, often spun out to considerable length.

They also tend to be more attuned to the audience and to which *topoi* are best suited to persuade that particular audience. These speeches form the true core of my thesis, and most clearly exhibit features that later appear in Aristotle's theoretical and systematic explication of rhetoric.

As mentioned above, I have schematized various persuasive techniques explained by Aristotle into three major levels, extracting this schema from the structure in which they are presented in the *Rhetoric.* I shall present these levels in order of their increasing complexity of rhetorical technique, and—corresponding to this complexity—as increasingly unable to be explained as universal, unsystematic, or untaught speech practices. As Aristotle establishes at the beginning of Book 3, the most fundamental division of rhetorical speech is that between style (λέξις), arrangement (τάξις), and content, or "proofs" (πίστεις). It is the latter element that is the focus of most of the *Rhetoric* (including the entirety of Books 1 and 2), and it is these "proofs," or persuasive techniques, that will be of interest to me in comparing Homeric speech with rhetorical speech according to Aristotle. As we saw above, Aristotle makes a three-part division of the basic rhetorical πίστεις in *Rhetoric* 1.2.3, and it is this division that comprises the first, most basic level of my schema.

Level I divides into the components of *êthos* (argument based on the speaker's character); *diathesis* (argument based on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind, of which appeal to emotion, *pathos*, is a major sub-category); and *logos* (argument based on reasoning in speech). The aspects of *êthos* that a speaker commonly invokes, according to Aristotle (2.1.5), are good sense (φρόνησις), virtue or courage (ἀρετή), and goodwill (εὔνοια). As discussed above, *diathesis* encompasses a wide range of audience-focused appeal, ultimately requiring an awareness of the audience's disposition and an understanding of emotions and how to manipulate them (*Rhetoric* 2.1-11). The components of *logos* are reckoned differently at different points in the *Rhetoric,* but both groupings are of interest, and together they comprise the second level—increasing in sophistication from Level I—of my schema.

At *Rhetoric* 1.3.7, Aristotle claims that the components of λόγος are threefold: evidence (τεκμήρια), probability (τὰ εἰκότα), and signs (σημέια). We might characterize these premises as being "external" aids to *logos*: elements that can be pointed out in support of an argument, but that are external to it (the concept of probability can be viewed in this way if we think of it as occurrences that are fixed or predictable, and thus objective in the same way that evidence is objective: both are deictic). By contrast, the two "types of rhetorical proof common to all rhetoric" that Aristotle identifies in 2.20.1 form a subcategory of *logos* that is "internal" to the argumentation, and thus complements the premises listed above: these two types are example (παράδειγμα) and *enthymeme* (ἐνθύμημα). *Paradeigma* (the term I shall use henceforth) is further divided by Aristotle into the citation of actual past events (λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα), and the making up of fables (ποεῖν), 2.20.2. *Enthymeme*, the rhetorical trope to which Aristotle devotes the most attention in the *Rhetoric*, is comprised of two parts: a premise (πρότασις or τόπος, 2.22.13ff.) and a conclusion (συμπεράσμα, 2.21.2).[80] Both *paradeigma* and *enthymeme* invoke logical reasoning for their rhetorical effectiveness, rather than a demonstration of material evidence. In combination with evidence, probability, and signs, they form Level 2 of my schema.

The third and most detailed level of rhetorical technique in my schema is that of the "elements/topics of demonstrative *enthymemes*" that Aristotle lists in 2.23.1-30. These twenty-eight τόποι are common techniques used to formulate the premises of *enthymemes*; they are part of the reasons given for whatever conclusion the speaker is attempting to persuade his audience to draw. Although they vary considerably in approach—from practical (such as division or ruling-out of reasons, topic #9) to theoretical (such as the argument from greater and less likelihood, topic #4)—these topics share a degree of intentional crafting of the argument which, when inserted into the *enthymeme* structure, creates a highly sophisticated rhetorical construction.

My examination of speeches in the *Iliad* reveals striking correspondences between the techniques employed by Homeric characters and those described by the

[80] For a detailed look at the function of ***enthymeme*** in Aristotle, see Burnyeat (1990).

three levels of rhetorical complexity developed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The significance of such correspondences for my hypothesis—that the Homeric composer was working from a systematic awareness of what would later be labeled "rhetoric"—increases with each level, given the levels' increasing complexity and remove from what might be thought of as naturally-occurring or un-artful means of persuasion.[81]

II. Model Passages: "Control" and "Proof" Texts

Having presented a schematic picture of the distribution of the *Iliad*'s persuasive speeches among Aristotle's various categories of rhetorical πίστεις, I shall now examine in more individual detail the speeches chosen for this analysis, and if and how they measure up to the label of "rhetoric." I will begin my demonstration with some examples of control texts: that is, speeches that aim to elicit some action from the audience but that lack persuasive devices, and therefore do not meet my qualifications for consideration as "rhetorical." An example of a speech intended to make the listeners take action without the aid of any rhetorical elements would be Priam's instructions to the Trojans in *Iliad* 7.368-78:

> Trojans and Dardanians and companions in arms: hear me
> while I speak forth what the heart within my breast urges.
> Take now your supper about the city, as you did before this,
> and remember your duty of the watch, and be each man wakeful;
> and at dawn let Idaios go to the hollow ships, and speak with
> the sons of Atreus, Menelaos and Agamemnon, giving
> the word of Alexandros, for whose sake this strife has arisen,

[81] This distinction raises the dichotomy between different definitions of rhetoric—a more modern one that would include any speech, however "natural" or "un-artful," as long as it attempts to influence the listener's actions; and a more traditional one (which is mine for the purposes of this study) that requires a measure of calculation and technique. The difference between these two definitions of rhetoric is one of markedness, and is well articulated in the following statements of Kennedy: 1) "*Rhetoric*, in the most general sense, is the energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions" (Kennedy (1991) 7). 2) "As that term [Rhetoric] was usually understood throughout classical antiquity: the art of persuasion by words or the art of civic discourse, taught and practiced in schools and applied in public address" (Kennedy (1994) xi).

> and to add this solid message, and ask them if they are willing
> to stop the sorrowful fighting until we can burn the bodies
> of our dead. We shall fight again until the divinity
> chooses between us, and gives victory to one or the other.[82]

This sort of speech provides a necessary contrast to the hypothesized rhetorical nature of other speeches which I will discuss below. Priam's primary mode of "persuasion" is his use of the imperative mood in the phrases "hear me," "take now your supper," "remember your duty," and "be wakeful." No reasons are adduced to these commands; Priam seems to rely on the practical, un-controversial nature of his proposal, and perhaps also on his status as king (although there is no explicit appeal to his status or identity—his ***êthos***—which *would* constitute a rhetorical element, according to Aristotle).[83] This straightforward combination of command and instruction, devoid of persuasive elements, is very common in the *Iliad*. To cite just a few examples, Odysseus uses it when speaking with Diomedes during the night raid in Book 10 (341-8); the gods engage in commanding and being commanded, as when Sleep plies Poseidon with a brief command to stir up the Greek troops in Book 14 (357-60) and Zeus commands Apollo to embolden Hector in Book 15 (221-35); and even the great orator Nestor employs this minimalist approach when giving instructions to burn the dead and then build a rampart for defense in Book 7 (327-43).

In contrast with Priam's speech above, a representative example of the more rhetorically nuanced speeches that will form the basis of my argument in this dissertation is Odysseus' in Book 2.284-332. Odysseus begins by addressing Agamemnon, but shifts part of the way through the speech to include the entire

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[82] Translation of the *Iliad* from Lattimore (1951) unless otherwise noted.

[83] It could be argued that even a speech such as this one carries persuasive force, in that it invites the audience to identify with the speaker in a common cause and shared experience, highlighted by the use of first-person plural verb at the end of the speech (ὕστερον αὖτε μαχησόμεθ'...). But since Priam makes no actual statement of identification with his audience, it is difficult to argue that this represents anything more than an incidental effect of his sentiments about the uncertainty of war. For entry into my classification of rhetorical speeches, I require demonstration of specific persuasive elements (drawn for the most part from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*).

audience of Greek warriors in the address.[84] Odysseus here delivers a formal assembly-speech, accompanied by the "rhetorical" gesture of holding the scepter (2.279).[85] It is characterized by the narrator as βουλή (282), and the act of speaking is described as both ἀγορήσατο and μετέειπεν (283). It is a complex speech, involving persuasion from several different angles: Odysseus embeds an exhortation from the mouth of another speaker (Calchas' prophecy at Aulis) within his own exhortation to his audience to fight. I present the formally persuasive/rhetorical elements of the speech—i.e., those that corresponding to Aristotle's πίστεις and τόποι—as follows, highlighted in bold.

Odysseus' speech begins with a reproach to the Achaeans for not adhering to their former promise "to go home only after you had sacked strong-walled Ilion" (286-8). This is an example of what Aristotle would call the **topic of consideration of timing (ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, #5)**, *Rhetoric* 2.23.6, which derives its argumentative force from comparing promises or behavior before and after a change in circumstance, and pointing out inconsistency. Odysseus emphasizes this reproach with an unflattering simile: "for as if they were young children or widowed women they cry out and complain to each other" (298-90). Such a comparison is calculated to engender in the Achaeans a sense of shame, and thus to put them in a frame of mind to prove themselves courageous—a use of ***pathos***-technique under the broader heading of ***diathesis***. The change of circumstance in question, of course, is the long duration of the war, and it is to this topic that Odysseus turns next. Rather than continuing in a rebuking tone, however, he conveys his sympathy for and understanding of his audience's frustration in the following passage:

> In truth, it is a hard thing, to be grieved with desire for going.
> Any man who stays away one month from his own wife
> with his intricate ship is impatient, one whom the storm winds
> of winter and the sea rising keep back. And for us now

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[84] This phenomenon of multiple-audience persuasive speech occurs frequently in the assembly context; cf. Nestor to the Greek army and Agamemnon more specifically in 2.337-68, Zeus to Hera and the other gods in 4.7-19; Nestor to Diomedes, Agamemnon, and the Greek army in 9.53-78; Pandarus to Hector and the Trojan chiefs in 12.61-79, Odysseus to Agamemnon and Achilles in 19.155-83, etc.

[85] For the notion of gesture as rhetorical, see Kennedy (1998) 36 *et passim*; for the performative significance for Homeric heroes of holding the scepter, see Martin (1989) 96.

> this is the ninth of the circling years that we wait here. Therefore
> I cannot find fault with the Achaians for their impatience
> beside the curved ships... (291-7)

The tone of this passage is aimed at putting the audience in a favorable frame of mind (***diathesis***), from the opening ***gnômê*** (line 291) to the introduction of first-person diction to forge a sense of camaraderie and shared experience (ἡμῖν, 295; οὐ νεμεσίζομαι, 296). Odysseus emphasizes his understanding of the frustration of the Greek soldiers by means of an argument resembling Aristotle's **topic of greater and less (ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, #4)**, which argues that if something that is lesser in quality or quantity or likelihood is the case, then something that is greater than it in quality or quantity or likelihood can be inferred also to be the case. This is the force of the ***gnômê*** "Any man who stays away one month from his own wife with his intricate ship is impatient": it is an example of a lesser, but still valid, cause for impatience, of which the greater cause is the situation-specific statement, "And for us now this is the ninth of the circling years that we wait here." The enthymematic conclusion of this topic, then, is the following concession, which also functions as an instance of ***diathesis***: "Therefore I cannot find fault with the Achaians for their impatience beside the curved ships." A second ***gnômê***-plus-conclusion pair serves as the transition between sections of the speech in lines 297-9. The ***gnômê***—"Always it is disgraceful to wait long and at the end go home empty-handed"—rationalizes Odysseus' imperative conclusion: "No, but be patient, friends, and stay yet a little longer until we know whether Kalchas' prophecy is true or is not true." The attachment of a purpose clause (ὄφρα δαῶμεν...) to this conclusion effects a transition into the second half of the speech's argumentation: the appeal to Calchas' prophecy in lines 299-330.

The language Odysseus uses to invoke the memory of Calchas' prophecy foreshadows forensic oratory, beginning with the statement that "you all were witnesses" (ἐστὲ δὲ πάντες/ μάρτυροι), 301-2. He then relies on the shared memory of his audience, as well as on the authority bestowed by the supernatural events he recounts, to make rhetorical use of a "sign" (**σῆμα**, 308), namely the omen sent by Zeus

at the outset of the Greeks' campaign of a serpent devouring nine sparrows. This gesture towards a σῆμα corresponds to one of the three components that Aristotle says are premises (προτάσεις) of a rhetorical speech's *logos* (1.3.7): signs (σημεία), evidence (τεκμήρια), and probability (τὰ εἰκότα). In Odysseus' reasoning, the omen also serves as evidence for the conclusion that the Argives should fight, since the prophecy about the ten-year duration of the war is being fulfilled before their very eyes (τὰ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται, 330). And within the framework of belief in the truth and divine authority of omens (i.e., from the internal audience's perspective), Calchas' interpretation of the omen acts as an appeal to another topic that anticipates Aristotle: the **topic of consequences by analogy (ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, #16)**, which deduces similar consequences for two occurrences based on an agreed-upon correspondence between those occurrences (in this case, the interpretation of the Achaeans as the snake and the Trojans as the sparrow is agreed-upon, and thus the sparrows' fate is argued to be a harbinger of Greek victory):

> As this snake has eaten the sparrow herself with her children,
> eight of them, and the mother was the ninth, who bore them,
> so for years as many as this shall we fight in this place
> and in the tenth year we shall take the city of the wide ways. (326-9)

In addition to these components of argumentation, however, Odysseus has taken care throughout his reminiscence to highlight the fact that *he* had been present, and had experienced the omen and prophecy along with the rest of them. This inclusion of his own character and voice within the story (e.g. **ἡμεῖς** δ' ἑσταότες θαυμάζομεν οἷον ἐτύχθη, 320) is aimed at creating a sense of camaraderie with the addressees, just as it had done earlier in his speech (see 295-6). It is an invocation of the rhetorical device of ***êthos***: Odysseus appeals to his own character—who he is and what his past experiences have been—to gain credibility with his audience.

The speech ends with a final imperative command, serving as the conclusion to the ***enthymeme*** of which the entire story of Calchas' prophecy was the premise: "Come then, you strong-greaved Achaians, let every man stay here, until we have taken the great citadel of Priam" (331-2). The speech represents the concerted use of no less than

six different techniques for effective rhetoric as catalogued by Aristotle, spanning all three levels of specificity that I described above: ***êthos*** and ***diathesis*** on the most basic level; several ***enthymemes*** on the middle level; and three of Aristotle's detailed **"topics of demonstrative *enthymemes*"** on the most specialized level.[86] The result of this μῦθος (as it is labeled in 335) can be judged by the audience response: "So he spoke, and the Argives shouted aloud, and about them the ships echoed terribly to the roaring Achaians as they cried out applause to the word of godlike Odysseus" (333-5). Its effectiveness in achieving its desired end is rather implicit than explicit, since it is followed by speeches from Nestor (which will be included in my analysis) and Agamemnon before the Argives are shown to resume their fighting stations. But Odysseus' speech is the one that turns the tide of the army's sentiments, and in this way can be justly said to have been effective—which, as we shall see, is more than can be said for many other "rhetorical" speeches in the *Iliad*. The relationship between rhetorical sophistication and effective persuasion, in Homer as in Classical and later oratory, is not one of simple correlation.[87]

III. The *Iliad*'s Rhetorical Speeches

While Odysseus' speech in *Iliad* 2.284-332 provides one of the more elaborate and wide-ranging examples of rhetorical technique in the *Iliad*, there are a number of speeches that partake of rhetorical tropes on a more modest, but still significant (i.e. self-conscious and crafted), scale; these I have labeled "intermediate" speeches. Moving chronologically through the *Iliad*, I shall give brief treatment to each of these speeches, marking their aspects of rhetoric (as per Aristotle's explication), as well as noting

[86] Buffiere (1973) gives a brief and less technical analysis of this speech, but highlights some of the same rhetorical strategies as I do (although he makes different use of terminology, referring to the adaptation of Odysseus tone to the character of his audience as "the rules of *ethos*" rather than of *diathesis*): "Il le fait selon les meilleures règles de l'*ethos*, adaptant son intervention à la qualité des personnes, brutal et direct avec la populace, ménageant davantage les grands. L'ordre une fois rétabli, il prononce le discours qui décidera les Achéens à reprendre la bataille : ses arguments sont ceux de la raison, sa conclusion est un encouragement, un appel à l'espérance." (351, citing chapter 166 of Pseudo-Plutarch's *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer*)
[87] This relationship will be discussed at greater length at the end of this chapter (Section IV, "Patterns of Aristotelian Rhetoric in the *Iliad*").

techniques of persuasion that Aristotle does *not* take into his account. I shall then give a more extended analysis of the smaller group of speeches that I consider to be on a par with Odysseus' Book 2 speech in terms of rhetorical complexity; these I have labeled "complex" speeches. I have identified a total of 35 "intermediate" and 10 "complex" rhetorical speeches in the *Iliad*.

A. Intermediate Speeches

I. The first speech which I categorize as demonstrating an intermediate degree of rhetorical complexity is Achilles' appeal to Thetis towards the end of his speech to her in 1.365-412. After explaining his grievance against Agamemnon in response to Thetis' question about why he is lamenting, Achilles begs his mother for a favor. This persuasive portion of the speech (393-412) begins with a command—the conclusion of the ***enthymeme*** that will follow: "You then, if you have power to, protect your own son, going to Olympos and supplicating Zeus" (393-4). Achilles' use of his own identity as a son to entail Thetis' pity and sense of obligation constitutes both an appeal to ***êthos*** and an exercise of ***diathesis***. He then introduces the premise of the *enthymeme* (using the typical enthymematic particle, γάρ (396)), which relies on presenting an argument that Thetis could in turn use to persuade Zeus to grant Achilles' request. Achilles recounts a claim that Thetis had made "many times" about an event from the mythical past: "You said you only among the immortals beat aside shameful destruction from Kronos' son the dark-misted, that time when all the other Olympians sought to bind him...Then you, goddess, went and set him free from his shackles..." (397-406).[88] Achilles, having used his own ***êthos*** to exert a claim on Thetis in his attempt to persuade her, suggests that she do the same to persuade Zeus (and thus achieve Achilles' object). Tying this premise to the enthymematic conclusion to end his speech, Achilles exhorts his mother to "sit beside him and take his knees and remind him of these things now, if perhaps he might be willing to help the Trojans...[so] that Atreus' son wide-ruling Agamemnon may

[88] Although Willcock (1964) sees this myth as an example of the use of a ***paradeigma***, I agree with Held (1987) that it does not make sense in that function. Rather, Achilles is suggesting the use of this myth as persuasive for Zeus because it will remind him of his obligation to Thetis.

recognize his madness, that he did no honour to the best of the Achaians" (407-12). The speech is successful; Thetis assents to Achilles' request (1.419), and later convinces Zeus (1.523-7).

II. Agamemnon's exhortation to the Greek army in 2.110-41 is the next example of a speech with several rhetorical elements. This speech is unique in its rhetorical aim, in that Agamemnon argues elaborately for a withdrawal from Troy with the expectation that his speech will, in fact, persuade the army to do the opposite (he confides to the leaders beforehand that it will be a test, ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι (2.73)).[89] This attempt at reverse psychology backfires, however. Despite the fact that Agamemnon can be an ineffective speaker in the *Iliad* when he *wants* to persuade (e.g. in his speech to Teucer, 8.281-91), here, ironically, he is effective when he intends *not* to persuade.[90] His faux-rhetoric, designed as a "test" (ἔπεσιν πειρήσομαι, 2.73) is all too persuasive, given his audience's state of mind. Agamemnon begins with an appeal to the supposedly hostile will of Zeus. "Zeus son of Kronos has caught me fast in bitter futility," claims Agamemnon, citing the god's fickle dealings with him (111-15). He reports that Zeus has commanded him to return home to Argos, and, as an argument for resigning to this command, offers the *gnômê* that Zeus "is too strong, who before now has broken the crests of many cities and will break them again, since his power is beyond all others" (116-18).

A subtle attempt at counter-persuasion can be observed in Agamemnon's emphasis on the shame that will arise from giving up: "And this shall be a thing of shame for the men hereafter to be told, that so strong, so great a host of Achaians carried on and fought in vain a war that was useless against men fewer than they, with no accomplishment shown for it..." (119-122). This constitutes an argument from an

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[89] For a convincing interpretation of Agamemnon's impulse to test his men, see Russo and Knox (1989): "At this moment [after Agamemnon's dream, which had contained an imperative from Zeus to fight] it becomes a Holy War, and a fundamental rule of Holy War imposes itself: the dismissal in shame of any cowards, of any who have no heart for the battle or no faith in the god commanding it." (353)

[90] See Martin (1989) for more on Agamemnon's rhetorical weakness, indicated by the form and in-effectiveness of his commands. "As Agamemnon's speaking power wanes" over the course of the poem, Martin observes, "Achilles' waxes...The control of authoritative speech passes like the Achaean scepter from the 'owner,' Agamemnon, to his young competitor." (62-3)

assumed knowledge of his men's frame of mind (***diathesis***), as Agamemnon (mis-) calculates that their emotions of shame and honor will arouse them to protest. He employs ***auxesis*** in this argument by dwelling at great length, and with a vivid illustration, on the fact that the Greeks outnumber the Trojans (122-30). Then he returns to his earlier defeatist theme, citing the great number of Trojan allies, "who drive me hard back again and will not allow me, despite my will, to sack the well-founded stronghold of Ilion" (132-3). This observation (carrying the weight of experiential truth for the audience) provides the first premise of an extended ***enthymeme***. As the second premise, Agamemnon uses an argument from ***diathesis*** all too effectively, stirring up his audience's emotions of pity and longing for their homes and families, as well as of frustration at the fruitlessness of their efforts:

> And now nine years of mighty Zeus have gone by...
> and far away our wives and our young children
> are sitting within our halls and wait for us, while still our work here
> stays unfinished as it is... (134-8)

The enthymematic conclusion follows in the form of the command "come then, do as I say, let us all be won over; let us run away with our ships to the beloved land of our fathers" (139-40). Perhaps imagining that this command will strike the Greek army as cowardly, Agamemnon adds a further premise—highly debatable—in the final line of his speech: "...since (γάϱ) no longer now shall we capture Troy of the wide ways" (141). But however flawed his assumptions and his λόγος, Agamemnon's use of διαθεῖναι is unwittingly in line with his audience's sentiments. Thus his speech is taken at face-value and, as such, is persuasive to the Greeks: Ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄϱινε/ πᾶσι μετὰ πληθύν, ὅσοι οὐ βουλῆς ἐπάκουσαν (142-3).

III. Nestor addresses the Greeks, and Agamemnon in particular, in 2.337-68, a speech that follows up the elaborate speech of Odysseus analyzed above. This is a relatively short speech by Nestor's standards; nevertheless, it incorporates several of Aristotle's rhetorical devices. Nestor begins with a vehement rebuke of his audience in 337-43: "Oh, for shame! You are like children when you hold assembly, infant children, to whom the works of war mean nothing. Where then shall our covenants go, and the

oaths we have taken?...We do our fighting with words only, and can discover no remedy, though we have stayed here a long time." Such biting words are certainly indicative of the "shame culture" that is represented in the *Iliad*[91]; but they also represent a calculated play on the emotions of the particular audience: fighting men who will abhor the thought of resembling infants and cowards (***diathesis***). Aristotle explains this technique of manipulating the audience's πάθη in *Rhetoric* 2.1.8 (with a specific focus on the emotion of shame in 2.6.1-2).

In lines 2.344-9, Nestor directs several commands at Agamemnon in the imperative (ἄρχευ', ἔα φθινύθειν) concerning how to deal with any remaining stragglers. Then he resumes his address to the broader assembly once again, opening into an ***enthymeme*** (which is signaled by the particle γάρ—often characteristic of *enthymemes*—in line 350). The premise comes first, in the form of an appeal to the promise of Zeus' favor in the past, reminiscent of Odysseus' argument:

> For I say to you, the son of all-powerful Kronos
> promised, on that day when we went in our fast-running vessels,
> we of Argos, carrying blood and death to the Trojans.
> He flashed lightning on our right, showing signs (σήματα) of favour. (350-53)

Nestor even mirrors Odysseus' technique as far as to invoke the vocabulary of signs; the lightning bolt he recalls parallels the omen of the snake and sparrow as an appeal to the persuasive power of divine authority. With Zeus' recalled promise as the premise, Nestor concludes the *enthymeme* with a command: "Therefore (τῶ, corresponding to the γάρ of line 350) let no man be urgent to take the way homeward until after he has lain in bed with the wife of a Trojan to avenge Helen's longing to escape and her lamentations" (354-6). He then directs a threat towards anyone who attempts to turn back home ("before all others he may win death and destruction" (357-9)), using ***pathos*** by drawing upon the emotion of fear. This approach to creating a favorable disposition in his audience (***diathesis***) contrasts with Odysseus' more patient, sym*pathê*tic attitude toward the same demoralized warriors. As we shall see, these differences in rhetorical

[91] For the classic treatment of "shame-culture" in the *Iliad*, see Dodds (1951); for a more recent treatment of shame as a societal value in the *Iliad*, see Adkins (2005) 699-700.

emphasis and priority are characteristic of the two speakers (Odysseus is adept at ***diathesis***, reading his audience; Nestor at appeals to ***êthos***, the credibility of his own rigorous character and experience).

Nestor concludes his speech by again turning to Agamemnon with commands, this time of a practical nature (2.360-68): he must draw up his troops according to tribe. Embedded in the instructions to Agamemnon, however, is a barb directed at the Argive audience: Nestor makes a final appeal to the army's sense of shame by noting that this arrangement will help to separate the bad soldiers (κακός, 365) from the good (ἐσθλός, 366). His parting line implies that the Greeks have failed to capture Troy thus far because of their "cowardice and ignorance of warfare" (κακότητι καὶ ἀφραδίῃ πολέμοιο, 368). It draws the speech to a close on the same note on which it had opened—shame—completing the speech's ring-composition structure: shaming; commands to Agamemnon; enthymematic exhortation to stay and fight followed by a threat; commands to Agamemnon; shaming. The result of Nestor's speech with regard to arousing the troops is (like Odysseus' preceding speech) obscured because it is immediately followed by another speech, namely Agamemnon's response. In the eyes of his primary addressee, at least, Nestor has been an effective persuader; Agamemnon proclaims him a victor in the art of assembly-speaking (ἦ μὰν αὖτ' ἀγορῇ νικᾷς, 370) and implements his suggestions (2.371ff).

IV. The next two speeches are part of the same interaction: a quarrel between Zeus and Hera at the beginning of *Iliad* 4 over the outcome of the war. The narrative has just seen the cataloguing of Greek and Trojan forces in Book 2 and the duel between Menelaus and Paris in Book 3. Zeus makes reference to the latter event as he initiates the quarrel in 4.7-19 with a speech that is equal parts blame and deliberation. Its aim is to discourage dissension and maverick action among the gods, and to reach a consensus on the best course for resolving the war. To this end, he addresses the assembled gods, specifically targeting Hera and Athena with "words offensive" (κερτομίοις ἐπέεσσι, 4.6). His first move is to provoke Hera into action by comparing her unfavorably with Aphrodite as a protector of her hero: while Hera and Athena are "sitting apart, looking

on at the fighting, and take their pleasure," Aphrodite actively "stands by her man and drives the spirits of death away from him" (9-11). It is once again an appeal to shame as rhetorical strategy, and shows Zeus' deployment of ***diathesis***: he knows what will most rankle his target, for as we see throughout the *Iliad*, Hera despises Aphrodite, her cause, and her methods of achieving her aims.

Having incited Hera in this way, Zeus turns to the assembled gods with the exhortation to let reason and mutual advantage prevail in making peace between Trojans and Greeks, based on Menelaus' victory in the duel (lines 4.13-19). He first issues a call for deliberation (φραζώμεθ', 14). The exhortation "Let us consider then how these things shall be accomplished" is followed by two opposing options: "whether again to stir up grim warfare…or cast down love and make them friends with each other" (14-16). As rationale for such deliberation, Zeus plaintively offers a best-case scenario: "If somehow this way could be sweet and pleasing to all of us, the city of lord Priam might still be a place men dwell in, and Menelaos could take away with him Helen of Argos" (17-19). The appeal to a solution that would be "sweet and pleasing to all of us" (πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ) exemplifies Aristotle's **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**. This topic involves examining persuasive and dissuasive elements (σκοπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα) for making people act: for example, people will be likely to take an action if it is "possible and easy and advantageous" (δυνατὸν καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον) (*Rhetoric* 2.23.21). Curiously, however, Zeus does not argue strongly for the proposed peaceable solution, merely that some sort of solution should be considered. This leaves his speech to end on an oddly indecisive note, and it is thus perhaps unsurprising that the speech fails to placate Hera and Athena ("Hera and Athena muttered," 4.20), and that Zeus concedes to Hera's demands in the negotiations that follow (ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις, 4.37).

V. With the tide already turned in her favor by Zeus' concession speech of 4.31-49, Hera makes a speech in 4.51-67 that presents her specific demands for the course of the war. The rhetorically-aware nature of her speech indicates that she does not take Zeus' concessions for granted, and is still concerned with persuading him. She opens

with a concession of her own: Zeus may destroy any of her three favorite cities in the future without opposition (51-6). Then she moves to flattery of Zeus' strength; knowing that he prides himself on this quality, she employs the technique of ***diathesis***: "In malice I will accomplish nothing, since you are far stronger (ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐσσι)." (56) Finally, in anticipation of her demands, she makes a strong appeal to her ***êthos*** in lines 58-61. Her work and will ought to be carried out because of her identity and status: she is a god (58), of the same race as Zeus (58), the firstborn daughter of Kronos (59), and the wife of Zeus (60-61). In line 61, she reminds Zeus that he is "lord over all the immortals," simultaneously flattering him (*diathesis*) and claiming authority for herself by association with him (*êthos*). Having thus laid the groundwork for her demands, she begins modestly with an exhortation that they "both give way to each other" (62) as an example to the other gods. She moves at last to pure commands: "give orders to Athene to visit horrible war again on Achaians and Trojans, and try to make it so that the Trojans are first offenders." (64-7) Having moved from concession, caution, and respect to bold demands, Hera has assessed her audience correctly and crafted her speech accordingly. The decisive success of the speech is evident from the narrator's cap: "Nor did the father of gods and men disobey her." (68)

VI. Athena addresses Pandarus in 4.93-103 in the guise of the Trojan hero Laodokos, attempting to persuade him to break the tenuous treaty between the warring sides by shooting an arrow at Menelaus. Her opening address exhibits flattery (***diathesis***), calling him "wise son of Lykaon" (93), as she boldly commands him to "let me persuade you" (μοί τι πίθοιο, 93) to shoot an arrow at Menelaus (94). This command forms the conclusion of an ***enthymeme***, whose premise follows in the form of an appeal to the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: "So you might dare send a flying arrow against Menelaos and win you glory and gratitude (χάριν καὶ κῦδος) in the sight of all Trojans, particularly beyond all else with prince Alexandros." (94-6) This *enthymeme* is then repeated in reverse to form a chiastic structure: "Beyond all beside you would carry away glorious gifts from him, were he to see warlike Menelaos, the son of Atreus, struck down by your arrow, and laid on the sorrowful corpse-fire."

(97-9) Athena brings to bear the incentives of both immortal glory and material gain, and this is the extent of her employment of persuasive technique. It is all that is necessary, however: hearkening back to Athena's opening words, μοί τι πίθοιο, the narrator informs us that the goddess "persuaded the fool's heart in him" (τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθεν (104)).

VII. In 7.109-19, Agamemnon addresses Menelaus in an attempt to dissuade him from dueling with Hector, for fear that he will be killed. The main force of his argument comes from an ***enthymeme*** whose conclusion is stated as a command: "Hold fast, though it hurts you, nor long in your pride to fight with a man who is better than you are" (110-111). The premise draws on an argument from the **topic of greater and less (#4)**: "There are others who shudder before him. Even Achilleus…trembles to meet this man, and he is far better than you are" (112-14). Agamemnon reiterates his conclusion ("Go back now and sit down" (115)), then ends his speech on a more reassuring note. Aware of Menelaus' valiant disposition and concern for honor, he notes that Hector's challenge will not go unanswered, even though Menelaus is not the right candidate for the job: "The Achaians will set up another to fight against this man, and…I think he will be glad to leave off" (116-18). This assurance, a nod to ***diathesis***, proves convincing; the narrator reports that Ὣς εἰπὼν παρέπεισεν ἀδελφειοῦ φρένας ἥρως/ αἴσιμα παρειπών ("The hero spoke like this and bent the heart of his brother since he urged wisely" (120-21)).

VIII. Agamemnon addresses an exhortation to Teucer in 8.281-91—a situation that hardly seems to call for a persuasive speech, in that Teucer is already aquitting himself brilliantly in the battle (8.273-9). Agamemnon opens with a flattering and respectful address (***diathesis***) in 281, calling Teucer "dear heart" and "lord of your people." This is followed by an ***enthymeme***, consisting of the simple conclusion/command "strike so" (βάλλ' οὕτως) and the lengthier premise "thus you may be a light given to the Danaans, and to Telamon your father." (282-3) While the invocation of the Danaans in their time of need constitutes a mild appeal to Teucer's sympathies as a leader of soldiers (***diathesis***), the invocation of Teucer's father is a much stronger attempt at *diathesis*. Agamemnon elaborates this appeal in lines 284-5 in order

to play on the emotions of filial affection and sense of obligation (much as Phoinix and Priam will appropriate the figure of Peleus when attempting to persuade Achilles): "...Telamon your father, who cherished you when you were little, and, bastard as you were, looked after you in his own house. Bring him into glory, though he is far away." This reminder of Teucer's past and the implied debt he owes to Telamon shade into a new enthymematic premise, of which the conclusion is the command τὸν...ἐϋκλείης ἐπίβησον (285). But Agamemnon strikes a discordant note by reminding Teucer that he is a bastard (σε νόθον, 284) in the midst of his appeal, thus undermining his attempt to put Teucer in a favorable frame of mind. Such mishandling of the *diathesis* technique is, as we shall see, typical of Agamemnon, and is the foremost reason for the frequent failure of his rhetoric. Agamemnon ends his speech with an appeal to the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**, promising rewards to Teucer *if* the gods ever grant them victory over Troy (286-91). The rhetoric of this promise is weak on several levels, however: he puts a condition (the capture of Troy) on the promise; he takes care to note that Teucer will receive his reward only after Agamemnon does (πρώτῳ τοι **μετ' ἐμὲ** πρεσβήϊον ἐν χερὶ θήσω, 289); and the incentives themselves are remarkably stingy, a series of single possible rewards rather than an accumulation of several (in stark contrast with Agamemnon's lavish peace-offering to Achilles in Book 9, for example): **ἢ** τρίποδ' **ἠὲ** δύω ἵππους αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσφιν/ **ἠὲ** γυναῖχ' (290-91). The speech ends on this note, and its ineffectiveness is quickly manifest: Teucer rebuffs the exhortation as unnecessary and patronizing: "Son of Atreus, most lordly: must you then drive me, who am eager myself, as it is?" (8.293ff.). Agamemnon's arguments may have partaken of rhetorical devices, but his application of them—and his insensitivity to his audience—doomed the speech's persuasive power. As is the case for many of the *Iliad*'s characters, Agamemnon's rhetoric is a significant aspect of his characterization.

IX. Nestor seeks volunteers for a nighttime ambush in an address to the assembled Greek army in 10.204-17. He opens with a mild appeal to shame, questioning whether there is any man who, "in the daring of his own heart" (ἑῷ αὐτοῦ/ θυμῷ τολμήεντι, 204-5), will face the Trojans. His vocabulary emphasizes a bravery that his

audience is not demonstrating, but that he wishes to evoke; and he subtly plays on their sense of shame (an example of ***diathesis***) by attributing to the rival Trojans the epithet "high-hearted" (μεγαθύμους, 205). An extended ***enthymeme*** comprises the bulk of the speech, employing as its conclusion suggestion instead of the more typical imperative command—an approach that is appropriate to the occasion (soliciting volunteers, rather than exhorting or rebuking soldiers on the battlefield). The conclusion-suggestions precede the premise: "So he might catch some enemy, who straggled behind them, or he might overhear some thing that the Trojans are saying..." (206-10). Nestor then states the enthymematic premise—the rationale for the action he is promoting—in the form of a future less vivid condition: "Could a man learn this, and then come back again to us unhurt, why huge and heaven-high would rise up his glory (κλέος) among all people, and an excellent gift (δόσις ἐσθλή) would befall him" (211-13). This premise, with its promise of future reward, partakes of the now-familiar **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**. And Nestor increases the appeal by elaborating on the nature of the incentive:

> For all those who hold by the ships high power as princes,
> of all these each one of them will give him a black sheep,
> female, with a lamb beneath; there shall be no gift like this one,
> one that will be forever by at the feasts and festivals. (214-17)

Such luxurious expansion of the single idea of a δόσις ἐσθλή (Nestor could have left it at that) demonstrates the rhetorical technique of ***auxesis***, or expansion, which Aristotle identifies as a common (κοινόν) aspect of persuasion in *Rhetoric* 2.18.4-5 (although he considers it most proper to epideictic oratory).[92] By elaborating upon the virtues of the incentive, Nestor shows respect for the anticipated effort that will entail such a reward. This again demonstrates his subtle attention to the need for ***diathesis***; it provides a contrast to Agamemnon's flippant and paltry reward-offer to Teucer in the previous

[92] See especially *Rhetoric* 2.18.4, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους κοινὸν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἢ ἀπολογοῦντες. ("Further, a common feature of all speeches is the matter of magnitude; for all use diminution and amplification when deliberating and when praising or blaming and when prosecuting or defending themselves.") *Rhetoric* 1.9.38-40 describes the technique of *auxesis* in more detail, but primarily in connection with epideictic oratory.

passage. Accordingly, Nestor's speech is successful in its object: the Greek warriors' first response is awed silence (πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ, 218); then Diomedes volunteers, and a horde of other Greeks follow suit (219-232).

X. Polydamas attempts to persuade Hector and the Trojan chiefs to adopt his proposal in 12.61-79, after the Trojans have reached an impasse on the battlefield because of the difficulty of the terrain for their horses. The opening of this speech focuses solely on laying out a practical strategy: Polydamas urges the Trojans to dismount from their horses rather than trying to cross the Achaeans' ditch in chariots (61-4). The persuasive—or rather, dissuasive—arguments of the speech commence in line 65 with a dire appeal to Aristotle's **topic of the consequence (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, #13)**: "There is no way to get down, no way again to do battle from horses, for the passage is narrow and I think they must be hurt there" (65-6). This warning against taking the horses into battle continues with an appeal to the implied maxim that god helps those who help themselves. If it is the will of Zeus to destroy the Achaeans, says Polydamas, so much the better; but the prudent strategy is to prepare for the worst:

> ...But if they turn again and a backrush comes upon us
> Out of the ships, and we are driven against the deep ditch,
> then I think no longer could one man to carry a message
> get clear to the city, once the Achaians have turned back upon us. (71-4)

Again, Polydamas depicts the consequences to the Trojans of neglecting his advice, providing an uncomfortable (and thus, he hopes, dissuasive) vision of the future. He caps off this speech with an ***enthymeme***, conclusion first. The conclusion commences with a frank demand that his audience let themselves be persuaded (ἀλλ' ἄγεθ', ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω, **πειθώμεθα** πάντες, 75), which is followed by practical instructions in the imperative and hortatory subjunctive moods (76-8). The premise of the *enthymeme* closes the speech: "As for the Achaians, they will not hold, if the bonds of death are fastened upon them" (78-9). It is so obvious a statement as to form a kind of *gnômê*, and provides a reason for the action that Polydamas is exhorting. The response to the speech is

favorable; Hector is pleased at what the narrator refers to as Polydamas' μῦθος ἀπήμων (80), and the Trojans immediately implement Polydamas' advice (81-7).

XI. The next two speeches in this catalogue are part of the same interaction between Polydamas and Hector, the first delivered by Polydamas in 12.211-29 in response to the portent of the eagle and snake that the Trojans have just witnessed. He begins with the complaint that Hector always opposes his plans, despite the fact that Polydamas *is a good speaker* (ἐσθλὰ φραζομένῳ, 211-12)—an explicit appeal to ***êthos***. He then turns this self-attributed character quality into an insult of Hector, questioning his ability to speak skillfully: "There is no good reason for you, in your skill, to argue wrong (παρὲξ ἀγορευέμεν), neither in the councils nor in the fighting, and ever to be upholding your own cause" (212-14). Polydamas' characterization of Hector as a poor rhetorician is, in fact, supported elsewhere in the *Iliad*, most notably by the narrator himself when he comments on the respective strengths of Polydamas and Hector in 18.252: ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἂρ μύθοισιν, ὁ δ' ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα ("But he [Polydamas] was better in words, the other [Hector] with the spear far better."). In the present context, however, it is a poor choice for the purpose of putting his audience in a favorable frame of mind.

Polydamas continues his argument with an ***enthymeme***, the conclusion placed first in the form of a simple command: "Let us not go on and fight the Danaans by their ships" (216). The extended premise is Polydamas' interpretation of the eagle and snake omen in 216-27, which serves the function of a **σημεῖον** for his argument.[93] The interpretation of the omen, taken to apply to the Trojans' current situation, employs an argument from the **topic of consequences by analogy (#16)**, in the same way as had Calchas' interpretation of the omen recounted by Odysseus in 2.326-9 (see above, p. 11). The analogy is signaled grammatically by the correlative phrases **ὧδε** γὰρ ἐκτελέεσθαι

[93] See Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2.25.8, Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων...εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον **σημεῖον**. ("Enthymemes are drawn from four sources and these four are probability, paradigm, *tekmerion* [or necessary sign], and *semeion* [or fallible sign]." Aristotle further explains *tekmerion* as a sign based on that which is necessary and everlasting, and a *semeion* as a sign based on that which is generalized or partial.

οἴομαι (217) and ὣς ἡμεῖς (223), which frame the portent's description and lead into the interpretation/enthymematic premise:

> So [like the eagle who dropped the snake] we...
> we shall not take the same ways back from the ships in good order;
> since we shall leave many Trojans behind us, whom the Achaians
> will cut down with the bronze as they fight for themselves by their vessels.
> (223-7)

Polydamas' closing statement, like the opening lines of the speech, refers to his own ability to persuade, as well as claiming knowledge of the gods' minds. He is only slightly more subtle than he had been at the beginning of the speech in promoting his own ***êthos***, using the figure of a θεοπρόπος as a stand-in for himself, and couching the confident statement in terms of a potential optative: "So (ὧδέ) an interpreter of the gods would answer, one who knew in his mind the truth of portents, and whom the people believed in [literally, "whom the people were persuaded by, οἱ πειθοίατο λαοί]" (228-9). The speech as a whole suffers from emphasizing the qualities of the speaker (***êthos***) to the neglect of what will please or placate the audience (***diathesis***), and the result of such rhetorical imbalance is that it fails to persuade. Hector responds with an entire speech of reproof, disagreement, and counter-persuasion, which in fact constitutes the next speech in this catalogue.

XII. Hector's tirade in 12.231-50 is ostensibly addressed to Polydamas, but it is highly conscious of the audience of Trojan warriors that is present, and serves as an exhortation (and hence a persuasion attempt) to this broader audience. Disapproval and rebuke in response to Polydamas' challenge takes up the first half of the speech (231-40), and Hector picks up on Polydamas' focus on prowess in speech and argumentation. He uses the verb ἀγορεύω twice in the span of three lines (231, 233) as he questions Polydamas' capabilities at speaking in the assembly, and he chastises him with the line "Your mind knows how to contrive a saying (μῦθον) better than this one" (232). Hector sets up an opposition between Polydamas' counsel and the counsels of Zeus, with which he claims to be personally acquainted (ἅς τέ μοι αὐτὸς ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσε, 236). In an attempt to outdo Polydamas, who had promoted his own ***êthos*** by claiming to be

an interpreter of the gods, Hector invokes the greatest of the gods as his personal confidante. He follows with an ***enthymeme*** in lines 237-43 which draws on an argument similar to Aristotle's **topic of turning against the adversary the things said by the adversary against the speaker (τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὑτοὺς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα, #6)**. Hector subverts Polydamas' appeal to the omen of the eagle—an appeal that invoked the gods by extension in its ending claim, "So an interpreter of the gods would answer" (228)—with the insinuation that to believe in bird signs is, in fact, to deny the promises of Zeus. Hector's sarcastic dismissal, "You tell me to put my trust in birds, who spread wide their wings..." (237-4), leads to the *enthymeme*'s conclusion: "No, let us put our trust in the counsel of great Zeus, he who is lord over all mortal men and all the immortals." (241-2). The premise then follows, in the form of a *gnômê*: "One bird sign is best: to fight in defence of our country" (243). This *enthymeme* packs a twofold rhetorical punch, appealing to two nearly irrefutable values for Hector's Trojan audience: piety toward the gods, opposed to the petty superstition of Polydamas; and courage in battle and in defense of the homeland, opposed to Polydamas' cowardice. Hector concludes his speech with an extended attack (244-50) on Polydamas' *êthos* based on his reluctance to press forward in battle (again employing the **topic of turning against the adversary the things said by the adversary against the speaker**). Hector is clearly no longer trying to persuade Polydamas (if that was ever his intent in this speech), as *ad hominem* attacks run counter to the consideration of *diathesis;* rather, he is using Polydamas to incite the Trojan audience to favor his own cause. He ends by threatening Polydamas with death if he turns any soldier away from fighting by "beguiling him with your arguments" (παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν), 248-50. This reference to Polydamas' misplaced prowess in speaking brings full-circle not only Hector's speech (which had opened with reproaching Polydamas for his poor μῦθος (232)), but the entire dialogue: Polydamas had begun *his* speech by criticizing Hector's use of argumentation (12.212-13). In short, a significant part of these antagonists' rhetoric is impugning each other's rhetoric (and promoting their own). In this instance, Hector's persuasive strategy carries the day, and the Trojans follow his lead into battle (12.251-2).

XIII. A unique phenomenon occurs in 12.269-76, when both Telamonian and Oilean Ajax deliver a simultaneous exhortation to Greek soldiers on the battlefield. For the purposes of rhetorical analysis, of course, the speech is like any other, despite being attributed to dual speakers. The narrative introduction to the speech offers an unusually detailed commentary on the speakers' rhetorical strategy: ἄλλον μειλιχίοις, ἄλλον στερεοῖς ἐπέεσσι / νείκεον, ὅν τινα πάγχυ μάχης μεθιέντα ἴδοιεν· ("...And stung them along, using kind words to one, to another hard ones, whenever they saw a man hang back from the fighting." (12.267-8)). This is essentially a representation of the ***diathesis*** technique—a recognition of the need for different persuasive approaches depending the individual addressed. The narrator's commentary is borne out in the speech itself, which opens with the Ajaxes acknowledging (through their vocative address) the widely varied statuses of the men whom they hope to persuade: "Dear friends, you who are pre-eminent among the Argives, you who are of middle estate, you who are of low account..." (269-70). They then turn these stated differences into a concise ***enthymeme***: "Since all of us are not alike in battle [gnomic premise], this is work for all now [conclusion]" (270-71). A second ***enthymeme*** immediately follows, this one with the conclusion/exhortation preceding the premise: "Now let no man let himself be turned back upon the ships...So may Olympian Zeus who grips the thunderbolt grant us a way to the city, when we beat off the attack of our enemies" (272-6). This premise, the ending note of the speech, is an appeal to **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: the Greeks' ultimate goal of capturing Troy may result from heeding the speakers' exhortation. It is a short and relatively simple speech, apt for the battlefield context. But it is effective: Ὣς τώ γε προβοῶντε μάχην ὤτρυνον Ἀχαιῶν, observes the narrator (277).

XIV. Sarpedon addresses Glaucus in 12.310-28 in an attempt to persuade his comrade to take the lead with him in the fighting. His opening argument is an ***enthymeme*** based on the ***êthos*** that he and Glaucus share: the identity of nobility and, consequently, the duty to be leaders of men. The enthymematic premise comes in the form of a rhetorical question: "Why is it you and I are honoured before others with pride

of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups in Lykia...?" (310-14). The conclusion, marked by the conjunction τῶ, is simple: "Therefore it is our duty in the forefront of the Lykians to take our stand, and bear our part of the blazing of battle" (315-16). Although the *enthymeme*'s premise does not perfectly correspond to any of Aristotle's topics (unless as a sort of reverse-topic of considering incentives, in which the incentive precedes rather than follows the desired action), it is nevertheless a commonplace of persuasion throughout the ages—along the lines of *sententiae* such as the Biblical "To whom much is given, much is required" (Luke 12:48), or Spiderman's guiding premise, "With great power comes great responsibility." A second, separate premise follows the conclusion in lines 317-21: Sarpedon appeals to Glaucus' desire for honor by means of a fictional interlocutor, who hypothetically would speak in praise of the two warriors if they "fight in the forefront of the Lykians" (321). Beck speaks of the phenomenon of quoting others within speeches in the *Iliad*, and how one of the two primary functions of such quotation is to persuade by lending authority to the speaker's cause.[94] This rhetorical gesture can also qualify as employing Aristotle's **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)** in its depiction of a hypothetical positive future occurrence that will motivate present action. Another ***enthymeme*** closes the speech in 326-8. The *gnômê* "No man can turn aside nor escape [the spirits of death]" serves as the premise (327), while the conclusion is a reiteration of Sarpedon's main object: "Let us go on and win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others" (328). Such nothing-to-lose logic proves effective, as Glaucus complies (οὐδ' ἀπίθησε, 329) and joins Sarpedon in leading the Lycians into battle.

XV. Poseidon (in the guise of the Aetolian warrior Thoas) delivers a battlefield exhortation to Idomeneus in 13.232-8. He opens with a threat warning cowards against hanging back from the fighting (232-4). An ***enthymeme*** follows, its conclusion stated first in the form of a simple command: "Take up your armour and go with me. We must speed this action together" (234-5). Poseidon then offers two premises to support this

[94] Beck, from a talk at the APA Annual Meeting (January 2007) entitled "Character-Quoted Speech in the *Iliad*." The other main function that quotation serves, according to Beck, is to dramatize strong emotion.

conclusion: first, an appeal to the **topic of greater and less (#4)** arguing that he and Idomeneus, by joining forces, would have an advantage (over a single person working alone): *αἴ κ' ὄφελός τι γενώμεθα καὶ* **δύ' ἐόντε** (236). The second premise, a *gnômê* ("The warcraft even of sad fighters combined turns courage" (237)), builds on this notion of strength in numbers. It is elaborated, in turn, by a final gesture to the present situation: "...νῶϊ δὲ καί κ' ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπισταίμεσθα μάχεσθαι" (238). This closing line also serves both as an appeal to the speaker's (Thoas') own ***êthos*** as an ἀγαθός, and as an instance of ***diathesis*** by means of complementing Idomeneus for his skill and courage in battle. The speech is a success; Idomeneus arms himself and then relays a battle exhortation in turn to his comrade Meriones (13.240-53).

XVI. Polydamas' speech to Hector in 13.726-47 finds him in the familiar role of urging caution in battle strategy. He also resumes his antagonistic tone towards Hector and his recurring complaint that Hector's prowess in warfare is not matched by skill in the βουλῇ (cf. 12.211-14). After making this complaint at some length (726-34), Polydamas turns to the persuasive portion of his speech, a strategic proposal (735-47). It takes the form of an ***enthymeme***, with premises preceding and following the conclusion. The first premise is a description of the situation (736-9), drawing upon observable evidence **(τεκμήρια)** to highlight the difficulties currently encountered by the Trojan soldiers, who are παυρότεροι πλεόνεσσι, κεδασθέντες κατὰ νῆας (739). The conclusion-command follows: "Draw back now, and call to this place all of our bravest..." (740-44). The second premise follows, an argument from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: "Since (γάρ) I fear the Achaians might wreak on us requital for yesterday; since beside their ships lurks a man insatiate of fighting and I think we can no longer utterly hold him from the fighting" (744-7). Despite a lack of conciliatory language, Polydamas' argumentation—aided, perhaps, by the evidence of the battlefield conditions—is convincing to Hector (ἅδε δ' Ἕκτορι μῦθος ἀπήμων (748)), and he complies.

XVII. The speech of Diomedes in 14.110-132—addressed primarily to Agamemnon, secondarily to the assembled Achaeans—contains rhetorical elements, but

it is also a meta-rhetorical speech. That is, it is an argument for the right to make an argument—to be considered an orator. Diomedes makes the speech in response to Agamemnon's proposal to desert the campaign against Troy and sail home, and specifically to the challenge Agamemnon poses in 14.107-9: "Now let someone speak who has better counsel than this was; young man or old; and what he says will be to my liking." The bulk of the speech is Diomedes' defense of his own qualifications for taking such an authoritative stance, counter to the sentiments of his commander-in-chief. This defense is based primarily on an argument from ***êthos***; but it is primarily his father's character and reputation, not his own, to which he appeals. In an attempt to legitimize himself among his aristocratic and older peers, Diomedes asserts that πατρὸς δ' ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐγὼ γένος εὔχομαι εἶναι (113). An elaboration of Tydeus' ancestry, exploits, and wealth follows (115-25). This expanded appeal to *êthos* is not unprecedented among Iliadic speakers—it is a technique most notably employed by Nestor in 1.259-73 and 7.133-58—but Nestor recounts his own past, whereas Diomedes (who is too young to have a past) lays claim to his family history to prove his own worth.[95]

The rhetorical use to which Diomedes puts his family history is clear from the transition to the persuasive portion of his speech. He turns the argument from his father's *êthos* into the premise of an ***enthymeme***: κέκαστο δὲ πάντας Ἀχαιοὺς/ ἐγχείῃ· τὰ δὲ μέλλετ' ἀκουέμεν, εἰ ἐτεόν περ. (124-5). The *enthymeme* conclusion makes clear that Diomedes is leaning on his father's *êthos* to make his argument, and extending that *êthos* to apply to himself:

> Therefore (τῶ, frequent linguistic signal of an *enthymeme* conclusion) you could not, saying that I was base and unwarlike
> by birth, dishonor any word that I speak, if I speak well.
> Let us go back to the fighting wounded as we are. We have to. (14.126-8)

The defiant claim "You could not…dishonour any word that I speak, if I speak well" (οὐκ ἄν με…μῦθον ἀτιμήσαιτε πεφασμένον, ὅν κ' ἐῢ εἴπω) opens up a new

[95] This may reflect the familiarity of the *Iliad*'s audience with the Cyclic tradition (for which see Burgess (2001))—in this case, Tydeus' role in the *Thebais* and Diomedes' in the *Epigonoi*.

dimension to the argument. Thus far, Diomedes has been relying solely on the rhetorical device of *êthos;* now he adds another component to the persuasive mix—namely, an explicit assertion of his prowess at speaking (what Aristotle would term ***logos***). Diomedes not only employs these two foundational-level aspects of Aristotle's rhetorical scheme, he talks about them as part of his claim for a right to be heard and heeded. Having thus laid the groundwork for his authority, Diomedes issues a string of simple commands and strategic instruction (128-32) to end his speech. These instructions skillfully take into account the need both for preserving the leaders' well-being ("we must hold ourselves...clear of missiles, so that none will add to the wound he has got already" (129-30)), and for the leaders to be present on the battlefield to uphold their soldiers' morale ("...but we shall be there to drive them on, since even before this they have favoured their anger" (131-2)). Diomedes' arguments have the desired effect, for when he has finished speaking, οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο (133-4).

XVIII. Hera addresses Aphrodite in 14.198-210 in an attempt to persuade the goddess of love to aid her in seducing Zeus, part of her plan to provide an advantage to the Greeks by distracting Zeus from his βουλή. Perhaps the most cannily manipulative of Iliadic speakers, Hera is not above incorporating deception into her rhetoric. She structures her argument like an ***enthymeme***, beginning with the conclusion/command, "give me loveliness and desirability" (198), but adducing as a premise the false mission to resolve a quarrel between Oceanus and Tethys (200-207). Hera crafts her story so as to arouse Aphrodite's sympathy and to assuage her associations of Hera as an aggressive rival. Her elaboration on Oceanus' and Tethys' identity recalls Hera's vulnerable youth, when they "brought me up kindly in their own house, and cared for me and took me from Rheia, at that time when Zeus of the wide brows drove Kronos underneath the earth" (202-4). Hera's manipulation of her own ***êthos*** in this way serves to lull her audience into trusting her tale. She also employs the technique of ***diathesis*** in the reason that she invents for her request: providing an aphrodisiac to settle a marital quarrel (205-7) is (correctly) calculated to be an irresistible prospect for Aphrodite. In the final lines of her speech, Hera speaks of her desire to use persuasion (παραιπεπιθοῦσα) on Oceanus

and Tethys (208-10). Such an awareness of persuasion—and the use of *talk* about persuasion as part of a larger scheme designed to persuade the unsuspecting addressee—demonstrates Hera's skill at using rhetorical tools. To cap off her display of *diathesis* in dealing with the goddess of love, Hera uses derivatives of the word φίλος in each of the four final lines of the speech:

> ...εὐνῆς καὶ **φιλότητος**, ἐπεὶ χόλος ἔμπεσε θυμῷ.
> εἰ κείνω γ' ἐπέεσσι παραιπεπιθοῦσα **φίλον** κῆρ
> εἰς εὐνὴν ἀνέσαιμι ὁμωθῆναι **φιλότητι**,
> αἰεί κέ σφι **φίλη** τε καὶ αἰδοίη καλεοίμην. (14.207-210)

As a final detail to make her speech's deception convincing, Hera introduces self-interest as a reason for her request—a delayed second premise to her enthymematic conclusion (in line 198) that Aphrodite should give her desirability. "Could I win over with persuasion the dear heart within them...I shall be forever called honoured by them, and beloved," she confesses (208-10). This use of the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**, of course, is an atypical one: instead of promising advantage to the addressee, Hera feigns candor about her own selfish motives. The true rhetorical ploy at work here is an unexpressed argument from likelihood (***eikos***) that plays on Aphrodite's expectations about and knowledge of Hera's *êthos*: proud and vain as she has many times shown herself to be, she is indeed likely to desire the honor and love of the senior gods. This somewhat unfavorable reflection on Hera's character perhaps is also intended to exploit the latent antagonism between the two goddesses, and hence would represent another use of *diathesis*. This combination of argument and deception works exactly as it was intended to do, and Aphrodite happily complies with Hera's request (14.211ff.).

XIX. Hera also delivers the next intermediately-rhetorical speech, this time addressing Zeus in 15.36-45. It is a defense speech of sorts, for she aims to appease Zeus' anger and to persuade him not to punish her for deceiving him in Book 14. She begins by swearing an oath that she is not responsible for the Achaeans' successes. This oath expands to fill six lines, invoking as witnesses first the realms of earth, heaven, and the underworld (36-8), and secondly Zeus' own person and "the bed of marriage between

us: a thing by which I at least could never swear vainly" (39-40). Hera displays both ***diathesis*** and ***êthos*** techniques in these two lines: the flattering and deferential reference to Zeus (σή θ' ἱερὴ κεφαλή) draws upon ***diathesis***, as does the mention of the marriage bed. Zeus, as we have seen in Book 14—and as Hera is well aware—is highly susceptible to the appeal of the marriage bed. Hera invokes her own trustworthy ***êthos*** in the phrase that closes the oath portion of her speech (40). Finally, her claim to take the marriage oath seriously also provides a veiled reproach of her husband—a subtle psychological manipulation that will contributes to putting him in the desired frame of mind (***diathesis***).

The ***logos*** component of Hera's speech occurs in the second half, and consists of a claim of innocence and ignorance in the matter of the Greeks' recent success against the Trojans. She employs an argument from likelihood (***eikos***) to protest her innocence and Poseidon's culpability, basing the argument on Poseidon's ***êthos***: "It is not through my will that the shaker of the earth Poseidon afflicts the Trojans...but it is his own passion that urges him to it and drives him" (41-3). Finally, she returns to ***diathesis*** in the closing lines of the speech, expressing a demure submission to Zeus' authority and guidance: "No, but I myself also would give him counsel to go with you, o dark clouded, that way that you lead us" (45-6). The speech achieves Hera's desired result, as Zeus is appeased (μείδησεν δὲ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, 15.47ff.).

XX. Hector delivers a battlefield exhortation to the Trojans and their allies in 15.486-99, incited by his observation that Teucer's arrows have missed their intended target—himself—by divine intervention (15.458-83). He opens with a common exhortation formula that acts as the conclusion to an ***enthymeme***: ἀνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς/ νῆας ἀνὰ γλαφυράς ("Be men now, dear friends, remember your furious valour along the hollow ships." (487-8)). The enthymematic premise follows, and it is an appeal to "evidence" (***tekmeria***) with the claim to have been an eyewitness (δὴ γὰρ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν) to Zeus' partiality to the Trojans (488-9). A second ***enthymeme*** follows in lines 490-94, similar in argumentation but reversed in structure, so as to form a chiasm with the previous *enthymeme*. Here, the premise comes

first, in the form of a *gnômê* which picks up on the notion of visual evidence: "Easily seen (ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτος) is the strength that is given from Zeus to mortals either in those into whose hands he gives the surpassing glory, or those he diminishes and will not defend them" (490-92). The premise continues by applying this *gnômê* to current situation: "...as now he diminishes the strength of the Argives, and helps us" (493). The second enthymematic conclusion—"Fight on then by the ships together" (494)—ensues. As a final reason or premise for his exhortation, Hector offers an appeal to the **topic of considering incentives and disincentives (#20)**—in this case, the incentives of honor and family: "He has no dishonour when he dies defending his country, for then his wife shall be saved and his children afterwards, and his house and property shall not be damaged..." (496-8). The speech is successful in its object, as we learn from the formulaic narrative comment following it: Ὣς εἰπὼν ὤτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου (500).

XXI. Immediately following this speech of Hector comes another exhortation employing rhetorical elements, delivered by Ajax to the Greek army in 15.502-13. It is as though the two rival warriors are speaking in a sort of remote antiphony (unbeknownst to each other); the narrative of Book 15 leaps back and forth from one side to the other in a series of such speeches, interspersed with fighting scenes, over the course of lines 425-741. Here, Ajax begins by appealing to his audience's sense of shame, addressing them with the rebuke αἰδώς, Ἀργεῖοι (502)—an appeal to the emotions, and hence a use of ***pathos***. He then makes a sarcastic argument from absurdity: "Do you expect, if our ships fall to helm-shining Hektor, you will walk each of you back dryshod to the land of your fathers?" (504-5) This question admits of only one answer, effectively forcing the audience to admit that they have no choice but to fight and save the ships. In addition, the threat that it expresses invokes the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**. Ajax' second rhetorical question calls on the evidence (***tekmeria***) of his audience's own ears for persuasive force, as he asks whether they can hear (ἦ οὐκ...ἀκούετε;) Hector urging his men to burn the Greek ships (506-7). In keeping with the sarcastic tone of the speech, Ajax invests his warning about Hector with a sinister

absurdity: οὐ μὰν ἔς γε χορὸν κέλετ' ἐλθέμεν, ἀλλὰ μάχεσθαι (508). Ajax ends his speech with an ***enthymeme*** that poses as its conclusion an exhortation "to close in and fight with the strength of our hands at close quarters" (510). The premise for this conclusion is a statement of generalized truth—namely, that it is better to take a risk on a bold action, rather than to wait passively for inevitable defeat (as the Greek soldiers are currently doing):

> Better to take in a single time our chances of dying
> or living, than go on being squeezed in the stark encounter
> right up against our ships, as now, by men worse than we are. (511-13)

Such an argument appeals to one of the less common topics that Aristotle identifies, that of **examining whether a better course of action could be taken than that which is being advised or carried out (εἰ ἐνδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως...σκοπεῖν, #25)**. By posing a choice between the bravery and honor of a momentary struggle, and the shame of being slowly "squeezed" (στρεύγεσθαι) by inferior men, Ajax also employs ***diathesis*** once again. This combination of argumentation and awareness of his audience's psychology renders Ajax successful; the Greeks' response is conveyed by the same formula that had followed Hector's corresponding speech in line 15.500 (Ὣς εἰπὼν ὤτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἑκάστου (514)).

XXII. Patroclus addresses an emotional appeal to Achilles in 16.21-45. His primary aim is to convince Achilles to join the fight; his secondary aim (knowing that he is unlikely to succeed in the first, based on Achilles' *êthos*) is to convince Achilles to allow him to fight in his stead. It should be noted that most of the persuasive strategies in this speech were suggested to Patroclus by Nestor in Book 11.656-803 (a persuasive speech in its own right that will be treated below, p. 81ff.). Patroclus opens the speech with a brief use of ***diathesis***, honoring Achilles by calling him φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν. Whether a calculated allusion on Patroclus' part or not, φέρτατος is the same adjective that Nestor had earlier used for Agamemnon when contrasting him with the καρτερός Achilles (1.280-81). In making the claim that none of the Achaeans (not even Agamemnon) stands ahead of Achilles in greatness, Patroclus is surely mindful of the

struggle for superiority and τιμή that has dominated the poem's action and Achilles' consciousness thus far (a consideration that will be confirmed by Achilles' response in 16.49-100). Patroclus then moves on to a different kind of ***diathesis***—an appeal to the emotions of pity for comrades in distress, instead of to those of pride. He gives an amplified account of the Greek warriors' dire situation in 22-9, detailing the wounds of the major chieftains. This account functions like the premise of an *enthymeme* in that it gives a reason for Achilles to take action, but Patroclus never actually states an enthymematic conclusion or makes an explicit request. Instead, he anticipates a negative response to his attempt to persuade Achilles, and launches into a series of reproaches in 29-35: Achilles is impossible (ἀμήχανος), possessed by anger (χόλος), accursedly brave (αἰαρέτη), and above all unnaturally pitiless (νηλεές). Another premise that does not attain full realization as an *enthymeme* can be found in the rhetorical question of lines 31-2, "What other man born hereafter shall be advantaged unless you beat aside from the Argives this shameful destruction?"

Patroclus then moves on to the second part of the speech (lines 36-45), which consists of a nearly direct quote of the words Nestor had suggested he use to persuade Achilles in 11.793-803 (the only difference being the use of second-person rather than third-person verbs in reference to Achilles).[96] He proposes an alternative solution to the Greeks' woes in the event that Achilles is "drawing back from some prophecy known in your own heart/ and by Zeus' will your honoured mother has told you of something" (36-7). This proposal takes the form of an extended ***enthymeme***, whose conclusions are the simple commands "Send me out" (ἐμέ περ πρόες ὦχ' (38)) and "Give me your armour" (δὸς δέ μοι. . .τὰ σὰ τεύχεα (40)). Each of these commands is followed by a premise that argues from the **topic of the consequence (ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος, #13)**: "Send me out…and I may be a light given to the Danaans" (38-9); "Give me your armour…so perhaps the Trojans might think I am you, and give way from their attack, and the fighting sons of the Achaians get wind again after hard work" (40-43). The

[96] I have chosen to treat the rhetorical elements of these lines at the point when they are used on their intended audience, rather than when they are first suggested in Book 11. The credit for these elements, however, goes to Nestor rather than to Patroclus.

gnômê that "there is little breathing space in the fighting" extends the argument of these premises (43). Patroclus' final statement offers yet another premise to his *enthymeme*: the observable fact that fresh fighters are more effective than weary ones: ῥεῖα δέ κ' ἀκμῆτες κεκμηότας ἄνδρας ἀϋτῇ/ ὤσαιμεν προτὶ ἄστυ νεῶν ἄπο καὶ κλισιάων (44-5).

Patroclus' rhetoric is as successful as he could have hoped, given the determination of both Achilles and the βουλὴ Διός. After a long speech of deliberation (16.49-100), Achilles reluctantly assents to letting Patroclus join the battle. It is a curious note that in this speech Patroclus does *not* use the technique—so common among Iliadic speakers—of appealing to his own *êthos*, based on his identity as Achilles' closest companion. This is especially striking given that it is Patroclus who seems to be the only person (thus far) who can persuade Achilles in the *Iliad*, and (as Nagy has noted) it is his status as Achilles' πολὺ φίλτατος…ἑταῖρος (17.411, 655) that ultimately enables him to do what all the other Greeks have tried and failed to do: persuade Achilles to fight.[97] But the lack of a verbal appeal to *êthos* is not the whole story. Patroclus instead *performs* what is in effect the same appeal through gesture and attitude—as though he himself stands as a σῆμα indicating the correct course of action to Achilles. This "semantic" performance accompanying the speech is depicted both by the narrator ("Meanwhile Patroklos came to the shepherd of the people, Achilleus, and stood by him and wept warm tears" (16.2-3)) and by Achilles ("Why then are you crying like some poor little girl, Patroklos, who runs after her mother and begs to be picked up and carried, and clings to her dress, and holds her back when she tries to hurry, and gazes tearfully into her face?" (16.7-10)). Another indication of the place of gesture in Patroclus' rhetoric is the description of his delivery: his speech is framed by the phrases "groaning heavily" (βαρὺ στενάχων (20)) and "supplicating in his great innocence" (λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος (46). His offer to serve as "a light given to the Danaans" and to wear Achilles' armor so that he can stand in his place futher situates him in the role of a σῆμα, a visual marker—to Achilles above all.

[97] See Nagy (1979) 104-9.

XXIII. In response to Zeus deliberating whether to make an exception for Sarpedon with regard to his fated doom on the battlefield, Hera steps in to dissuade him from such a course in 16.440-57. Her first argument is a warning of the other gods' disapproval if Zeus favors his son (ἔρδ'· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι (443)), an appeal to the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20).** She then makes a further warning in lines 445-9, this one taken from the **topic of an earlier judgment about the same or a similar matter, i.e. precedent (ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὁμοίου, #11)**: this would set a precedent by which other gods would clamor for their own children to be saved contrary to their destinies, "since around the great city of Priam are fighting many sons of the immortals. You will waken grim resentment among them" (448-9). This line of reasoning also partakes of the argument from the **topic of consequence (#13)**; the consequences of defying Sarpedon's destiny would be chaos and potentially rebellion among the gods. These various topics are premises of an ***enthymeme*** that comprises the whole speech, and whose conclusion follows in a gentler tone: "No, but if he is dear to you, and your heart mourns for him, then let him be, and let him go down in the strong encounter underneath the hands of Patroklos..." (450-52). The final portion of Hera's argument is a further premise to the same *enthymeme*: it offers a measure of consolation to Zeus by reminding him that Death and "painless" (νήδυμον) Sleep will escort Sarpedon back to his homeland, "where his brothers and countrymen shall give him due burial" (454-7). As is consistently the case, Hera's rhetoric is effective in persuading Zeus, and he does not disobey (οὐδ' ἀπίθησε) her words (458).

XXIV. Hector addresses the Trojan allies with another battlefield exhortation in 17.220-32. His first argument is an assurance that he has not called them to fight for selfish reasons, but so that they could "defend the innocent children of the Trojans, and their wives, from the fighting Achaians" (221-4). This appeal to pity is calculated to evoke in his addressees the memories of their own families, an act of ***diathesis***. It puts into practice Aristotle's discussion of the rhetorical effectiveness of appeal to emotions (*Rhetoric* 2.2-11), in particular his observation that the basis of pity is the nearness in

"age, in character, in habits, in rank, in birth" of the sufferer to oneself, so that one can plausibly imagine the misfortune happening to oneself (2.8.13). Hector exploits this tactic here, evoking the allies' pity (and, he hopes, their aid) by inviting them to identify with the Trojans' suffering. Hector also relies heavily in this speech on an appeal to his own ***êthos*** and that of the people he represents. In particular, he emphasizes the qualities of selflessness, sacrifice, and courage—initially in defense of his request for aid, then as an enthymematic premise for the argument that his audience *should* aid the Trojans. "With such a purpose I wear out my own people for presents and food, wherewith I make strong the spirit within each one of you" (225-6), goes the premise; the ***enthymeme*** concludes with the command, "Therefore [τῶ] a man must now turn his face straight forward, and perish or survive" (227-8). Hector closes the speech with an appeal to the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)** in lines 229-32, a straightforward offer of reward (half the spoils and κλέος equal to Hector's) for any man who can retrieve Patroclus' body from Ajax and the Greeks. The speech is successful, as the allies take immediate action (not even pausing for verbal affirmation) on Hector's suggestion (233-4).

XXV. The next two speeches in this catalogue are in dialogue with each other: the alternate proposals of Polydamas and Hector for dealing with the re-appearance of Achilles on the battlefield. Polydamas speaks first, addressing the Trojan forces in 18.254-83 with a counsel of caution. It is worth noting the narrator's lengthier-than-usual introduction of the speaker, which remarks that ὁ [Polydamas] μὲν ἄρ μύθοισιν, ὁ [Hector] δ' ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα (18.252). Such a comment is consistent with other clues throughout the *Iliad* that point to the poem possessing an evaluative notion of what it means to speak effectively. Polydamas' first (and major) argument is that the Trojans should go on the defensive now that Achilles is again fighting for the Greeks. The ***enthymeme*** proceeds as follows: [conclusion] "I myself urge you to go back into the city and not wait for the divine dawn in the plain…" (254-6). The premises are several; first, an argument resembling Aristotle's **topic of induction (ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, #10)**: "While this man was still angry with great Agamemnon, for all that time the Achaians were easier

men to fight with" (257-8)—from which fact the audience may infer that Achilles' reinstatement into the Achaean forces will make them more difficult men to fight with. Secondly, Polydamas argues from his own experience and from the **topic of consideration of timing (#5)** (according to which a different judgment is made before and after some signal event): "For I also used then to be one who was glad (χαίρεσκον γὰρ) to sleep out near their ships...But now (νῦν δ') I terribly dread the swift-footed son of Peleus" (259-61). As a third premise, Polydamas issues a warning: Achilles' wrath is so violent that he will threaten the very city of Troy and its women (262-5). This threat to the things that the Trojans hold most dear, an argument from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**, also seeks to arouse their emotions of fear, and thus exhibits ***diathesis***. The conclusion to this extended *enthymeme* is restated following the litany of premises: "Let us go into the town; believe me; thus it will happen" (266).

In the second half of his speech, Polydamas largely repeats his arguments from the first half: if the Trojans stay where they are, Achilles will drive them back to the city with heavy casualties; the strategic move would be to pre-empt him by withdrawing now (267-83). The speech ends with practical instructions and an optimistic picture of the results of the recommended course of action ("His valour will not give him leave to burst in upon us nor sack our town" (282-3)). Polydamas demonstrates his awareness of the audience's state of mind by conceding that his counsel may pain them for the moment (εἰ δ' ἂν ἐμοῖς ἐπέεσσι πιθώμεθα **κηδόμενοί** περ... (273)), perhaps calculating that his sympathy will dispose them more favorably towards him. His prowess in speaking, however, is for naught on this occasion: whether he has miscalculated his audience's state of mind, is defeated by Hector's subsequent counter-proposal, or is simply the victim of the inexorable βουλὴ Διός, Polydamas' arguments fail to win over the Trojans.

XXVI. Hector's response to Polydamas in 18.285-309 is aimed not so much at persuading Polydamas himself of a different course of action, but at persuading the entire Trojan audience at hand. His opening line (285) repeats the formula with which he had begun his antagonistic address to Polydamas in 12.231 (Πουλυδάμα, σὺ μὲν οὐκέτ'

ἐμοὶ φίλα ταῦτ' ἀγορεύεις), again targeting for criticism Polydamas' supposed area of expertise. Hector then launches into a section where the technique of ***diathesis*** is at the forefront, strongly identifying himself with the Trojans and their concerns and frustrations:

> Have you not all had your glut of being fenced in our outerworks?
> There was a time when mortal men would speak of the city
> of Priam as a place with much gold and much bronze. But now
> the lovely treasures that lay away in our houses have vanished… (287-90)

Rather than evoking the emotion of fear, as Polydamas had done, Hector stirs up those of anger and indignation in his audience. An ***enthymeme*** follows, pointing to the evidence of the recent improvement in the Trojans' fortunes. Drawing its premise from the **topic of consideration of timing (#5)**, Hector notes that the changing favor of Zeus has made all the difference. The Trojans *had* been doing badly, so long as Zeus was angry with them (290-92); now, however, Zeus' favor has returned (νῦν δ'…μοι ἔδωκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω/ κῦδος ἀρέσθ' ἐπὶ νηυσί (293-4)). The conclusion of this *enthymeme*—"why, fool, no longer show these thoughts to our people" (295)—is directed at Polydamas alone. For the benefit of the wider audience, however, Hector hints at the cowardice of a man who would withdraw from battle even when the gods are favorable.

In the transition to the second half of his speech, as he turns from Polydamas to address the Trojans directly, Hector issues brute commands rather than persuasive arguments. The vocabulary of persuasion, however, persists: "Not one of the Trojans will obey (ἐπιπείσεται) you," he taunts Polydamas; "I shall not allow it. Come, then, do as I say and let us all be persuaded (πειθώμεθα)" (296-7). A series of practical instructions follows, including the ***enthymeme*** that if any Trojan fears for the safety of his possessions, he should donate them to the people, for "it is better for one of our own people to partake in them than for the Achaeans to" (3000-302). It is not until the last lines of the speech that Hector addresses the major point of Polydamas' argument: the threat of Achilles. He employs an appeal to his own ***êthos*** to inspire his men not to fear the Greek champion: "If it is true that brilliant Achilleus is risen beside their ships, then the worse for him if he tries it, since I for my part will not run from him…" (305-8). He

supports this bluster with a *gnômê* designed to preempt the argument that he is no match for Achilles in battle: "The war god is impartial. Before now he has killed the killer" (309). These bold words drown out Polydamas' cautions, however grounded in reality and experiential evidence they had been, and the Trojans roar their approval (310). In a rare narrative gesture, the narrator comments on this persuasive victory, voicing the opinion that although Hector's rhetoric is successful, it is not "good counsel":

> Fools, since Pallas Athene had taken away the wits from them.
> They gave their applause to Hektor in his counsel of evil (κακὰ μητιόωντι),
> but none to Poulydamas, who had spoken good sense before them (ὃς ἐσθλὴν φράζετο βουλήν). (311-13)

This narrative observation also provides an ironic symmetry to the passage, which had begun with a similar comment on these two speeches: that Polydamas has the skill to "win" (ἐνίκα) with μύθοι, Hector to win with the ἔγχος (18.252). As the narrator is well aware, excellence in speaking and strength of argumentation are no guarantee of rhetorical success—a disquieting truth that will hound the debate over rhetoric throughout its Classical-era flourishing. Hector's proposal is exactly what his audience wanted to hear, and on this occasion, ***diathesis*** trumps all other strategies.

XXVII. Odysseus in 19.155-83 delivers as speech addressed primarily to Achilles, but which turns to Agamemnon at the end. The speech is a counter-proposal to Achilles' exhortation to the Greeks (19.146-53) to begin fighting immediately, now that he has decided to rejoin the fight. Odysseus employs ***diathesis*** from his opening line, taking a respectful and flattering tone even while disagreeing with Achilles: μὴ δὴ οὕτως ἀγαθός περ ἐών, θεοείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ (155). He then makes his proposal in the form of a two-part ***enthymeme***, consisting of a negative command and premise ("Do not drive the sons of the Achaians on Ilion when they are hungry, to fight against the Trojans since (ἐπεὶ) not short will be the time of battle, once the massed formations of men have encountered together, with the god inspiring fury in both sides." (155-9)), followed by a positive command and premise ("Rather tell the men of Achaia here by their swift ships, to take food and wine, since (γάρ) these make fighting fury and warcraft." (160-1)). The

latter gnomic premise is then expanded with practical observations about the body's need for sustenance in order to perform well in battle (162-70), after which the enthymematic conclusion is restated: "Come then, tell your men to scatter and bid them get ready a meal" (171-2).

Odysseus then encourages the reconciliation between Agamemnon and Achilles to be confirmed by gifts (172-8). Ever mindful of the need for ***diathesis*** when speaking to Achilles, Odysseus is attentive to his pleasure (σὺ δὲ φρεσὶ σῇσιν ἰανθῇς, 174), and acknowledges the insult to his honor represented by the seizure of Briseis, calling upon Agamemnon to swear that he did not violate certain boundaries (ὀμνυέτω [Ἀγαμέμνων] δέ τοι ὅρκον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἀναστάς,/ μή ποτε τῆς εὐνῆς ἐπιβήμεναι ἠδὲ μιγῆναι, 175-6). Odysseus concludes his speech with an ***enthymeme*** directed at Agamemnon (but still with an awareness of Achilles as his audience). The conclusion comes first—"And you, son of Atreus, after this be more righteous to another man."—followed by the premise, a *gnômê*: "For there is no fault when even one who is a king appeases a man, when the king was the first one to be angry" (181-3). Odysseus' speech is persuasive to Agamemnon, as the king voices his approval of the μῦθος (185) and proceeds to take his advice with a speech of instruction to his chiefs (19.185-97). Achilles, however, is not convinced. Rather than responding directly to Odysseus, he addresses Agamemnon's response to Odysseus; and although he does not try to thwart the king's decision to feed his troops, he makes known his disagreement with the plan (19.205-14).

XXVIII. It is at this point that Odysseus delivers another speech that merits inclusion in this catalogue for exhibiting rhetorical features. This speech (lines 19.216-37) has the same general aim as had Odysseus' previous speech—to convince Achilles of the need to rejuvenate the troops before resuming battle—but it is a more sincere and personalized appeal. Odysseus does not *need* Achilles' permission or agreement, for Agamemnon has already decreed the course of action; ostensibly he has nothing to gain from this appeal. The fact that he even makes it shows Odysseus' concern with accord among the Greeks, and his recognition of the importance of winsome speech in the midst of the power manipulations that have occurred between the chief players

(particularly Agamemnon and Achilles). Odysseus, unlike Agamemnon, understands that persuasion is not only about achieving what one wants in the immediate circumstance, but about winning over the heart and mind of the audience—a longer-term, and ultimately more effective, rhetorical strategy.

Odysseus begins with a flattering address to Achilles, using the same formula as Patroclus had in 16.21: ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηλῆος υἱέ, μέγα φέρτατ' Ἀχαιῶν (216). The adjective φέρτατος is repeated in comparative form in the next line, as Odysseus continues his exercise of ***diathesis*** by comparing himself unfavorably to Achilles in matters of strength: κρείσσων εἰς ἐμέθεν καὶ φέρτερος οὐκ ὀλίγον περ/ ἔγχει (217-8). He then suggests one area of his own ***êthos*** in which he "might overpass" Achilles, couching this notion in the potential optative to retain a deferential tone—namely, that of thought/understanding (νόημα), based on his greater age and life experience (218-19). Odysseus' appeal to his trustworthy ***êthos*** doubles as the premise of an ***enthymeme***, for it is followed by the conclusion, "therefore (τῶ) let your heart endure to listen to my words" (220). A second ***enthymeme*** addresses the specific case that Odysseus is making. It begins with the *gnômê* "when there is battle men have suddenly their fill of it…" (221-4), then applies this commonplace to the particular situation in the premise, "there is no way the Achaians can mourn a dead man by denying the belly" (225-7). His conclusion is a command: "No, but we must harden our hearts and bury the man who dies…and all those who are left about from the hateful work of war must remember food and drink" (228-31). An additional premise follows this conclusion: "…so that afterwards all the more strongly we may fight on forever relentless against our enemies" (231-2). The entire argument is constituted on the **topic of consequence (#13)**, depicting the bad consequences of following Achilles' counsel (men tiring of battle), and the good consequences of following Odysseus' (men having the strength to fight more strongly). With this argument in mind, Odysseus ends his speech on a note that he knows will appeal to Achilles—a battle cry: "Therefore let us drive on together and wake the bitter war god on the Trojans, breakers of horses" (236-7). The narrator records no response

from Achilles to this speech, however. It would seem that the preeminent hero is as impervious to persuasion as ever.

XXIX. Achilles delivers a battlefield exhortation to his Greek comrades in 20.354-63. It is a relatively short speech that relies heavily (but not exclusively) on arguments from ***êthos***. Achilles opens with three stark imperative commands (μηκέτι νῦν Τρώων ἑκὰς **ἕστατε**...ἀνὴρ ἄντ' ἀνδρὸς **ἴτω**, **μεμάτω** δὲ μάχεσθαι (354-5)), forgoing any attempt to prime his audience through ***diathesis***. His premise for issuing these commands is an argument from the **topic of greater and less (#4)**: not even Ares and Athena themselves could take on so many men at the same time; how much less can I, as a mortal, be expected to do so without assistance (356-9)? Achilles embeds within this argument some elements of an appeal to his own ***êthos***, a means of garnering legitimacy for his request. His statement that "it is a hard thing for me, for all my great strength...to fight with all of them" (356-7) reminds the audience of both his extraordinary abilities in warfare, and his willingness to engage in battle, however impossible the odds. As such, he sets himself up as a ***paradeigma*** for his audience to follow. He develops this line of argumentation further in the final lines of the speech (360-63):

> But what I can do with hands and feet and strength I tell you
> I will do, and I shall not hang back even a little
> but go straight on through their formation, and I think that no man
> of the Trojans will be glad when he comes within my spear's range.

If Achilles himself is willing to spare no effort, it follows that the least his comrades can do is stand fast in support of him. He offers the example of his own behavior both to inspire action and to inspire confidence in the Greek warriors.[98] But the result of this "urging" (ἐποτρύνων) is unspecified, for the narrative focus shifts immediately to the other side of the battlefield and Hector's corresponding exhortation to the Trojans (reminiscent of the mirroring speeches of Hector and Ajax in Book 15).

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[98] For further discussion on the use of ***paradeigma*** in the *Iliad*, see Willcock (1964). Willcock observes that "the mythical example is commonly used in speeches in the *Iliad* when one character wishes to influence the actions of another. Usually it is a matter of exhortation or consolation. This is what is meant by a paradeigma." (147) (Following Aristotle, my definition of the term ***paradeigma*** does not require it to be "mythical;" as in this instance, it can point to the example of the speaker's own behavior.)

XXX. Hector exhorts his men in lines 20.366-72 with a speech that is an ***enthymeme*** in its entirety, beginning with the conclusion in the form of the speech-opening command "Do not be afraid of Peleion" (366). The premise is built on an appeal to the commonplace, generally-acknowledged in the Iliadic context, that the gods, who "are far stronger than we are" (368) give unmitigated success to no man—including Achilles. "Even Achilleus will not win achievement of everything he says. Part he will accomplish, but part shall be baulked halfway done" (369-70), observes Hector, relying on his audience's agreement with the premise concerning the gods. In this argument, he draws upon the **topic of considering contradictories, whether in dates, actions, or words (τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ πάντων καὶ χρόνων καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, #22)**. Hector ends by invoking his own *êthos* as he, like Achilles before him, attempts to inspire his men by example: "I am going to stand against him now, though his hands are like flame, though his hands are like flame, and his heart like the shining of iron" (371-2). The encouragement is successful; the Trojans lift their spears to fight (373).

XXXI. The ghost of Patroclus pleads with Achilles to bury him in 23.69-92. The speech draws primarily on the technique of ***diathesis***, as Patroclus invokes his relationship to and shared history with Achilles. He knows what will stir up sym*pathê*tic emotions in his listener. The speech opens with a reproach ("You sleep, Achilleus; you have forgotten me" (69)), contrasting Achilles' current behavior with a reminder of the past ("...but you were not careless of me when I lived, but only in death" (70)). The command to bury him and let him pass through the gates of Hades is followed by an appeal to pity (***pathos***), as Patroclus chronicles his miserable liminal existence (71-4). He then moves on to a recollection of shared memories, calculated both to invoke pity in Achilles and to remind him of the bond that had existed between them: "No longer shall you and I, alive, sit apart from our other beloved companions and make our plans, since the bitter destiny that was given me when I was born has opened its jaws to take me" (77-9). Patroclus makes a second request in 82-4 (repeated in 91-2), begging that his ashes be laid in the same urn as Achilles' when *he* dies. His persuasion tactic for this

request moves from the specificity of ***pathos*** to the broader ***diathesis***: in calling for an interment together with Achilles, he appeals to his and Achilles' shared past in order to engender favorable feeling: "...just as we grew up together in your house, when Menoitios brought me there from Opous, when I was little...There the rider Peleus took me into his own house, and brought me carefully up, and named me to be your henchman" (84-90). Patroclus' mention of Peleus is a technique frequently used by speakers attempting to persuade Achilles (see also Phoenix in 9.434-605, Patroclus in 16.21-45, and Priam in 24.486-506). Those who know him well realize that, for persuasive purposes, invoking his father is one of the only ways of putting Achilles in a favorable—or at least susceptible-to-appeal—frame of mind. The *pathêtic* memories that Patroclus recounts in 84-90 serve as the premise to an ***enthymeme*** conclusion in 91-2: "Therefore, let one single vessel, the golden two-handled urn the lady your mother gave you, hold both our ashes," the ὁμὴ of this image of their ashes mingling in the urn corresponding to the ὁμοῦ of line 84, referring to the two heroes' childhood together. Patroclus ends his speech with the word μήτηρ (thus invoking both Achilles' parents in his thorough exercise of ***diathesis***), and achieves his object: Achilles responds that πάντα μάλ' ἐκτελέω καὶ πείσομαι ὡς σὺ κελεύεις (96).

XXXII. The final four speeches in this catalogue are all part of the same dialogue between Priam and Achilles in Book 24. Priam speaks first, addressing a stunned Achilles in 24.486-506 with a request for Hector's body. His opening tactic is an indirect appeal to pity, based on the association between himself and Achilles' father: "Achilleus like the gods, remember your father, one who is of years like mine, and on the door-sill of sorrowful old age. And they who dwell nearby encompass him and afflict him..." (486-92).[99] In visualizing Peleus' sad and lonely experience and comparing it to his own, Priam avails himself of the rhetorical strategies of both ***êthos*** and ***pathos***. Invoking his past *êthos* as a powerful king in order to emphasize the pitiable depths to which he has

[99] Macleod (1982), in his commentary on *Iliad* 24, remarks that this speech "begins straightaway with its main point; supplications in Homer are normally introduced in a more elaborate way; see 15.662-3, 22.338; *Od.* 11.67-8, 15.261-2. The abruptness betokens intense feeling." (127) I would add that there is calculation as well as emotion in this strategy: Priam knows the importance of Peleus to Achilles, and wastes no time in invoking the parallel which will be the basis for his supplication.

fallen, he employs both gesture and words to perform his current *êthos*: that of an old man, vulnerable and inoffensive. By doing this, Priam intends Achilles to recognize the traits of his own father; he uses this association, in turn, to put Achilles in a sym*pathê*tic frame of mind (***diathesis***). Priam's manipulation of the emotion of pity exhibits a perceptiveness that closely resembles Aristotle's theoretical treatment of pity in *Rhetoric* 2.8:

> Let pity be [defined as] a certain pain at an apparently destructive or painful evil happening to one who does not deserve it and *which a person might expect himself or one of his own to suffer,* and this when it seems close at hand...The kind of people who think they might suffer are those...that have parents or children or wives; for these are their "own" and subject to the sufferings that have been mentioned... (2.8.2-5)[100]

Continuing his focus on arousing pity within his listener, Priam next recounts the loss of his own sons and the sorrow it has brought on him (αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ πανάποτμος (493)), an ominous precedent for the parallel with Peleus. In this section, he uses amplification (αὔξησις) of the numerical magnitude of his loss to emphasize the piteousness of his situation[101]:

> ...τέκον υἷας ἀρίστους
> Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ, **τῶν δ' οὔ τινά** φημι λελεῖφθαι.
> **πεντήκοντά** μοι ἦσαν, ὅτ' ἤλυθον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν·
> ἐννεακαίδεκα μέν μοι ἰῆς ἐκ νηδύος ἦσαν,
> τοὺς δ' ἄλλους μοι ἔτικτον ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γυναῖκες.
> **τῶν μὲν πολλῶν** θοῦρος Ἄρης ὑπὸ γούνατ' ἔλυσεν·
> **ὃς δέ μοι οἶος ἔην**, εἴρυτο δὲ ἄστυ καὶ αὐτούς,
> **τὸν σὺ πρῴην κτεῖνας** ἀμυνόμενον περὶ πάτρης,
> Ἕκτορα...
>
> ...I have had the noblest
> of sons in Troy, but I say not one of them is left to me.
> Fifty were my sons, when the sons of the Achaians came here.
> Nineteen were born to me from the womb of a single mother,
> and other women bore the rest in my palace; and of these
> violent Ares broke the strength in the knees of most of them,

[100] Note that Aristotle here emphasizes the sympathetic character of pity: pity does not have to be linked only to what might befall oneself, but may be felt for the sake of loved ones—an aspect often overlooked in readings of the *Poetics*.

> but one was left me who guarded my city and people, that one
> you killed a few days since as he fought in defence of his country,
> Hektor... (493-501)

Macleod identifies in this passage yet another Aristotelian technique: "By numbering and classifying his sons Priam gives more weight to his loss: cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1365a10 'a single subject when divided into parts seems more impressive.'" He further observes that the fact "that Priam goes on...to treat Hector as his 'only' son has argumentative and emotive value. It stresses the analogy between himself and Peleus; it also represents the strength of his grief at losing Hector."[102] Here, at last, Priam introduces the reason for his visit. His request takes a deferential form: no imperative demand, only the statement that "I come now to the ships of the Achaians to win him back from you" (501-2). As a premise, he offers a simple argument from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: "I bring you gifts beyond number" (502). Whether he is attuned to the fact that Achilles is historically unmoved by gifts, or is simply a canny judge of effective rhetoric for a given audience, Priam touches on the incentive only briefly. Instead, he offers a final ***enthymeme*** that returns to his original tactics of ***êthos*** and ***pathos***. The conclusion—"Honour then the gods, Achilleus, and take pity upon me"—is followed by a premise that brings the speech full circle: "...remembering your father, yet I am still more pitiful" (503-4).

In the final lines of the speech, Priam gestures to his self-abasement in order to stir up the pity of Achilles (***pathos***): "I have gone through what no other mortal on earth has gone through; I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my children" (505-6). This deictic technique, with the speaker using himself as a σῆμα, is one that we have seen exercised on Achilles in the past (see Patroclus' speech of 16.21-45). It is also a strikingly prescient example of Aristotle's theory on arousing pity (a continuation of the passage cited above):

[102] Macleod (1982) 128-9.

> And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear near at hand...necessarily those are more pitiable who contribute to the effect by gestures and cries and display of feelings and generally in their acting (ὑπόκρισις); for they make the evil seem near by making it appear before [our] eyes...For this reason signs (σημεῖα) and actions (πράξεις) [contribute to pity]. (*Rhetoric* 2.8.14-16)

Priam is clearly effective in stirring up Achilles' emotions; the narrator takes care to note that Ὣς φάτο, τῷ δ' ἄρα πατρὸς ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο (507). A bond is thus forged between the two enemies as they weep together. It will take more discussion, however, before Achilles is persuaded to accede to Priam's request.[103]

XXXIII. Achilles' lengthy response to Priam in 24.518-51 contains a relatively brief instance of rhetorical persuasion; most of the speech is a reflection on the unhappy life of mortals, expanding upon Priam's lament over his own and Peleus' misfortunes. In this, Macleod notes, it resembles the later genre of *consolatio*: "Just as the sufferings of legendary heroes are invoked to console ordinary men, so here the sufferings of ordinary men are invoked to console a legendary hero."[104] Achilles turns from consolation to exhortation of Priam at two points within the speech, however, both of which involve the use of ***enthymeme***. In 522-6, he urges Priam to "Come, then, and sit down upon this chair, and you and I will even let our sorrows lie still in the heart for all our grieving." Following this conclusion are two premises, both gnomic: "[For (γάρ)] there is not any advantage to be won from grim lamentation. Such is the way the gods spun life for unfortunate mortals, that we live in unhappiness." At the end of the speech, Achilles employs another ***enthymeme*** to encourage Priam, but with an only slightly different gnomic premise: "But bear up, nor mourn endlessly in your heart [conclusion], for (γάρ) there is not anything to be gained from grief for your son; you will never bring him back [premise]" (549-51).

XXXIV. Priam ignores Achilles' attempt to placate him, and responds by persisting in his original request (24.553-8). This brief response speech contains an ***enthymeme***, comprised of the conclusion/command that Achilles release Hector's body,

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[103] The question of who or what *does* persuade Achilles in the *Iliad* is addressed in section III.C, "Persuasion and Achilles," below.

[104] Macleod (1982) 131-2.

followed by a premise drawn from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: "Accept the ransom we bring you, which is great. You may have joy of it, and go back to the land of your own fathers, once you have permitted me to go on living..." (555-8). This perfunctory argument reveals the strain of impatience in Priam; short imperative commands have replaced the more nuanced rhetorical techniques of his first speech (such as recollection of the past and appeals to emotion and ***êthos***). His stated incentive—that Achilles will be able to enjoy the ransom back in his homeland—betrays his lack of audience sensitivity (***diathesis***), ignorant as he is of the fact that Achilles is destined never to return home. (It is a moment of dramatic irony: the Iliadic narrator and audience, and indeed Achilles himself, know that Priam's promise holds no weight; only Priam remains naïve.) In addition, Priam displays presumption—a quality which Achilles despises—with the expectant participle ἔασας ("...once you have permitted me..." (557)). This lack of ***diathesis*** not only renders the speech ineffective, it undoes some of the goodwill that Priam's earlier speech had engendered. Achilles nearly retracts his intention to grant Priam's request in his fierce response of 24.559-70.

XXXV. The final speech in this catalogue occurs after the storm between Achilles and Priam has passed and Achilles has relinquished Hector's body (prompted more by the gods' orders than by Priam's rhetoric (24.560-62)). One final act of persuasion is needed, however: in 24.599-620, Achilles attempts to convince Priam to cease from grieving and take sustinence, just as others had urged Achilles to do when he was in mourning for Patroclus (19.216-37, 303-4). After opening his speech with a reminder of his concession to Priam (599-601), Achilles launches into an ***enthymeme*** to make his case. The conclusion is stated in the form of the simple command "now you and I must remember our supper" (μνησώμεθα δόρπου (601)); but as Macleod points out, Achilles' use of the first-person verb indicates "sym*pathê*tic participation," a subtle touch of ***diathesis*** exerted to encourage Priam.[105] The premise is spun out at greater length, for it involves the ***paradeigma*** of the Niobe story, beginning with a clear statement of the example to be followed: "For (γάρ) even Niobe, she of the lovely tresses, remembered to

[105] Macleod (1982) 139-40.

eat (ἐμνήσατο σίτου), whose twelve children were destroyed in her palace…" (602-17)).[106] Having repeated the phrase "she remembered to eat" one more time in 613, Achilles caps the *paradeigma* with a restatement of his conclusion in 618-19: "Come then, we also, aged magnificent sir, must remember to eat (μεδώμεθα σίτου)." He ends his speech on a consoling note, reminding Priam that when he returns to Troy, he will be able to mourn Hector at length, and assuring him that "he will be much lamented" (πολυδάκρυτος δέ τοι ἔσται (620)). By showing consideration for Priam's greatest concern, Achilles displays the crucial element of ***diathesis***. His persuasion is effective; Priam does not respond verbally, but he assents to eating (24.627-8).

B. Complex Speeches

Now that I have presented the Iliadic speeches that display a modest rhetorical component (by employing features listed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), I move on to those that—like Odysseus' speech in 2.284-332—partake of a greater number of rhetorical features, or extend these features to greater length.

I. Again proceeding chronologically through the *Iliad*, the first of these more significant speeches is delivered by Nestor in 1.254-84.[107] He addresses both Agamemnon and Achilles in an effort to mitigate their quarrel, opening with an invocation of shame for the sorrow that the quarrel is bringing upon the Greeks: ὢ

[106] For further discussion of the Niobe paradigm, see Willcock (1964) and Held (1987). Willcock defines ***paradeigma*** as "a myth introduced for exhortation or consolation" (142). This definition is more specific than the one Aristotle gives, namely that a paradigm is "to speak of things that have happened before" or "to make up [an illustration]" (*Rhetoric* 2.20.2). Willcock (following Kakridis (1949)) focuses his attention on the *ad hoc inventio* of Achilles' ***paradeigma***, as demonstrated by the unique detail of Niobe's refusal to eat in this account of the myth; Held discusses the similarities between Achilles' use of the Niobe myth and Phoenix's use of the Meleager myth in Book 9.

[107] The diction of Nestor has received considerable scholarly attention: see Dickson (1995) on the narrative authority and the mediating powers of Nestor, and Martin (1989) on Nestor as the *muthos* speaker *par excellence*. Dickson has noted that, along with Nestor's longevity, "the command of persuasive speech" is the most prominent feature of his characterization; that "he is also the speaker whose counsel is most often styled 'best' (ἀρίστη) in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 2.370-72; 7.324-25 = 9.93-94)"; and that his advice "most consistently earns the respect, approval and obedience of his fellow Akhaians" (10). According to Martin, Nestor is presented as the "ideal speaker in the *Iliad*" based on his mastery of authoritative speech (*muthoi*), noting that Nestor "directs the greatest number of muthoi to others, but is himself never the recipient of such commands" (59). These commands encompass the persuasive strategies, in Martin's typology, of praise and control (61) and recollection (80ff; Nestor is "the master of this genre" of recollection as persuasion).

πόποι, ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ἱκάνει (254). The πένθος that Nestor refers to is elaborated in the following lines. Making an argument from Aristotle's **topic of the consequence (#13)**, he envisions the glee of Priam if he were to discover the Greeks' internal quarrel (255-8). This topic serves as the premise for an ***enthymeme*** whose conclusion is the simple command, ἀλλὰ πίθεσθ' (259), with the implication that they should "be persuaded" to cease from quarreling.

Nestor then makes an appeal based on his own ***êthos***, beginning with the authority engendered by his seniority (ἄμφω δὲ νεωτέρω ἐστὸν ἐμεῖο (259)). He also invokes the example of men he has dealt with in the past—"better men than you"—who did not disregard him (260-61).[108] This argument employs both the **topic of an earlier judgment about the same or a similar matter, i.e. precedent (#11)**, and the **topic of greater and less (#4)**. The latter goes like this: if the men of an earlier generation, who were greater warriors than you, obeyed me (καὶ μέν μευ βουλέων ξύνιεν πείθοντό τε μύθῳ (273)), how much more should you, lesser warriors, obey (ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ὔμμες (274)). In lines 262-72, Nestor expands upon this earlier generation of superior men that he had known as a ***paradeigma*** for his current audience: κάρτιστοι δὴ κεῖνοι ἐπιχθονίων τράφεν ἀνδρῶν·/ κάρτιστοι μὲν ἔσαν καὶ καρτίστοις ἐμάχοντο (266-7); and he again highlights his own ***êthos*** by counting himself a part of their company (καὶ μὲν τοῖσιν ἐγὼ μεθομίλεον (269)). At the end of this paradigmatic section, Nestor inserts a miniature ***enthymeme***, with a conclusion/command followed by a gnomic premise: "Do you also obey, since (ἐπεὶ) to be persuaded is better" (274).

In the final part of his speech (275-84), Nestor addresses each of the quarreling rivals in turn, and tailors his appeal to the individual. He turns to Agamemnon first, commanding him (with a flattering nod to his high status, ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν (275)) not to take Briseis away from Achilles, adding as an afterthought the reminder that the Achaeans themselves had given her to him (275-6). Turning to Achilles, he argues from an ***enthymeme*** that again takes the form of a conclusion/command supported by a

[108] Martin (1989) gives a different name to this strategy (recollection), but likewise identifies it as a persuasive technique based on a claim to authority: Nestor "uses the device of recalling the past in order to legitimate his claim on authority in the present (I.259-74)." (80)

gnômê: "Nor, son of Peleus, think to match your strength with the king, since (ἐπεὶ) never equal with the rest is the portion of honour of the sceptred king to whom Zeus gives magnificence" (277-9). The next lines—still directed at Achilles—attribute to each of them different aspects of ἀριστεία, an attempt at ***diathesis*** through flattery and recognition of their individual claims to superiority: εἰ δὲ **σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι**, θεὰ δέ σε γείνατο μήτηρ,/ ἀλλ' **ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν**, ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσιν ἀνάσσει (280-81). This complimentary language is emphasized by complementary syntax and metrical structure. Finally, Nestor makes a personal appeal to Agamemnon (relying on the pull of his ***êthos*** by using the first-person pronoun) to end the speech. The appeal is another ***enthymeme***, based in necessity; he entreats Agamemnon to give up his anger because Achilles "stands as a great bulwark of battle over all the Achaians" (282-4). The speech pleases Agamemnon, but it is unsuccessful in its aim to stem the hostilities between the two warriors. Whether because of a lack of attentiveness to his audience's (particularly Achilles') states of mind and the rhetorical techniques required thereby, or simply because of the demands of the plot, Nestor's rhetoric fails to convince in this situation.[109]

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[109] This speech has attracted considerable attention for its rhetorical sophistication. White (1984) deals with the use of *peitho* in the speech, remarking that "Nestor seeks to persuade the men to a form of reconciliation that itself operates by a kind of mutual persuasion" (36ff.). Martin (1989) notes that in the very arrangement of the speech, "binary structures abound, presenting a rhetorical model, or icon, for two-sidedness...the command to be reconciled is rigorously "proportionate" [κατὰ μοῖραν, as Agamemnon calls it in 1.286] at the poetic level, down to the rhythm and structure of each verse, as it is at the rhetorical level, according praise and blame equally to Agamemnon and Achilles." Martin also sees this speech as typical of Nestor, and argues that in its "application of gnomic precedents and the employment of recollection" as well as in its "fluency, length, and authority," it is the speech style that is valued most highly throughout the *Iliad* (101-3).

Toohey's (1994) analysis of this speech, like mine, identifies formal rhetorical elements, although he focuses more on its structure than its content. He analyzes it as follows:

254-8 (*exordium*): The Trojans would rejoice if they knew of the dissension amongst the Greeks.

259-61 (*prothesis*): Be persuaded (*pithesthe*: 259). I once associated with better men than you, and they listened to me.

261-71 (*paradeigma* = *pistis*): Nestor explains how the Lapiths took his advice (were persuaded) when he helped them fight against the Centaurs.

271-74 (*prothesis*): They were better than you and they listened to me. Be persuaded (*pithesthe*: 274).

275-84 (*epilogue*): Advice for Achilles and Agamemnon: (be persuaded) cease from your anger.

Toohey adds that "We could also mention some of the rhetorical techniques utilized by Nestor. Amongst others there is the application of a *paradeigma* (the story of the Lapiths and Centaurs) and, within that, the vivid listing of famous combatants' names (a real appeal to the past) and the vivid frame for the example provided by the use in anaphora of forms of *peithomai* ("be persuaded": 1.259, 1.273 and 1.274); there are

II. Odysseus, 2.284-332. See above, Section II ("Model Passages") for an analysis of this speech.

III. Sarpedon addresses Hector in 5.472-92 with an exhortation to fight that is more rhetorically elaborate than most. It is itself spurred by a brief exhortation delivered by Ares (in the guise of Akamas) to the Trojan army in 5.464-9. Sarpedon's opening tactic employs ***diathesis*** through a taunt designed to arouse the emotion of shame: "Where now, Hektor, has gone that strength that was yours?" (472). Continuing to question Hector's dedication to the fighting, Sarpedon makes an appeal to the **topic of consideration of timing (#5)** in lines 473-7: Hector made a boast in the past (φῆς **που**...)—namely, that he could defend Troy with his family alone—which he is failing to fulfill in the present (τῶν **νῦν** οὔ τιν' ἐὼ ἰδέειν δύναμ'...). He draws attention to concrete, visual evidence by the wording "I am not able to see anyone" of Hector's family, and continues to evoke shame in his addressee by claiming that his brothers and brothers-in-law "slink away like hounds who circle the lion, while we, who are here as your companions, carry the fighting" (476-7). This reminder of his own contribution to the war effort works as a simultaneous appeal to ***êthos*** and ***paradeigma***, an appeal that Sarpedon elaborates upon in 478-84 as he details the personal sacrifices he has made to support the Trojans. This passage also initiates an extended ***enthymeme***, for which the premise is an argument from the **topic of greater and less (#4)**:

> I have come, a companion to help you, from a very far place...
> Yet even so I drive on my Lykians, and myself have courage
> to fight my man in battle, though there is nothing of mine here
> that the Achaians can carry away as spoil or drive off.

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other repetitions of words and sound and, in addition, metonymy, antithesis, and litotes. There is personification of a type in the *exordium*. The epilogue utilizes dramatically the technique of apostrophe. **That there are similarities, albeit not overwhelming ones, between this small speech and later oratory is evident.** The differences are also marked. The logic of the speech is anecdotal and is deliberately tied to the character of the speaker—the latter surely a crucial point in this literary medium. The speech too is patterned in ring form—something less immediately evident in later rhetoric. But the major points remain to be made. **The logic of Nestor's utterance is apparent and is clearly and precisely articulated...But it is a logic based upon the paradigm, rather than on real proof or *pistis*"** (154-5; emphasis added). I would argue that Toohey understates his case by calling the use of paradigm and appeal to the speaker's character features of the "literary medium," and seeing them as points of difference between Nestor's speech and "later oratory." As we have seen, these very features play a prominent role in Aristotle's typology of rhetoric.

But you: you stand here, not even giving the word to the rest
of your people to stand fast and fight in defence of your own wives. (478-86)

Hector and the Trojans—with greater responsibility and more to lose than Sarpedon and the Lycians—should be fighting with proportionally greater ferocity; this is not, however, the case.[110] Having stated this as a premise (and as another source of shame), Sarpedon concludes the *enthymeme* with the command not to "be taken as war-spoil and plunder by the men who hate you" (488). He invokes both fear and shame in the last lines of his speech, warning that the Greeks' imminent assault on Troy should be a constant concern for Hector (490), as should be the avoidance of reproof (κρατερὴν δ' ἀποθέσθαι ἐνιπήν (492)) (reproof such as Sarpedon himself is now issuing). The speech is effective, and indeed merits the unusually descriptive narrative comment δάκε δὲ φρένας Ἕκτορι μῦθος (493). Hector is depicted leaping from his chariot, shaking two spears, and roaming throughout the army "stirring men up to fight and waking the hateful warfare" (494-6)—exactly what Sarpedon had called for.

IV. Nestor addresses the assembled Greek army in 7.124-60 with an exhortation in response to Hector's public challenge to the Greeks of a duel (7.67-91).[111] No one save

[110] Achilles uses a similar argument to indict Agamemnon in 1.152-60 and 9.328-47.

[111] On this speech, Dickson (1995) finds significant Nestor's claim to have an authoritative inventory of all the Greeks (line 7.128), presumably pre-existing even the narrator's own catalogue of ships in Book 2. Nestor's "extradiegetic analepsis" (narration of events outside the scope of the poem), as Dickson calls it, is remarkable when compared with the narrator's stated reliance on the Muses to produce a similar catalogue: "The old man draws on no source other than that of his own vast personal memory...His authority for what he says is grounded in what he himself has *seen*, not in some mediated access—e.g. hearsay—to the events in question." (73-5)

Toohey (1994) analyzes this speech as having rhetorical elements (cf. his analysis of Nestor's 1.254-84 speech in n. 13 above). His analysis focuses primarily on the structure of the speech, rather than on the argumentation:

"124-31 (*exordium*): Peleus would want to die if he heard that the Achaeans were cowering before Hector.

132-5 (*prothesis*): I wish I were young again (*ai gar...heboim*: 132- 33).

136-56 (*paradeigma = pistis*): I once killed Ereuthalion, champion of our opponents. He had the armour of Areithous.

157-58 (*prothesis*): I wish I were young (*eith' hos hebooimi*: 157); then I would fight Hector.

159-60 (epilogue): But you all do not want to fight Hector.

"The pattern of this speech is remarkable in its similarity to that at 1.254-84. (We are again witnessing a carefully constructed speech.)...Several aspects of this paraenetic speech require stress. The logic of the *paradeigma* is identical to that of the first of Nestor's speeches. It makes its claim for persuasion on that most popular of rhetorical tropes, an appeal to the past — specifically Nestor's. The speech also evinces the

Menelaus rises to the challenge; and after Agamemnon has dissuaded Menelaus from the task (see above, pp. 22-3), Nestor attempts to stir up the spirits of better-qualified challengers. His opening move is an appeal to shame (***diathesis***) in several different manifestations. He addresses the audience as ὢ πόποι, then continues with the guilt-inducing statement that "great sorrow settles on the land of Achaia" (124). The reason for such sorrow is elaborated upon in the next seven lines, and channeled through the invoked presence of Peleus. "Surely he would groan aloud, Peleus, the aged horseman, the great man of counsel among the Myrmidons," intones Nestor (125-6). Using the authority vested in Peleus' ***êthos*** to arouse the emotions of shame and guilt in his audience (***pathos***), Nestor projects from Peleus' joyful reaction to the noble men of the past (127-8) what his response would be to the cowardly ones of the present: "Now if he were to hear how all cringe away before Hektor, many a time he would lift up his very hands to the immortals, and the life breath from his limbs would go down into the house of Hades" (129-31).

Embedded in the ***diathesis*** of the previous section is Nestor's appeal to his own ***êthos***: *he* is an authority on what Peleus' response would be, because he and Peleus were comrades and interacted in the past ("Once, as he questioned me in his house, he was filled with great joy..." (127-8)). Nestor continues to leverage his own ***êthos*** in the next section of his speech, an extended recollection of a scene from the war between the Pylians and Arcadians. In that war, Nestor had himself played the role of hero in a duel against the Arcadian hero Ereuthalion—a duel with many parallels to the one Hector is currently proposing, including the fact that the "bravest" (ἄριστοι) of the Pylians "were all afraid and trembling: none had the courage" (151). Not only does Nestor extol his own ***êthos*** with phrases such as ἀλλ' ἐμὲ θυμὸς ἀνῆκε πολυτλήμων πολεμίζειν/ θάρσεϊ ᾧ· γενεῇ δὲ νεώτατος ἔσκον ἁπάντων (152-3), he also sets himself up as a

paratactic, oral compositional mode of ring form (ABCBA), stressed also by Kirk...But at the same time the technique used by this speech — the reminiscence — is totally in keeping with the ethos of old Nestor. Reminiscence is a ploy of the powerless, but, and we could emphasize this, the reminiscence occurs as a paradigm." (157-8)

paradeigma to be followed.[112] This recollection of a past feat turns into an implied ***enthymeme***, beginning with a premise that argues from the **topic of greater and less (#4)**: Nestor contrasts his own willingness to duel against Hector—despite his old and feeble state (less reason to fight)—with the reluctance of the Greek warriors, who are much younger and in better condition (greater reason to fight) (157-60). His final statement is not a typical enthymematic conclusion or command, but it does convey strong prescriptive implications: "But you, now, who are the bravest of all the Achaians, are not minded with a good will to go against Hektor" (159-60). Nestor's "scolding," as the narrator characterizes it (ὣς νείκεσσ' ὁ γέρων (161)), is successful: nine warriors immediately volunteer, and Ajax is chosen by lot for the duel.

V. Hector addresses the Trojans and their allies in 8.497-541 in a battlefield speech following a period of Trojan success in the fighting, as they have pressed forward to the Achaean ships. It is a speech aimed at both exhorting his audience to future fighting, and convincing them of adopting his strategy in the present. Hector opens with a command (κέκλυτέ μευ (497)) followed by an explanation of his strategy (to leave off from pursuing the Greeks now that it is nightfall (498-502)). Even in proposing this course of action, Hector highlights his own confidence and courage (drawing attention to his ***êthos***): "Now I had thought that, destroying the ships and all the Achaians, we might take our way back once more to windy Ilion, but the darkness came too soon, and this beyond all else rescued the Argives and their vessels along the beach where the sea breaks. But now let us give way to black night's persuasion..." In addition, Hector bolsters the Trojans' confidence by postulating that the Argives would have been thoroughly defeated if not for the external (and temporary) circumstance of encroaching darkness. Beginning with the hortatory subjunctive command to "be persuaded by black night" (πειθώμεθα νυκτὶ μελαίνῃ (502)), Hector issues a series of simple, practical commands for nighttime preparations in lines 503-9. The final command—to bring piles of firewood—turns into the conclusion of an ***enthymeme***, followed by a series of reasons

[112] Dickson (1995) makes the point that Nestor, in contrast to the younger heroes of the *Iliad*, "is compelled to be *the singer of his own tales*," since "he has lived well beyond his heroism and also beyond its original witnesses" (36).

or premises. These premises expand from the more practical and mundane concerns to the more strategic and far-reaching: "so that (ὧς) all night long…we may burn many fires" (508-9); "so that not (μή) in the night-time the flowing-haired Achaians may set out to run for home" (510-11); "[further conclusion] No, not thus in their own good time must they take to their vessels, but in such a way that a man of them at home will still nurse his wound…[premise] so that (ἵνα) another may shrink hereafter from bringing down fearful war on the Trojans" (512-16). This expanded *enthymeme* draws upon the rhetorical technique of **amplification (αὔξησις)** of the reason; and the last argument—that the Trojans ought to harass the Achaeans so that their misfortune would dissuade men from fighting against the Trojans in future—draws upon the **topic of consequence (#13)**.

A second serial ***enthymeme*** construction follows this one, as Hector gives commands to the heralds to instruct the boys, old men, and women in Troy to complete various tasks in order to guard the city. The command-conclusions of this *enthymeme* culminate in the general admonishment to "let there be a watch kept steadily" (521), followed by the premise: "…lest (μή) a sudden attack get into the town when the fighters have left it" (522)—again, an appeal to the **topic of consequence (#13)**. Hector caps his instructions and their attendant reasons with a meta-referential imperative that things "be thus…as I tell you" (ὧδ' ἔστω…ὡς ἀγορεύω (523)), repeating the sentiment for emphasis in the following line and characterizing his speech as a μῦθος (524). He follows this command with a prayer to the gods in 526-8 that the Trojans would be able to drive off the Greeks. By referring to himself as "hopeful" (ἐλπόμενος) that this task can be accomplished, and by speaking of the Greeks as "dogs swept into destruction" (κύνας κηρεσσιφορήτους), Hector exerts ***diathesis***, attempting to evoke the emotions of confidence and fighting fury in his audience.

In the final portion of his speech, Hector turns to the example of his own ***êthos***. He draws attention to his willingness to fight Diomedes despite the uncertainty of the outcome, thereby providing a ***paradeigma*** and an inspiration for his men:

> [Tomorrow] I shall know if the son of Tydeus, strong Diomedes,
> will force me back from the ships against the wall, or whether I
> shall cut him down with the bronze and take home the blooded war-spoils.
> Tomorrow he will learn his own strength, if he can stand up to
> my spear's advance; but sooner than this, I think, in the foremost
> he will go down under the stroke, and many companions about him. (532-7)

This note of confidence is extended into the speech's conclusion, a complex wish tied to an argument from probability (***eikos***):

> Oh, if I only
> could be as this in all my days immortal and ageless
> and be held in honour as Athene and Apollo are honoured
> as surely as this oncoming day brings evil to the Argives. (538-41)

Here, Hector makes the postulation that defeating the Greeks is such a likely outcome that he would entrust his greatest wish to the same likelihood.[113] It is a bold, almost reckless, note on which to end his speech—one which puts a twist on that Classical-era rhetorical standby, the argument from probability. But it drives home the speech's overall strategy of stirring up the emotions of confidence and optimism in the Trojan warriors in preparation for the next day's battle. As a result, the Trojans immediately shout their approval (ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν (542)) and implement his plan.

VI. Nestor steps into the midst of a quarrel in the Achaean assembly in 9.53-78, making a speech addressed primarily to Diomedes (whose speech immediately preceded his own), secondarily to Agamemnon (who had proposed withdrawing from Troy, a plan opposed by Diomedes), and thirdly to the assembled Achaean army (which had expressed approval of Diomedes' upstart sentiments). Nestor's speech is thus a rhetorical balancing act, attempting to do several things at once: to persuade the addressees individually of different things; to reconcile those two people to each other; and to restore damaged morale and establish strategic tasks for the army. In its attempt to mediate between two feuding parties without offending either one of them, this speech is reminiscent of Nestor's speech to Agamemnon and Achilles in 1.254-84. Here,

[113] Nagy's discussion of this passage (1990b) points out that this wish is not a contrafactual one, but rather represents Hector's hubristic and deluded belief that being honored as a god is within the realm of possibility(294-9); see also Nagy (1979) 148.

Nestor relies heavily on the technique of ***diathesis***, tailoring his words to each specific addressee and what would appeal to that person. He begins by extending compliments to Diomedes, observing that Diomedes is superior to his peers in both battle prowess and assembly-speaking: Τυδεΐδη, πέρι μὲν πολέμῳ ἔνι καρτερός ἐσσι,/ καὶ βουλῇ μετὰ πάντας ὁμήλικας ἔπλευ ἄριστος (53-4). He also praises the μῦθος which Diomedes has just spoken for its general correctness (55-6 and 58-9), but criticizes it for falling short of completion: ἀτὰρ οὐ τέλος ἵκεο μύθων (56). Such an assessment suggests that both speaker and audience share an objective standard for argumentative or persuasive skill, and that Diomedes measures up well with his peers in this skill; but nevertheless, in his immaturity, he lacks the ability to follow through with his rhetoric. In contrast, Nestor himself possesses this skill by virtue of greater age and experience, and subsequently models it: "But let me speak, since I can call myself older than you are, and go through the whole matter, since there is none who can dishonour the thing I say, not even powerful Agamemnon" (60-62). This represents perhaps the most emphatic argument from ***êthos*** in the *Iliad*, from the speaker most prone to appealing to his own *êthos*; Nestor gestures toward his age and status as he pronounces himself immune to the possibility of dishonor that seems to plague all other heroes in the poem.[114] What follows is, as Martin has noted, Nestor's instruction-by-example of a "complete" μῦθος for his younger comrade, beginning with the claim that he will "go through the whole matter" (πάντα διίξομαι (61)).[115]

Nestor initiates his general exhortation to the Achaean audience with a admonitory *gnômê*: "Out of all brotherhood, outlawed, homeless shall be that man who longs for all the horror of fighting among his own people" (63-4). Hainsworth observes the effect of this proverb on the audience (i.e., as an instance of ***diathesis***) when he says that "Nestor is cunningly forestalling (as Akhilleus did not in book I) a violent reaction to his reasonable proposals…The *gnômê* suits Nestor's age (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1395a for the

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[114] Dickson (1995) sees Nestor's advanced age as the key factor in his rhetorical prowess, remarking that, in the world of the *Iliad*, "the kind of mastery needed in order to identify and reach the τέλος μύθων…belongs to older men, next to whom even an accomplished warrior is at best like a son" (13-14).
[115] See Martin (1989) 24-26.

appropriateness of proverbs to the elderly) and is a characteristic part of his rhetorical armament."[116] A series of practical instructions follows in 65-8, operating on the assumption that the Greeks will stay and fight but making no mention of Agamemnon's proposal to withdraw. Nestor continues to show sensitivity to the Greek commander's dignity as he transitions from suppressing criticism to expressing praise in the next lines, addressed directly to Agamemnon. In 68-73, he issues several orders ("take command;" "divide a feast among the princes"); but instead of following these commands with reasons to form *enthymemes*, he proffers flattering reminders of Agamemnon's status and power: "...since (γάρ) you are our kingliest (βασιλεύτατος);" "All hospitality is for you; you are lord (ἀνάσσεις) over many." With this well-placed employment of ***diathesis***, Nestor preserves the unity of the army and saves face for a leader whom Diomedes had just labled a coward. He then ends his speech with a return to a more generalized exhortation, applicable to Agamemnon, Diomedes, and the whole assembled army. This comes in the form of an ***enthymeme***, beginning with a *gnômê* as its conclusion: "When many assemble together follow (πείσεαι) him who advises the best counsel" (74-5). The premise draws on the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**, warning that "in truth there is need for all the Achaians of good close counsel, since (ὅτι) now close to our ships the enemy burn their numerous fires" (75-7). Having reminded his audience of the significance of the upcoming night for their fortunes (78), Nestor ends his instructive display of diplomatic rhetoric. The speech is a twofold success: it is persuades the Achaeans to take action (οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο (79)), and it teaches Diomedes how to reach the τέλος μύθων. Martin observes that, subsequent to this "expert teaching" from Nestor, "Diomedes grows in rhetorical ability through the rest of the poem," and by the time he speaks in Book 14, "he has learned how to construct an impregnable speech."[117]

VII. Phoenix's speech to Achilles as part of the embassy to persuade him to rejoin the Greek army (9.434-605) is marked by its expansion (***auxesis***) of several

[116] Hainsworth (1993) 67.
[117] Martin (1989) 25.

rhetorical approaches. Its length alone—at 171 lines, it is the longest speech in the *Iliad*—commands the audience's attention and endows it with special significance. Martin has documented the *Iliad*'s equation of size with importance, observing that "length is a positive speech value. The assignment of length in speech by the narrator Homer produces our impressions about the importance of a given episode and also of a speaker."[118] Much scholarly attention has been lavished on this speech; among those that focus on its content are the treatments of Held (1987); Nagy (1979); Rosner (1976); Scodel (1982 and 2002); and Willcock (1964). Rosner, in analyzing the parallels between this speech and the themes of the *Iliad* as a whole, identifies an aspect of Phoenix's use of *diathesis* (though she does not present it as such, or speak in terms of rhetoric) when she notes that Phoenix "concentrates on Peleus' hospitality." Phoenix, Rosner goes on to observe, shifts "away from the materialistic outlook of Odysseus/Agamemnon into the humanity and *xenia* of Peleus/Achilles."[119] Willcock argues for interpreting the Meleager *paradeigma* as ad hoc invention by the Iliadic narrator; Nagy also focuses on the Meleager story, particularly Phoenix's reliance on the *êthos* of the embassy members as "most dear" (φίλτατοι) to Achilles—the same term Phoenix uses to describe the companions of Meleager. Scodel (2002) focuses her analysis on the relationship of the character of Phoenix in the *Iliad* to what the audience would have known about him via tradition; commenting on Phoenix's *êthos*, she notes that "his 'leadership' was presumably intended to get the embassy through the door and win them a fair hearing."[120] Held points out the parallels between this speech and the supplications of Chryses in Book 1, Patroclus in Book 16, and Priam in Book 24; he notes particularly the similarity in the roles of Phoenix and Priam with relation to Achilles (substitute father-figures), and their correspondingly similar arguments.[121] James Boyd White (1984), writing from the perspective of a lawyer, recognizes in Phoenix's speech two major strains of appeal, the

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[118] Martin (1989) 138; see also 102-3 for a discussion of the positive connotations in the *Iliad* of Nestor's loquacity, and support for such prizing of speech-length from comparative studies.
[119] Rosner (1976) 315.
[120] Scodel (2002) 170. Scodel also postulates that Phoenix's character and speech are largely unique to the *Iliad*, a product of the narrative context (see 165 ff.).
[121] Held (1987).

logical (as represented by the Meleager myth, the argument that Achilles will receive the gifts of honor if he joins battle now, but will lose them if he refuses) and the ethical. "Phoenix's more effective appeal is ethical, based on his special standing in the household and life of Achilles," White claims. Achilles "combines the attributes of father and mother, and, in addition, he makes a claim that rests on his status as a suppliant to whom the house has been opened."[122] To the best of my knowledge, however, no scholar has analyzed the speech for its use of rhetoric (in the technical or Aristotelian sense).

Phoenix opens his appeal by using ***pathos***, attempting to stir up Achilles' emotions with the combination of a "stormburst of tears" (433) and a plea that he take pity on Phoenix in his old and dependent state (437-8). This plea expands into a call for loyalty (to the wishes of Peleus (438-43)) and obligation (to his old mentor and instructor, in return for all he has done for Achilles in the past (438-43, 485-95). Phoenix takes the opportunity of vowing that he will follow Achilles wherever he goes to expand upon his own youth and his character-forming exploits, placing particular emphasis on his relationship with Achilles as a surrogate son (447-95).[123] Phoenix' identity (***êthos***) and proximity to Achilles, as well as his own pitiable history (***pathos***), lend authority and emotional weight to his appeal. The climax of this autobiographical excursion is posed as a multi-faceted ***enthymeme*** that states the persuasive purpose of the speech for the first time (62 lines into it):

> Premise 1: "And, godlike Achilleus, I made you all that you are now, and loved you out of my heart...So I have suffered much through you, and have had much trouble, thinking always how the gods would not bring to birth any children of my own; so that it was you, godlike Achilleus, I made my own child, so that some day you might keep hard affliction from me." (485-95) Phoenix implies that his past devotion to Achilles has put Achilles under obligation; he now attempts to redeem that obligation by making a request. (The problem with the request, of

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[122] White (1984) 49.

[123] Scodel (1982) notes that this autobiographical portion of Phoenix's speech involves a negative exemplum for Achilles (Phoenix's decision to flee those near and dear to him after a quarrel) that is cleverly sidelined by rhetorical sleight-of-hand, and replaced by the portion of his autobiography that is relevant to his appeal to Achilles. "An example which, if given as a negative paradigm, would embarrass the teller, is placed within his assertion of his special claim on his hearer's respect. It is not logical, but a rhetoric which in skill and discretion is more effective than the reasonable arguments the last portion off the speech employs." (136)

course, is that it is not in Phoenix's own interests, but in the interests of the Achaeans, most particularly Agamemnon.)
Conclusion: "**Then, Achilleus, beat down your great anger.**" (496)
Premise 2 (*gnômê*): "It is not yours to have a pitiless heart." (496-7)
Premise 3 (***paradeigma***): "The very immortals can be moved; their virtue and honour and strength are greater (μείζων) than ours are, and yet with sacrifices and offerings for endearment, with libations and with savour men turn back even the immortals in supplication..." (597-501)

This final argument of the *enthymeme* appeals not only to the *paradeigma* of the gods, but also to the **topic of greater and less (#4)**, with its reminder to Achilles that if even the gods (who, as superior beings, have greater prerogative for anger) can relent, surely he (as a mere mortal) is capable of following suit. What follows is a parable—a rare technique among Iliadic speeches—about the Litai, personified goddesses of supplication.[124] Phoenix relates in this myth the ominous fate that awaits those who repudiate prayers or pleas (the manifestation of the Litai). This warning serves as the first premise of another ***enthymeme***—even more intricate than the previous one—which is structured as follows:

Premise 1 (parable of the Litai; argument from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**): "If a man shall deny them, and stubbornly with a harsh word refuse, they go to Zeus, son of Kronos, in supplication that Ruin may overtake this man, that he be hurt, and punished." (510-12)
Conclusion 1: "So, Achilleus: grant, you also, that Zeus' daughters be given their honour..." (513-4)
Premise 2 (argument from the **topic of the same men not choosing the same thing, but a different thing, before and after (μὴ ταὐτὸ τοὺς αὐτους ἀεὶ αἱρεῖσθαι ὕστερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, #18)**): "Were he not bringing gifts and naming still more hereafter, Atreus' son; **were he to remain still swollen with rancour, even I would not bid you throw your anger aside**, nor defend the Argives, though they needed you sorely. **But see now** (νῦν δ'), he offers you much straightway, and has promised you more hereafter..." (515-19)
The complexity of this premise goes beyond simply Phoenix's use of a topic suggesting a change of heart. He also exerts the force of his own ***êthos***—toward which Achilles is predisposed—into the suggestion. In addition, he sympathizes

[124] Held (1987) observes that only three speeches in the *Iliad* that include both a parable and a *paradeigma* are this one, Agamemnon's to Achilles and the Agaean assembly in 19.78-144, and Achilles' to Priam in 24.518-51. He sees significant parallels between these speeches (especially Phoenix's and Achilles') for this reason, arguing that they illustrate an educational process by which Achilles is instructed by Phoenix and then in turn instructs Priam of the same lesson (see esp. 252-4).

with Achilles' view of Agamemnon by characterizing the king as "swollen with anger" (ἐπιζαφελῶς χαλεπαίνοι) and by "siding" with Achilles in this potential situation—a gesture of ***diathesis***—before supplying the twist that Agamemnon does *not* in fact remain "swollen with rancour."

Premise 3 (argument from the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**): "But see now, he offers you much straightway, and has promised you more hereafter..." (519)

Premise 4 (argument from the ***ethea*** of the embassy members; Phoenix implies that the quality of the messengers demands a favorable response to their message): "He has sent the best men to you to supplicate you...those who to yourself are the dearest (φίλτατοι) of all the Argives." (520-22)[125]

Conclusion 2: "Do not you make vain their argument (μῦθον ἐλέγξῃς) nor their footsteps, though before this one could not blame your anger." (522-3) Phoenix sets up his argument such that Achilles' refusal to accede to the embassy's request is constituted as an act of disrespect towards the individuals involved (an especially egregious charge considering that Phoenix has just identified them as Achilles' φίλτατοι).

Premise 5 (***paradeigma*** of heroes of old): "Thus it was in the old days also, the deeds that we hear of from the great men, when the swelling anger descended upon them. The heroes would take gifts; they would listen, and be persuaded (πέλοντο παράρρητοί τ' ἐπέεσσι)." (524-6) The adjective παράρρητος—approaching technical terminology, and cognate with ῥήτωρ—appears only twice in Homer (again in 13.726, where Polydamas admonishes Hector to "be persuaded"), and nowhere else in Greek literature; its sense of "open to (rhetorical) persuasion" is a remarkably explicit example of the Iliadic characters' attentiveness to persuasive arts.

Phoenix then transitions seamlessly from this complex *enthymeme* to a new section in 529-605, an expansion of the theme of heroes of old. He takes as his crowning ***paradeigma*** the tale of Meleager. The significance of this myth, and its parallels with Achilles' situation, have received thorough scholarly treatment (e.g., Willcock (1964) [see note 4 pp. 147-8 on rerlevant scholarship up to 1964]; Rosner (1976); Nagy (1979) esp. 103-9). In strictly technical rhetorical terms (surely an inadequate lens for viewing the scope of the Meleager narrative), the entire story serves as the premise to a final ***enthymeme*** whose conclusion comes at the end of Phoenix's speech. This premise ends

[125] Nagy (1979) points out the fact that these two superlatives, "best of the Acheans" and "most dear [to Achilles]," do not, in fact, aptly apply to all three of the embassy members (Phoenix is hardly among the not ἀρίστοι; Odysseus is hardly φίλτατος to Achilles). On this basis, then, "the ethical stance of the Embassy may well be undermined—from the heroic perspective of Achilles." (57-8)

with the account of Meleager's capitulation to his wife's pleas to fight: "So he gave way in his own heart, and drove back the day of evil from the Aitolians; yet these no longer would make good their many and gracious gifts..." (597-9). The conclusion follows: "Listen, then; do not have such a thought in your mind; let not the spirit within you turn you that way, dear friend" (600-01). Three final considerations—additional premises of the same *enthymeme*—bring the speech to a close. "It would be worse to defend the ships after they are burning" (601-2), Phoenix asserts, drawing upon the **topic of consideration of timing (#5)**; "The Achaians will honour you as they would an immortal" (603) employs the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**; finally, Phoenix warns that "if without gifts you go into the fighting where men perish, your honour will no longer be as great, though you drive back the battle" (604-5), an argument from the **topic of consequence (#13).**

With this admonition, Phoenix ends his tour-de-force effort. No matter how skillful and well-argued the rhetoric, however, his speech was destined to be unsuccessful because of Achilles' pre-determined (and pre-ordained) stance.[126] The hero is deferential in his response to Phoenix, but refuses to be persuaded, turning back the old man's final argument (τείσουσιν Ἀχαιοί) with the reply οὔ τί με ταύτης/ χρεὼ τιμῆς ("such honor is a thing I need not" (607-8)).[127] As in a few other instances in the *Iliad*, it is apparent here that no amount of brilliant argumentation can substitute for either knowing the key to the particular audience's frame of mind (***diathesis***), or being of the right character (***êthos***) to appeal to that audience—as, we will subsequently find out, only Patroclus and Priam can be to Achilles.[128]

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[126] For further discussion of the relationship between speeches and plot necessity, see Section IV.C ("Rhetoric and Plot in the *Iliad*") below.

[127] White (1984) observes that although Phoenix's ethical appeal moves Achilles, the latter manages to sidestep its demands by extending a counter-offer of hospitality and refuge to Phoenix (49-50).

[128] Whitman (1958), however, sees evidence that Achilles is moved by this speech, citing the words of Achilles' response in 9.612-13: "Stop confusing my heart with lamentation and sorrow for the favour of great Atreides" (178).

VIII. Nestor's address to Patroclus in 11.656-803 is a sprawling speech that can be characterized as persuasive in only some of its portions.[129] The ultimate goal of the speech is to convince Patroclus to plead with Achilles to rejoin the fighting, but this goal does not come into view explicitly until near the end, lines 764-802. The opening lines are directed towards Achilles, although he is not present; Nestor treats Patroclus as Achilles' proxy, and presumably hopes that his appeals to shame and pity will affect Patroclus, who is best positioned to persuade Achilles. By cataloguing the misfortunes and injuries of the Achaeans in 655-64, Nestor is using an emotional appeal, ***pathos***, to arouse his audience's pity and thence sympathy for his cause (***diathesis***). He continues this appeal with a reproach: "Meanwhile Achilleus brave as he is cares nothing for the Danaans nor pities them. Is he going to wait then till the running ships by the water are burned with consuming fire for all the Argives can do, till we ourselves are killed one after another?" (664-8) Nestor then launches into an extended narrative depicting his own past exploits, triggered by the wish that he were still young and strong (670-762). With this narrative—recounting the battle between Nestor's Pylians and the hostile Epeians—Nestor asserts his own ***êthos*** to gain credibility, and offers himself as a ***paradeigma*** of courage even in the face of opposition (i.e., his father's opposition to his participation in battle (717ff.)). Hainsworth has a similar perspective, observing that "Nestor's reminiscences have, from his standpoint, two purposes. First, to use an incident from his heroic youth in order to insist on his credentials and the value of his words...second, indirectly to admonish or exhort...Patroklos should overcome Akhilleus' opposition and insist on leading the eager Myrmidons to war."[130]

Following this narrative portion that comprises the bulk of his speech, Nestor makes a transitional statement with ominous overtones, again directed obliquely at Achilles ("But Achilleus will enjoy his own valour in loneliness, though I think he will weep much, too late, when his people are perished from him" (762-4)). Only then does

[129] See again Toohey's (1994) analysis of this speech's rhetorical structure (158-61). Martin (2000) analyzes the ostensibly digressive nature of the speech—particularly Nestor's *paradeigma*—and traces elements in Nestor's speech that characterize it as unique and archaizing. On the *paradeigma* in particular, see also Austin (1966) and Pedrick (1983).

[130] Hainsworth (1993) 296.

he turn at last to address Patroclus. This portion of the speech (765-90) evokes a shared past between speaker and addressee: Nestor's long-ago invitation to Achilles and Patroclus to join the war. Nestor relies heavily on ***diathesis*** in this section, as evidenced by the affectionate opening vocative ὦ πέπον and the immediate mention of Patroclus' father: "Dear child, surely this was what Menoitios told you that day when he sent you out from Phthia to Agamemnon" (765-6). In recounting this scene of the meeting between himself and the two father-and-son pairs at the home of Peleus, Nestor chooses what to expand upon and what to suppress based on the particular audience (Patroclus), and on what will affect his emotions. This is evident in the way that he quickly passes over Peleus' words to Achilles with the description "And Peleus the aged was telling his own son, Achilleus, to be always best in battle and pre-eminent beyond all others" (783-4).[131] In contrast, he quotes the entire speech from Menoitius to Patroclus (786-9), a speech whose words are uncannily pertinent to the present moment and Nestor's particular ends: "'My child, by right of blood Achilleus is higher than you are, but you are the elder...You must speak solid words (πυκινὸν ἔπος) to him, and give him good counsel, and point his way. If he listens to you (πείσεται) it will be for his own good'" (786-9). Such a use of (likely fabricated) quotation is a strategy that Dickson has commented on with specific reference to this speech, and that Beck has analyzed more generally in the *Iliad*. In this passage, notes Dickson, Nestor uses quotation "implicitly to establish the dominance of his own perspective; even when he 'impersonates' another speaker, his quotation is selective, governed not only by a certain viewpoint but also a definite rhetorical aim."[132] Beck has catalogued all instances in the *Iliad* of characters quoting others in their speeches, and finds that the two major uses of this technique are either 1) to dramatize strong emotions, or 2) *to persuade the addressee*.[133] This quotation is

[131] Martin (1989) observes that Nestor here is likely making up the speeches of Peleus and Menoitius, "not necessarily recounting 'what happened'...Nestor selects the one detail from the alleged 'instructions' of Peleus that will contrast most with his own recapitulation of another speech of advice, that made by Patroklos' father, suggesting that the companion of Achilles should instruct and guide him...Homer here has supplied enough detail to make us appreciate the possibilities for fictional presentation within authoritative speechmaking" (61-2).
[132] Dickson (1995) 69.
[133] Beck (2007).

an example of the latter, as Nestor leverages for persuasive effect the words of one whom Patroclus esteems and holds dear.

The entire recollected scene, ending with Nestor's rebuke to Patroclus that "this is what the old man told you, you have forgotten" (790), serves as the premise of an ***enthymeme***, providing a reason for the conclusion that follows: "Yet even now you might speak to wise Achilleus, he might be persuaded (πίθηται)" (790-91). Nestor then offers two further premises, the first a projection of a hopeful outcome ("Who knows if, with God helping, you might trouble his spirit by entreaty (παρειπών)"); the second a *gnômê* ("the persuasion (παραίφασίς) of a friend is a strong thing") (792-3). The persuasive vocabulary is explicit, and Nestor's phrasing is carefully calculated: he employs optative verbs rather than imperatives, and two different conditional clauses, thus couching the proposal as a humble suggestion.

The final portion of Nestor's speech (794-803) turns to a proposal of a new tactic. In the event of Achilles' continued refusal to be persuaded, Nestor suggests a backup plan that will preempt any counter-argument such as those Achilles had made to the embassy in Book 9. This plan is expressed simply, with imperative verbs: "Let him send you out. . .let him give you his splendid armour to wear to the fighting" (796-8)). For my treatment of the rhetorical argumentation of these lines, see my discussion above (p. 42 ff.) of Patroclus' speech to Achilles in 16.21-45, which quotes these lines of Nestor almost exactly. Nestor's speech is effective, both in stirring up Patroclus' feelings (τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε (804)), and achieving the desired goal (βῆ δὲ θέειν παρὰ νῆας ἐπ' Αἰακίδην Ἀχιλῆα (805); see also Patroclus' attempt to persuade Achilles (16.20-45)).

IX. Glaucus issues a speech of rebuke and challenge to Hector in 17.142-68 in the midst of the battle over Patroclus' body.[134] It is characterized by the narrator as a χαλεπὸς μῦθος (141), and attempts to motivate primarily through appeals to shame; at times it resembles a forensic prosecution speech. It begins by commenting on the

[134] Moulton (1981) finds this speech to be "aptly attuned to [Glaukos'] character, as far as it is developed in the *Iliad*, and to the code of values to which he and Sarpedon subscribe." (4-5)

disparity between Hector's appearance/reputation and his actual weak performance in battle; by thus arousing the emotion of shame, he employs ***pathos***: "Hektor, splendid to look at, you come far short in your fighting..." (142-3). An ***enthymeme*** follows, beginning with the conclusion: "Take thought now how to hold fast your town..." (144-5). Its premise argues from the **topic of consequence (#13)**: "...since (γάϱ) no Lykian will go forth now to fight with the Danaans for the sake of your city, since (ἐπεί) after all we got no gratitude for our everlasting hard struggle against your enemies" (146-8). The accusation that Hector has neglected the allies becomes more pointed with the following rhetorical question, an argument from the **topic of greater and less (#4)**: "How then, o hard-hearted, shall you save a worse man in all your company, when you have abandoned Sarpedon, your guest-friend and own companion, to be the spoil and prey of the Argives, who was of so much use to you, yourself, and your city while he lived?" (149-53). Glaucus then threatens to lead his Lycians homeward and abandon the war effort, so that "the headlong destruction of Troy shall be manifest" (154-5). It is a threat designed to arouse Hector's fear.

Glaucus' next tactic—also drawing upon ***pathos*** in that it is calculated to incite an emotional response—is to issue a taunting challenge for evidence of the Trojans' "fighting strength" (μένος). "For if the Trojans had any fighting strength that were daring and unshaken, such as comes on men who, for the sake of their country, have made the hard hateful work come between them and their enemies, we could quickly get the body of Patroklos inside Ilion" (156-9). This contrafactual condition employs a mixture of logic and shaming to bring home its rhetorical point, much as the forensic oratory of Classical Athens would later do. The logic continues with Glaucus' next lines, also an appeal to the **topic of consideration of incentives and dis-incentives (#20)**: "If, dead man though he be, he could be brought into the great city of lord Priam...the Argives must at once give up the beautiful armour of Sarpedon, and we could carry his body inside Ilion" (160-63). Glaucus ends his speech with a return to his original tactic—an appeal to Hector's sense of shame. His contemptuous attack on Hector's character—insulting him with an unfavorable comparison to Ajax—is calculated to spur him to

action: "No, but you could not bring yourself to stand up against Aias of the great heart, nor to look at his eyes in the clamour of fighting men, nor attack him direct, since he is far better (φέρτερος) than you are" (166-8). Glaucus' approach to ***diathesis*** (via the ***pathos*** of shame) throughout this speech reverses its more normal usage as a technique for putting the addressee in a sym*pathê*tic, favorable frame of mind towards the speaker; rather, it puts him in a defensive, angry frame of mind. Nevertheless, it serves the same purpose of making the addressee inclined to do what the speaker wants him to do: in this case, to fight more fiercely for the body of Patroclus. This tension is reflected in Hector's response to the speech, which expresses annoyance but ultimately compliance with Glaucus' desires: "Glaukos, why did a man like you speak this word of annoyance (ὑπέροπλον)?...Come here, friend, and watch me at work..." (17.170, 179ff.). Glaucus' attentiveness to the psychology of his audience has produced rhetorical effectiveness.

X. Priam addresses Hector in 22.38-76 in an attempt to convince him not to face Achilles in single combat. He opens with an imperative plea not to stay outside the walls of the city to fight with Achilles, dispensing with flattery and instead offering naked realism as a reason: "You might encounter your destiny beaten down by Peleion, since he is far stronger (πολὺ φέρτερος) than you are" (39-40). Priam then gives rein to his own sentiments toward Achilles, from which he moves onto his first rhetorical move, that of arousing pity (***pathos***) by cataloguing the loss of many sons at Achilles' hands (44-53). This catalogue ends with a use of the **topic of greater and less (#4)** that also serves as the premise to an ***enthymeme***: the death of his sons Lykaon and Polydoros, Priam asserts, may be a source of sorrow to the Trojan people; but it is "a sorrow that will be fleeting beside their sorrow for you, if you go down before Achilleus" (54-5). From this premise, Priam draws an enthymematic conclusion in command-form: "Come then inside the wall, my child" (56). A further premise is added, arguing from the **topic of consideration of incentives and disincentives (#20)**: "...so that (ὄφρα) you can rescue the Trojans and the women of Troy, neither win the high glory for Peleus' son, and yourself be robbed of your very life" (56-8).

Lines 59-71 comprise Priam's vivid, impassioned, and extended appeal to pity for himself, in the form of a projection about the future if Hector does not listen to his appeals. In this, he both appeals to his ***êthos*** and employs ***pathos*** to put Hector in the desired frame of mind. His explicit call for pity (πρὸς δ' ἐμὲ τὸν δύστηνον ἔτι φρονέοντ' **ἐλέησον** (59)), and the vision of future disaster that follows, constitute an emotional appeal similar to the one expressed in Priam's speech to Achilles in 24.486-506 (see above, 57ff.). Like that speech, this one manipulates the psychology of the addressee (Hector) by emphasizing the proximity of the sufferer to himself, a technique elaborated by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 2.8.2-5 (see above, 57; note that Aristotle identifies this technique as especially effective on those with parents and children):

> Oh, take
> pity on me, the unfortunate still alive, still sentient
> but ill-starred, whom the father, Kronos' son, on the threshold of old age
> will blast with hard fate, after I have looked upon evils
> and seen my sons destroyed and my daughters dragged away captive...
> And myself last of all, my dogs in front of my doorway
> will rip me raw, after some man with stroke of the sharp bronze
> spear, or with spearcast, has torn the life out of my body... (59-68)

An extended *gnômê* closes the speech. It functions like the premise of an ***enthymeme***, but the accompanying conclusion is only implicit: "For a young man all is decorous when he is cut down in battle and torn with the sharp bronze, and lies there dead...but when an old man is dead and down, and the dogs mutilate the grey head and the grey beard and the parts that are secret, this for all mortality, is the sight most pitiful (τοῦτο δὴ οἴκτιστον πέλεται δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσιν)" (71-6). The fact that Priam leaves the conclusion (i.e., a renewal of his plea that Hector refrain from fighting with Achilles) unstated—and, indeed, never returns to the urgent plea of the speech's opening—is noteworthy. What could be interpreted as a lack of rigor in rhetorical argumentation (*logos*) is indicative of the old man's desperation; he focuses on his own fears and pitiable state to the exclusion of other considerations that might persuade his addressee. Perhaps for this reason (and no doubt also because of the constraints of the narrative and the βουλὴ Διός), Hector is unmoved by the speech (οὐδ' Ἕκτορι θυμὸν ἔπειθε (78)).

C. Persuasion and Achilles

Now that we have reached the end of the survey of speeches which I have defined as "rhetorical" in the *Iliad*, it is possible to observe a number of speech-related themes emerging. Those of broad significance will be treated in the upcoming sections, but I take this opportunity to note one more specific point of interest: namely, the fact that Achilles is the object of a disproportionate number of the rhetorically-invested speeches in the *Iliad*.[135] While this is not in itself a surprising fact (given that the plot of the epic revolves around Achilles and his involvement in the war), there are certain patterns surrounding attempts to persuade Achilles that are worth noting. Although many people try (Agamemnon, Odysseus, Phoenix, Ajax, Lycaon, Hector, the kings of the Achaeans (19.303-4, 23.39-42), etc), only two people in the entirety of the *Iliad* are successful at persuading Achilles to do something "out of character"—i.e., something that he had been previously opposed to do. These two are Patroclus (to allow him to enter battle in Book 16) and Priam (to relinquish Hector's body in Book 24). The explanation for Patroclus' success is fairly simple: he is Achilles' "nearest and dearest," and thus the persuasion is based purely on Patroclus' *êthos*, his identity. The reason for Priam's success is far more complex and difficult. His *êthos* is the farthest thing from being persuasive for Achilles—he is the father of Achilles' bitterest enemy, and Achilles is the murderer of his son. But through his rhetoric, Priam is able to forge an *êthos* that appeals to Achilles by analogy with Achilles' own father. Achilles responds favorably to the invitation to transfer his pity for Peleus onto Priam. In addition, both Patroclus and Priam take the approach of embodying σημέια for Achilles, pointing to *themselves* as argumentative "evidence" through gesture (Patroclus' tears and clinging to Achilles

[135] Much has been made of the uniqueness of Achilles' speech in the *Iliad*; less scholarly attention has been given to the speech and persuasion techniques directed at Achilles, asking what common thread binds together both those that fail and those (rare ones) that succeed. Mackie touches on this issue when she observes that Odysseus, Phoenix, and Agamemnon all "talk to and treat Achilles as though he had no father, no properety, and consequently no status," and such strategies are unsuccessful at moving Achilles (see Mackie (1996) 140-52). Still, Mackie's point in this passage is one about Achilles' language in response to these advances; she does not attempt to examine any productive or successful approaches to persuading Achilles. My aim in this section is to look briefly at what these might be.

(16.2-20); Priam's tears and suppliant gestures (24.477-512)) and deictic self-reference (Patroclus: "Send me out...and I may be a light given to the Danaans" (16.38-9); Priam: "Take pity on me...I put my lips to the hands of the man who has killed my children" (24.503-6)).

IV. Patterns of Aristotelian Rhetoric in the *Iliad*

A. Techniques

Below, in table form, is a summary of the Aristotelian rhetorical techniques utilized by Iliadic speakers (Tables 1a, 1b, and 1c). Patterns emerge that distinguish the 35 speeches of intermediate rhetorical complexity from the ten speeches of highest rhetorical complexity. The most immediately-apparent difference between the two groups is the use of a greater *number* of different techniques in each of the speeches of the latter group (an average of 5.7 techniques per speech) than in the speeches of the former group (an average of 3 techniques per speech). In addition, the complex speeches employ Aristotle's most specific rhetorical category—the Topics of demonstrative *enthymemes* (Level III in my schema explained at the beginning of this chapter)—in a considerably higher proportion than do the intermediate speeches. Whereas the 10 complex speeches employ the Topics a total of 21 times, or 2.1 times per speech, the 35 intermediate speeches employ the Topics a total of 30 times, or only 0.86 times per speech (see the tables below for a listing of the frequency of specific Topics). The techniques of ***enthymeme*** and ***diathesis*** are almost universally employed, appearing in all of the complex speeches and in most of the intermediate speeches; the technique of ***êthos***-appeal is widespread (in all but one of the complex speeches and in 14 of the intermediate speeches); the technique of ***pathos*** appears in six complex and four intermediate speeches; and ***paradeigma*** appears in six complex speeches, although in only two intermediate speeches.


Table 1a. Complex Speeches: Distribution of Rhetorical Techniques
Technique Usage Instances
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
9
10
10
6
7
4
4
3
1
1
1
I. ÊTHOS
DIATHESIS
II. ENTHYMEME
PARADEIGMA
III. TOPICS: #4
#13
#20
#5
#11
#16
#18
Êthos
Diathesis
Enthymeme
Paradeigma
Topics


Table 1b. Intermediate Speeches: Distribution of Rhetorical Techniques
Technique Usage Instances
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
13
23
30
2
15
4
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
I. ÊTHOS
DIATHESIS
II. ENTHYMEME
PARADEIGMA
III. TOPICS: #20
#13
#4
#5
#6
#10
#11
#16
#22
#25
Êthos
Diathesis
Enthymeme
Paradeigma
Topics


Table 1c. All Speeches: Distribution of Rhetorical Techniques
Technique Usage Instances
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
22
33
40
8
19
10
8
5
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
ÊTHOS
DIATHESIS
ENTHYMEME
PARADEIGMA
TOPICS: #20
#4
#13
#5
#11
#16
#6
#10
#18
#22
#25
Êthos
Diathesis
Enthymeme
Paradeigma
Topics

It is worth noting those techniques which Aristotle lists in the *Rhetoric* but which are *not* present in the Iliadic "rhetorical" speeches. While the first-order categories (***êthos, diathesis***, and ***logos***) and the second-order categories (***enthymeme, paradeigma***) are all well-represented in Iliadic speeches, as are a number of the third-order topics, the following topics (listed in *Rhetoric* II.23.1-30) do not appear:

- Topic of opposites (#1)
- Topic of different grammatical forms of the same word (#2)
- Topic of definition and drawing syllogistic conclusions (#7)
- Topic of varied meanings of a word (#8)
- Topic of division (#9)
- Topic of contrasting opposites ("on the one hand...on the other hand"; #14)
- Topic of concluding causes from results (#17)
- Topic of identifying purpose with cause (#19)
- Topic of the implausible (#21)
- Topic of the cause of a false impression (#23)
- Topic of cause and effect (#24)
- Topic of comparison of contraries (#26)
- Topic of prosecuting or defending on the basis of what would have been a mistake (#27)
- Topic of name etymology (#28)

Thus about half of Aristotle's topics go unused in the *Iliad*.

B. Speakers

The distribution of "rhetorical" speeches (as defined by my Aristotelian rubric) according to speaker is presented in Table 2a. Of the ten rhetorically complex speeches, four are delivered by Nestor, while each of the other speakers (Odysseus, Sarpedon, Hector, Phoenix, Glaucus, Priam) has only one. This is a good measure of Nestor's dominance in terms of quantity of speech, and rhetorical elaborateness, in the *Iliad*. "If the attribution of advanced age and command of speech is not an especially unique one," Dickson observes, "it still remains true that Nestor is the most conspicuous embodiment of these traits in the poems."[136] Of the 35 intermediate speeches, no speaker

[136] Dickson (1995) 14.

stands above the rest as strikingly as Nestor does in the complex speeches, but Hector leads the way with five; Polydamas and Achilles have four; Agamemnon three; and several other heroes deliver one or two such speeches (see Table 1b). Among the gods, Hera has four intermediate speeches, while Zeus, Athena, and Poseidon each have one. It is Nestor on the Greek side, and Hector on the Trojan, who have the greatest *number* of rhetorical speeches (both delivering six).



Table 2a. Distribution of Rhetorical Speeches According to Speaker

Table 2b presents a summary of the individual Aristotelian rhetorical techniques employed by each speaker.[137] It reveals a fairly regular distribution: that is, no strong patterns emerge linking particular speakers with particular techniques (see Table 2b). There are no clear distinctives between the speech of gods and mortals, or of males and females, according to these categories. Two small points of note: 1) it is perhaps surprising that neither Agamemnon, Ajax, or Patroclus employs an appeal to ***êthos***, given the widespread use of that technique. A possible explanation for this absence has already been offered in the case of Patroclus (the substitution of ***êthos***-performance for speech); as for Agamemnon, it is likely that his demonstrated lack of character credibility throughout the *Iliad* would render any appeal to ***êthos*** ineffective. There is no such clear reason for Ajax not to appeal to his ***êthos***, but considering that he only delivers two rhetorical speeches in the poem—one of them a joint effort with Oilean Ajax—the sample size is too small to consider the absence significant. 2) There is greater selectiveness in the use of the techniques of ***paradeigma*** and ***pathos*** than in the use of ***êthos***, ***diathesis***, ***enthymeme***, or ***topics*** in general. While this is perhaps not inherently remarkable, since they are more limited categories than the others, it is worth noting *which* speakers invoke them. Only Nestor (three times) and Priam (twice) use ***pathos***-appeals more than once; Odysseus, Phoenix, Ajax, Glaucus, and Patroclus each do so once. Likewise, only Nestor (three times) and Achilles (twice) use ***paradeigma*** more than once; Hector, Sarpedon, and Phoenix are the only other speakers who avail themselves of the technique.

[137] Note that, for the purposes of these statistics (which are designed to show the range of techniques employed by the range of Iliadic speakers), I have counted each technique as occurring only once per speech, even if there are multiple instances of that technique in a speech.



Although we have seen that Nestor and Hector deliver the greatest *number* of speeches displaying Aristotelian categories of rhetoric, quantity is by no means the only criterion for speaking prowess. What of the relative rhetorical *success* of all the speakers? Since nearly all of these speeches are followed by a narrative indication of whether the addressees approve and/or heed the speakers' words or not, we can trace their effectiveness at persuasion—taking into account, of course, that the constraints of the plot at times overrule the effects of a given speech, making it impossible to categorize as a success or failure (the relationship between rhetorical speeches and the plot of the *Iliad* is discussed in the section C below). Those instances in which there is some ambiguity about the effectiveness of a speech for its internal audience—either because the audience

response is unstated (rare), because the speech convinces one part of the audience but not another (only Odysseus' speech in 19.155-83, which convinces Agamemnon but not Achilles), or because plot concerns clearly necessitate a speech's failure to persuade (Phoenix to Achilles in 9.434-605, Patroclus to Achilles in 16.21-45, Polydamas to the Trojans in 18.254-83, and Priam to Hector in 22.38-76)—are discounted.

Of the remaining speeches, who is the most "successful" rhetorician (judging by the Iliadic characters' ability to achieve the desired effect on their audiences)? By this calculation, the answer is Hector: all six speeches that he delivers convince his audience to take the action that he wanted (however misguided from the narrative perspective). Five out of Nestor's six speeches are successful. Thus the persuasive prowess of both Hector and Nestor is borne out in the result, as well as in the number, of their speeches. Among the other speakers with more than one "rhetorical" speech, most have mixed results. The notable exception is Hera, whose four speeches are all successful. No speaker among this group is characterized as especially *in*effective, unless it is Zeus, whose lone persuasive attempt (4.7-19) fails to convince Hera of the need for a compromise in the outcome of the war. Although it may seem surprising that the father of the gods rarely persuades others to do his bidding, the key concept here is *persuasion*. Zeus is masterful at giving commands—Martin has spoken of him as "the source of all authority in the poem," based on his forceful and effective *muthoi*—and consequently he has no need for (and thus, perhaps, no practice in) the art of persuasive argumentation.[138] When a need for persuasion does arise, Zeus is no match for his consort, who must rely frequently on wheedling rather than authority.

C. Rhetoric and Plot in the *Iliad*

My contention in this chapter has been that the *Iliad*, in the direct speeches of its characters, demonstrates a systematic employment of persuasion techniques that would later come to be categorized as rhetorical, specifically by Aristotle. Any analysis of persuasive speech, however, must examine the standards by which such speech is

[138] Martin (1989) 48 ff.

deemed successful—namely, the effectiveness of a speaker at persuading or motivating his audience to the desired action or state of mind. Aristotle identifies the hortatory (προτροπή) model as one form of deliberative rhetoric (*Rhetoric* 1.3.3); it is concerned with the future (1.3.4) and what is expedient (1.3.5, τέλος δὲ. . .τῷ συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν· ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον βέλτιον συμβουλεύει); this hortatory model is the category under which most or all of the Iliadic speeches fall. The fact that these speeches take place in a literary, fictional context, however, complicates the process of determining their rhetorical success. How do the narrative conception of fate and the demands of the plot interact with the Iliadic characters' rhetoric, and affect their success or failure to persuade other characters? In a related question, to what extent do the constraints of literary characterization affect the internal rhetoric?

There is no question that all of the speeches in the *Iliad* drive the plot, to a greater or lesser degree. The pertinent question for my study is whether the audience response to persuasive speeches is dictated by the plot (thus rendering "good rhetoric" irrelevant), or is represented as genuinely resulting from the words—and hence the skill—of the speaker. There is evidence for both phenomena in the *Iliad*. Examples of the first would include Nestor's appeal to Agamemnon and Achilles in 1.254-84 to cease their quarrel, a rhetorically nuanced and complex speech which nevertheless fails to placate the rivals; if Nestor had been successful in soothing the *menis* of Achilles, the entire plot of the *Iliad* would have been short-circuited. Polydamas' appeal to the Trojans in 18.254-83 to withdraw from the battlefield in anticipation of Achilles' arrival is likewise rhetorically sound, but doomed by the plot necessities of Achilles' upcoming *aristeia* and Hector's tragic insistence on facing him. Priam's speech to Hector in 22.38-76—a last, desperate effort to dissuade his son from dueling with Achilles—is unsuccessful for the same reason. Most prominent among these examples, Phoenix' tour-de-force embassy speech to Achilles, despite its wide range of rhetorical techniques and sensitivity to its audience, fails in its object. The speech is doomed before Phoenix even begins for the same reason that nearly all speakers who attempt to persuade Achilles fail: the outcome of the Trojan war, expressed as Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή in 1.5,

is directly tied to the actions of Achilles, and Achilles' actions are governed by his knowledge of his own fate—which renders him, beyond all others, nearly (but not entirely, as we have seen above) impervious to persuasive arguments.

Such clearly plot-necessitated audience responses are not the norm, however. More often than not in the *Iliad*, the dynamics of spoken interactions unfold in a more natural, less pre-determined manner—that is, one can trace a correspondence between "good" rhetoric and a positive audience response, "bad" rhetoric and ineffectiveness, and even speeches that show a mixture of both and are received accordingly (such as Diomedes' passionate outburst of 9.32-49, acclaimed by the Achaeans but critiqued by Nestor). Examples of good rhetoric enjoying success would include seven of the ten rhetorically complex speeches that I have analyzed, the three unsuccessful speeches being clear cases of plot necessity overruling skillful speech, as discussed above (Nestor in 1.254-84, Phoenix in 9.434-605, and Priam in 22.38-76). Hera's clever employment of ***diathesis*** when wheedling Zeus, Hector's exhortations to the Trojan troops, and a variety of other speeches among my "intermediate" category enjoy success. Examples of bad rhetoric failing to persuade an audience are fewer, but include Zeus' ill-conceived effort to placate Athena and Hera in 4.7-19, Agamemnon's awkward attempt to exhort Teucer in 8.281-91, and Polydamas' antagonistic expression of a battle strategy to Hector in 12.211-29. The common denominator in these rhetorical failures is the speakers' insensitivity to the character and attitude of their addressees—or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, a lack of ***diathesis***.[139]

To be sure, no literary representation of speech can be treated as an artifact of rhetoric in the same way that a freestanding fifth- or fourth-century oration can be. The suspense of the plot only adds to the complexity of variables present in the relationship between speaker and addressee in a persuasion situation—and sometimes, as we have seen, that suspense renders the internal rhetoric impotent. But rhetoric can be present, and identified as such, even if it does not achieve its persuasive aim. Indeed, the

[139] Further discussion of the Iliadic composer's notion of "bad" speech can be found in the many studies on the speech of Thersites, e.g. Kirk (1985) 138-42; Martin (1989) 109-113; Roisman (2007), *et al.*

presence in the *Iliad* of rhetoric that fails to persuade because of its poor quality is vital to my contention, for it provides a basis for comparison, which in turn implies a system with standards—a system involving *praxis* and *didaxis*. As demonstrated by the list of meta-rhetorical Iliadic passages in Chapter 1.V, this conceptualization of speech as a skill—practiced with varying degrees of success by different speakers and in different situations—is reinforced by the Iliadic narrator's own voice, and by the words of the characters themselves.

Appendix A: List of Iliadic speeches that are intended to persuade but are not highly rhetorically marked (i.e., having little or no correspondence to Aristotelian rhetorical categories)

Book 1

Chryses to the Atreides, 1.17-21, supplication; Agamemnon to Chryses, 1.26-32, warning/command; Chryses prayer to Apollo, 1.36-42, supplication; Achilles to Agamemnon, 1.59-67, suggestion/command; Achilles to Agamemnon, 1.122-9, command; Agamemnon to Achilles, 1.141-7, simple instruction; Athena to Achilles, 1.207-14, command; Agamemnon to the heralds, 1.322-5, simple command; Chryses to Apollo, 1.451-7, supplication/prayer; Thetis to Zeus, 1.503-10 and 514-16 supplication/request; Zeus to Hera, 1.561-7, command/rebuke; Hephaistos to Hera, 1.573-83.

Book 2

Zeus to Dream, 2.8-15 and Dream to Agamemnon, 2.23-34, simple command; Agamemnon to the Greek princes, 2.72-5, simple command; Nestor to the Greeks, 2.79-83, simple command/appeal to Agamemnon's status; Hera to Athena, 2.157-65, flyting + command; Athena to Odysseus, 2.173-81, flyting + command; Odysseus to Greek kings, 2.190-7 and to Greek commoners, 200-206, exhortation/threat; Odysseus to Thersites, 2.246-64, flyting + simple command ("Stop, nor stand up alone against princes"), although admitting that Thersites is a "fluent orator" (ἀκριτόμυθε); Agamemnon to the Greeks, 2.381-93, simple instruction + threat (391-3); Agamemnon to Zeus, 2.412-18, prayer; Nestor to Agamemnon, 2.434-40, simple command; Iris (in the guise of Polites) to the Trojan assembly and Hector in particular, 2.796-806, simple command.

Book 3

Paris to Hector, 3.59-75, forbidding him to rebuke and issuing a command/suggestion; Agamemnon to the Greeks, 2.82-3, simple command; Menelaus to assembled Greeks & Trojans, 3.97-110, instruction + gnomic statement about old age being more trustworthy than youth; Iris (in the guise of Laodike) to Helen, 3.130-38, simple command; Priam to Helen, 3.162-70, 192, simple commands; herald Idaios to Priam, 3.250-58, simple command/instruction; Agamemnon to Zeus, 3.276-91, simple prayer (i.e. does not make arguments/give reasons); random Greeks & Trojans, 3.298-301 and 320-23, simple prayers; Menelaus to Zeus, 3.351-4, simple prayer; Aphrodite (in the guise of an old wool-dresser) to Helen, 3.390-94, command to go to bed with Paris; Helen to Aphrodite, 3.399-412, instructing Aphrodite to take her own advice; Aphrodite to Helen, 3.414-17, command/threat; Helen to Paris, 3.428-36, flyting + oddly contradictory commands that obscure her true intention (go back and fight Menelaus/no, stay here because he would kill you); Paris to Helen, 3.438-46, attempt at erotic persuasion; Agamemnon to the Trojans and allies, 3.456-60, simple command.

Book 4

Hera to Zeus, 4.25-9, blaming with the intention of changing his mind on the subject of Troy's fate; Zeus to Hera, 31-49, concession speech with several embedded commands; Zeus to Athena, 4.70-72, simple command; Agamemnon to herald Talthybios, 4.193-7, simple command; Talathybios to Machaon, 4.204-7, simple command; Agamemnon exhortation speeches: 4.234-9, 4.242-9, 4.257-64, 4.338-48, 4.370-400; Nestor 4.303-9.

Book 5

Diomedes prayer to Athena, 5.115-120; Aeneas' exhortation to Pandaros, 5.171-78(?); Sthenelos urges Diomedes to withdraw, 5.243-50; Ares' exhortation to the Trojans in the guise of Akamas, 5.464-9; Agamemnon to the Achaeans, 5.529-32 (common exhortation formula); Sarpedon to Hector, 5.684-88; Athena to Diomedes, 5.826-34.

Book 6

Adrestos supplication to Menelaus, 6.46-50, and Agamemnon to Menelaus, 6.55-60 (like the defense and prosecution for a court speech); Helenos advice/suggestion to Aeneas and Hector, 6.77-101(?); Hecuba to Hector, 6.253-62(?) and Helen to Hector, 6.354-8(?), and Andromache to Hector, 6.407-39, to persuade him to stay; Hector to Andromache, 6.486-93.

Book 7

Apollo to Athena, 7.24-32 to persuade her to put an end to the fighting; Helenos to Hector, 7.47-53 to urge him to duel; Agamemnon to Menelaus, 7.109-119, to dissuade him from dueling with Hector; Nestor to Agamemnon, 7.327-43, strategic plan—more instruction than persuasion; Antenor to the Trojans, 7.348-53, urging them to hand Helen over; Priam to the Trojans, 7.368-78, proposing a plan without any elements of persuasion.

Book 8

Diomedes to Odysseus, 8.93-6, urging him not to run from battle; Diomedes to Nestor, 8.102-111, urging him to withdraw from the battlefield [interesting that he gives two opposite exhortation speeches within the space of a few lines, with very different approaches and tones based on the difference in audience]; Nestor to Diomedes, 8.139-44, urging him to leave the battlefield; Hector to Trojans and allies, 8.173, exhortation to fight and set fire to the Achaean ships; Hector to his horses, 8.185-97, urging them forward in battle; Athena to Poseidon, 8.201-7, reckless proposal of rebellion against Zeus; Agamemnon to the troops, 8.228-44, scolding/flyting + prayer to Zeus; Athena to Hera, 8.374-80, urging her to harness horses for battle.

Book 9

Agamemnon to the Achaeans, 9.17-28, urging them to give up and go home; Diomedes to Agamemnon, 9.32-49, primarily a flyting rather than a persuasive speech; the only element of 'persuasion" seems to be the curt command, "if in truth your heart is so set upon going, go. The way is there..." (42-3); Nestor to Agamemnon, 9.96-113 (persuades

him of the necessity of persuading Achilles) and 163-72 (simple instruction); Odysseus to Achilles in his own words, 9.225-63 and 300-306; and using Agamemnon's words in 264-99; Achilles to Phoinix, 9.607-19, gentle persuasion to stay with him and abandon Agamemnon (Odysseus even recounts later that "he will never use force to persuade him" (9.692); Ajax to Odysseus/Achilles, 9.624-42; Diomedes to the Achaeans, 9.704-9, simple instruction.

Book 10

Agamemnon to Menelaus, 10.65-71, simple instruction; Prayers of Odysseus to Athena (10.278-82) and Diomedes to Athena (10.284-94, a more elaborate request); Odysseus to Diomedes, 10.341-8, simple instruction; Dolon to Odysseus & Diomedes, 10.378-81, supplication; Athena to Diomedes, 10.509-11, simple instruction/warning.

Book 11

Peisandros and Hippolochos to Agamemnon, 11.131-5, battlefield supplication; Agamemnon to the Danaans, 11.276-9, simple exhortation; Hector to the Trojans and allies, 11.286-90, simple (formulaic) exhortation; Idomeneus to Nestor, 11.511-15, simple instruction ending with a maxim to form an *enthymeme* ("A healer is a man worth many men in his knowledge. . ." therefore drive Machaon out of the battle on your chariot); Kebriones to Hector, 11.523-30, simple exhortation; Eurypylos to the Danaans, 11.586-90, simple exhortation; Eurypylos to Patroclus, 11.827-35, appeal for help in dressing a wound.

Book 12

Menestheus to Thootes, 12.343-50, simple command; Telamonian Ajax to Oilean Ajax, 12.366-9, simple exhortation; Teucer to the Lykians, 12.409-412, exhortation; Hector to the Trojans, 12.440-1, simple command.

Book 13

Poseidon to the Aiantes, 13.47-58, exhortation; Poseidon to assorted Achaians, 13.95-124, flyting/exhortation; Hector to the Trojans and allies, 13.150-54, simple command; Idomeneus to Meriones, 13.275-94 (not really intended to persuade; epideictic/praise speech?); Deiphobos to Aeneas, 13.463-7, simple command; Idomeneus to his comrades, 13.481-6, simple command.

Book 14

Nestor to Machaon, 14.3-8, simple instruction; Agamemnon to Nestor, 14.65-81 (example of bad attempt to persuade—advocates fleeing Troy for the third time); Hera to Sleep, 14.233-241 and 264-69, command accompanied by an incentive; Hera to Zeus, 14.330-40, coy request to go to her chamber rather than make love on Mount Ida (she lets Zeus "win" the argument and make love with her then and there); Sleep to Poseidon, 14.357-60, simple command; Poseidon to the Greeks, 14.364-77.

Book 15

Athena to Ares, 15.128-41; Zeus (via Iris) to Poseidon, 15.158-67 (=176-83), simple command + threat; Iris to Poseidon, 15.201-4, persuasion effected by a simple *gnômê* ("You know the Furies, how they forever side with the elder," 204); Zeus to Apollo, 15.221-35, simple command; Apollo to Hector, 15.254-61, simple exhortation/command; Thoas to the Greeks, 15.286-99, simple command; Hector to the Trojans, 15.347-51, simple command + threat; Nestor to Zeus, 15.372-6, supplication/prayer; Menelaus to Antilochus, 15.569-71, simple exhortation/command; Nestor to the Achaeans, 15.661-6, exhortation/supplication (appeal to loved ones at home).

Book 16

Achilles to Patroclus, 16.80-100, simple command; Achilles to Patroclus, 126-9, simple command; Achilles to the Myrmidons, 16.200-9, appeal to past; Achilles to Zeus, 233-48 (prayer); Patroclus to the Myrmidons, 16.269-74, simple exhortation/command; Sarpedon to the Lycians, 16.422-5, simple flyting/exhortation; Sarpedon to Glaucus, 16.492-501, command + appeal to sense of duty and shame; Glaucus to Apollo, 16.514-526, prayer; Glaucus to Aeneas and Hector, 16.537-47, command + appeal to sense of duty and shame; Patroclus to the Aiantes, 16.556-61, exhortation; Apollo to Patroclus, 16.707-9, simple command; Apollo in the guise of Asios to Hector, 16.721-5 (argument from greater/lesser; appeal to sense of shame).

Book 17

Euphorbus to Menelaus, 17.12-17, simple command; Menelaus to Euphorbus, 17.29-32, simple command+*gnômê*; Menelaus to Ajax, 17.120-22, simple exhortation/command; Hector to the Trojans & allies, 17.184-7, simple (formulaic) exhortation/command; Ajax to Menelaus, 17.238-45; Menelaus to the Danaans, 17.248-55, simple command; Apollo to Aeneas, 17.327-32, flyting; Aeneas to Hector, 17.335-41; unnamed random Achaean, 17.415-19; unnamed random Trojan, 17.421-2; Automedon to Alkimedon, 17.475-80, simple command; Hector to Aeneas, 17.485-90, suggestion with the force of a command; Automedon to Alkimedon, 17.501-06, simple command; Automedon to the Aiantes and Menelaus, 17.508-15, simple command; Athena (in the guise of Phoenix) to Menelaus, 17.556-9, flyting/command; Apollo (in the guise of Phainops) to Hector, 17.586-90, flyting; Meriones to Idomeneus, 17.622-3, simple command; Ajax to Menelaus, 17.652-5, simple command; Menelaus to the Aiantes, 17.669-72; Menelaus to Antilochus, 17.685-93, simple command; Ajax to Menelaus, 17.716-21, simple command.

Book 18

Thetis to Achilles, 18.134-7, simple command; Thetis to her sister nymphs, 18.140-4; Iris (for Hera) to Achilles, 18.170-80, appeal to shame; Iris to Achilles, 197-201, simple command; Polydamas to Hector and assembled Trojans, 18.254-83, warning/counsel without many elements of persuasion besides emphasizing the threat of Achilles; Charis/Aphrodite to Hephaistos, 18.392, simple command; Thetis to Hephaistos, 18.429-61, supplication/petition, appeal to past and pity.

Book 19

Thetis to Achilles, 19.8-11 and 19.29-36, simple commands; Achilles to Atreus, 19.56-73 (command = 68-71); Atreus to Achilles, 19.78-144 (command = 139-44); Agamemnon to Odysseus and the Achaeans, 19.185-97, simple instructions/commands; Achilles to the lords of Achaia, 19.305-8, begging them not to try to persuade him; Zeus to Athena, 19.342-8, simple command; Achilles to his horses, 19.400-03, simple command.

Book 20

Apollo (in the guise of Lycaon) to Aeneas, 20.83-5, simple flyting; Apollo (in the guise of Lycaon) to Aeneas, 20.104-9, command to face Achilles based on Aeneas' superior lineage; Hera to Poseidon and Athene, 20.115-31, simple exhortation to involve them in the battle; Poseidon to Hera, 20.133-43, counterargument that the gods should stay away; Achilles to Aeneas, 20.196-8, exhortation to back down; Aeneas to Achilles, 20.200-258 (see esp. 244-58), exhortation to fight ending with "You will not by talking turn me back from the strain of my warcraft..." (256ff.); Poseidon to the other gods, 20.293-308, exhortation to save Aeneas; Poseidon to Aeneas, 20.332-9, exhortation to stay out of battle; Apollo to Hector, 20.376-8, simple command; Achilles to Hector, 20.429, simple command.

Book 21

Lycaon to Achilles, 21.74-96, supplication + history; River Xanthos to Achilles, 21.214-221, simple command/supplication designed to elicit an action; Xanthos to Apollo, 21.229-32, flyting designed to elicit an action; Achilles to Zeus, 21.273-83, complaint/supplication designed to elicit an action; Poseidon and Athena to Achilles, 21.288-97, exhortation + simple command; Xanthos to brother Simoeis, 21.308-23, simple command; Hera to Hephaistos, 21.331-41, simple command/instruction; River Xanthos to Hephaistos, 21.357-60, simple command; Xanthos to Hera, 21.369-76, supplication; Hera to Hephaistos, 21.379-80, simple command; Hera to Athena, 21.420-22, simple command; Poseidon to Apollo, 21.436-60, attempt to stir up a quarrel; Apollo to Poseidon, 21.462-7, attempt to placate; Artemis to Apollo, 21.472-7, flyting; Hera to Artemis, 21.481-8, flyting/challenge/command; Priam to the guards at the Scaean gates, 21.531-6, simple command.

Book 22

Hecuba to Hector, 22.82-9, supplication; Athena to Zeus, 22.178-81 (repeat of Hera to Zeus, 16.441-3); Athena to Achilles, 22.216-23, simple command; Athena (in the guise of Deiphobos) to Hector, 22.229-31 and 239-46, simple exhortation; Hector to Achilles, 22.250-59, simple command/suggestion; Hector to Achilles, 22.338-43, supplication.

Book 23

Achilles to the Myrmidons, 23.6-11, simple exhortation; Achilles to the Achaean kings, 23.48-53, simple command; Achilles to Agamemnon, 23.156-60, simple command; Achilles to Agamemnon and assembled Achaeans, 23.236-48, simple instruction; Nestor to Antilochus, 23.306-48, instruction; Antilochus to his horses, 23.403-415; Menelaus to his horses, 23.443-5, simple command; Achilles to Oilean Ajax and Idomeneus, 23.492-8, peacemaking; Achilles to Ajax and Odysseus, 23.735-7, simple command; Odysseus to Athena, 23.770, simple prayer/supplication; Achilles to Agamemnon, 23.890-94, simple command to take the prize for spearthrowing (showing honor).

Book 24

Zeus to Thetis, 24.104-19, command to persuade Achilles to give up Hector's body (attempt to persuade x to persuade y, cf. Nestor to Patroclus in Book 11); Thetis (on behalf of Zeus) to Achilles, 24.128-37, simple command; Zeus to Iris, 24.144-58, simple command; Iris (on behalf of Zeus) to Priam, 24.171-87; Hecuba to Priam, 24.201-9, attempt to dissuade; Priam to his sons, 24.253-64, simple instruction (+ flyting); Hecuba to Priam, 24.287-298, command + last attempt to dissuade; Priam to Zeus, 24.308-13, supplication; Zeus to Hermes, 24.334-8, simple command; herald to Priam, 24.353-7, warning/suggestion; Hermes to Priam, 24.465-7, simple command/instruction; Achilles to Priam, 24.517-551, exhortation to cease from grieving; Achilles to Priam, 24.560-70, warning/command; Priam to Achilles, 24.635-42, simple request/command; Hermes to Priam, 24.683-8, simple warning designed to make Priam get up and leave; Priam to the Trojans, 24.716-17, simple command; Priam to the Trojans, 24.778-81, simple command/instruction.

Chapter 3: The Genealogy of Rhetoric from Homer to Aristotle

I. Explaining the correspondence between Homeric practice and Aristotelian theory: Three possibilities

Now that the points of correspondence between the techniques of persuasion used in Homeric speech and those appearing in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* have been demonstrated, how can we explain these correspondences—especially considering that they seem to have gone largely unacknowledged by Aristotle himself, leading to a subsequent history of near silence on the subject of Homer's contribution to rhetoric?[140] What are the historical and literary processes that might have led from Homer's poetic representation of rhetoric to Aristotle's canonical treatise? This chapter will examine the three possible explanations for the rhetorical correspondences between Homer and Aristotle: 1) common sources for both authors; 2) universality of rhetoric, with Aristotle (following to some degree the anonymous handbook authors and Plato) arriving at his theories apart from and independent of Homeric example; and 3) impact of the Homeric paradigm on the development of formal rhetoric, culminating in Aristotle's work.

In searching for the most likely of these explanations, I will draw upon the evidence of texts in the intervening centuries between Homer and Aristotle, both poetic (Hesiod, Homeric hymns, Pindar, tragedy) and theoretical (the Sophists and Plato).[141] Specifically, I will be examining instances of rhetorical speech by Aristotle's definition in these texts. A comparative examination of non-Greek ancient narratives will inform my discussion of the possibility of rhetoric's universality. While acknowledging that it is impossible to answer definitively questions such as "Did Homer invent rhetoric?" and

[140] Aristotle's treatment of Homer in the *Rhetoric* will be discussed in Chapter 4.

[141] Obviously, tragedy plays a major role in the progression I am tracing from poetic representation of speech to formalized rhetoric, due to its nature and relative abundance of material. It will thus enter my discussion as a literary intermediary between the poetry of Homer and the rhetorical theory of the Classical era. I will not, however, treat tragedy with the extent of analysis that I have devoted to Homeric poetry, in that I am chiefly concerned with the latter as the *earliest* representation of speech in Greek literature, and with the phenomenon whereby the direct speech of characters is distinguished from the narrative voice.

"Was Aristotle borrowing from Homer in developing his rhetorical theory?", my intention is to identify the most plausible account of the transmission and transmutation of the rhetoric that we have already seen demonstrated in Homeric poetry into the familiar Classical manifestation of rhetoric.

A. Common sources

It is certainly possible that both Homer and Aristotle drew on the same pre-Homeric material in creating their respective representations of a rule-governed system for persuasive speech. The lack of attestation for pre-Homeric sources (beyond a few references to the shadowy figures of Orpheus and Musaeus), however, makes it impossible to argue for this possibility in any meaningful way.[142] Even if the Homeric epics were derived from "earlier sources," the fact that subsequent Greek literature does not acknowledge such sources suggests that the epics (in the process of crystallization from an oral-performative tradition into their eventual textualization in the sixth century or later) must have effectively assimilated and superseded any source material. The point of relevance for our purposes is that the Homeric epics represent the earliest surviving Greek literature (leaving aside the textualization debate, for which see footnote 72, Chapter 1), and were generally treated as such by the ancients.

[142] See West (1983) on the Orphic Poems. To the mythical figure of Orpheus, best known for his gifts at singing and lyre-playing, were attributed various works of poetry; the earliest attestations date to the late-sixth or early-fifth century B.C.E. (West 7). Even if a tradition of Orphic poetry predated the Homeric epics (which would be pure speculation), its subject matter—centering on religious ritual, theogonies, cosmogonies, metempsychosis, and the like, (which led to the appropriation of Orphic material by the Pythagoreans, Bacchic mysteries, and other mystery cults)—makes it unlikely that such poetry would have provided the necessary rhetorical paradigms for Homer and Aristotle. The figure of Musaeus occupied a place similar to and allied with Orpheus in Greek tradition, but with even less claim to being an actual historical figure. His name is often invoked in the Classical era and later as an early (pre-Homeric) poet, but his name served primarily as the mouthpiece for a variety of oracles and poetry on religious and eschatological themes (See West 39-44).

B. Universality of rhetoric

In seeking to explain the correspondences between Homer's and Aristotle's notions of effective rhetoric, it is necessary to consider the possibility that Homeric speakers are depicted as using a mode of speech that is universally available, an innate human capacity. Plett distinguishes between what he calls "primary grammar," or ordinary speech, and "secondary grammar," or rhetorical language; is the Homeric composer employing "primary grammar," merely mimicking a mode of unlearned, everyday communication that occurs naturally in society?[143] Or is there a consciously-deployed, rule-governed system for persuasion represented in Homeric characters' speech, a phenomenon unique within pre-Classical Greek literature?

In order to answer this question, it is first of all necessary to reprise my definition of the term "rhetoric." This term has been conceived and deployed in numerous ways throughout its history, and perhaps no modern scholar has devoted more study to the subject than George Kennedy. I therefore turn to Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* for an articulation of three different historical conceptualizations of the term "rhetoric," from most to least specific. He describes the first of these as follows:

> Some might argue that "rhetoric" is a peculiarly Western phenomenon, a structured system of teaching public speaking and written composition, developed in classical Greece, taught in Roman, medieval, renaissance, and early modern schools, and, with some revisions, still in use today.[144] (2-3)

As is appropriate for the narrowest definition of the term, this definition includes elements of technical metarhetoric, that is, manuals analyzing and providing instruction in the practice of rhetoric. (We must keep in mind, however, that a "structured system," and instruction in that system, can be practiced and displayed without the benefit of a technical manual; to think otherwise would be to follow Havelock's problematic claim

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[143] See Plett (1985) 62.
[144] Kennedy (1998).

that systematic and logical thinking was not possible before the invention of writing.[145]) This narrow definition, observes Kennedy, is only "a subset of a more general meaning that also goes back to the beginnings of Western rhetorical consciousness." He explains the second and more general meaning thus:

> A common brief definition of "rhetoric" in classical antiquity was "the art of persuasion," or in Aristotle's fuller form (*Rhetoric* 1.2.1) "an ability, in each case, to see the available means of persuasion." (3)

The invocation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* marks this definition as the one generally understood in Classical Greece (and which gradually evolved into the school-curriculum rhetoric described in the first passage). Although the translated phrase "art of persuasion" may sound like a casual and non-technical activity to the modern English-speaking ear, the original context of the phrase, and the word τέχνη in connection with persuasion, denoted just the opposite: that persuasion was a technique, a skill. But there is a yet more fundamental understanding of rhetoric, according to Kennedy. This understanding

> existed in Greece before "rhetoric," that is, before it had the name that came to designate it as a specific area of study. "Rhetoric" in this broader sense is a universal phenomenon, one found even among animals, for individuals everywhere seek to persuade others to take or refrain from some action, or to hold or discard some belief. (3)
> ...Rhetoric, in the most general sense, may thus be identified with the energy inherent in an utterance (or an artistic representation): the mental or emotional energy that impels the speaker to expression, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy received by the recipient who then uses mental energy in decoding and perhaps acting on the message. Rhetorical labor takes place. (5)

Surely this final and most wide-ranging definition of rhetoric as "energy [mental or emotional] inherent in an utterance"—which can be expressed by a monkey's call of warning or a stag's roar of competition over a mate (to cite two of Kennedy's examples)—qualifies as a universal and innate capacity of living creatures. But it is a modern construal of a term that has traditionally had a much more precise definition, as

[145] See Chapter 1, footnote 60 (p. 30), which quotes Havelock (1986) 39: "May not all logical thinking be a product of Greek alphabetic literacy?" Halverson's critique (1992) astutely points out the shortcomings of this view.

attested in the first two Kennedy passages above. This more precise definition is what I have been working with in this dissertation, and what I will continue to employ. To revisit my working definition of rhetoric, introduced in Chapter 1: *Rhetoric is a learned and deliberately-practiced skill, involving the deployment of tropes and techniques, and aimed at winning an audience's approval or assent.*

We return now to the question of which of these definitions of rhetoric aptly describes the practice of characters in the Homeric epics. Clearly, Homer—as does every speaker and author/composer—represents his characters employing rhetoric by Kennedy's most general definition: "mental or emotional energy that impels the speaker to expression, the energy level coded in the message, and the energy received by the recipient." Homer *is*, in this sense, depicting a common and universal practice of rhetoric. But does he also depict rhetoric in the sense of that term which has prevailed from Aristotle's up to our own time—the "structured system," the "ability, in each case, to see the available means of persuasion"? Based upon my examination of speeches in the *Iliad* (Chapter 2), and supported in many instances by the ancient commentators themselves (Chapter 1), I would argue that indeed Homer does operate from this sense of rhetoric (despite the absence of rhetorical *terminology* in the epics[146]). Across a wide spectrum of Homeric speakers, the degree of sophistication in arguments, variety in tropes, and sensitivity shown to the particular audience is too marked to be an accidental or unconscious phenomenon. In order to contextualize synchronically this claim that Homeric "rhetoric" is not simply a universal phenomenon, I have looked at surviving non-Greek literature that predates or is roughly contemporaneous with the Homeric epics and that is roughly similar in form (i.e., narrative with embedded direct speech). What follows is a very brief overview of the appearance of rhetoric in three major ancient non-Greek texts; for a helpful and more in-depth overview of rhetoric in ancient literate societies, Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric* is an excellent resource. I have found that in the represented speeches of these works, it is possible to identify occasional instances of a few of the rhetorical tropes that exist in Homer, such as rebukes

[146] See, however, the end of Chapter 1 for a list of meta-rhetorical references in the *Iliad*.

that appeal to shame and simple, isolated enthymemes. But on the whole, these speeches are of the type that I did *not* include in my reckoning of rhetorical speeches in the *Iliad* based on criteria of complexity and technical sophistication.

In ancient Near Eastern literature, the most obvious parallel to the Homeric epics is the *Epic of Gilgamesh,* which in its fullest surviving version dates from the seventh century B.C.E. (although portions of the poem appear earlier in other versions).[147] Most of the direct speeches in *Gilgamesh* involve information exchange or simple instructions, with no rhetorical techniques adduced—or, at least, with few of the rhetorical techniques found in Greek literature (logical argumentation, *diathesis,* etc.).[148] There are a few exceptions, however. Tablet II of the epic contains Gilgamesh's speech attempting to enlist Enkidu's help in attacking the monster Humbaba, a seemingly impossible heroic task. In the speech, he employs logical argument by reminding Enkidu of human mortality and the irrationality of fearing death in face of this fact; he invokes shaming tactics with the words "Now you are afraid of death—what has become of your bold strength?"; he offers the incentive of eternal fame to be achieved by the defeat of Humbaba; and he points out Enkidu's own past experience with wilderness survival as preparation for this task ("You were born and raised in the wilderness, a lion leaped up on you, ***so*** you have experienced it all" (emphasis added)).[149] Tablet III depicts the Elders of the city of Uruk using *gnômai* to caution Gilgamesh before he ventures out to fight Humbaba ("'The one who goes on ahead saves the comrade.' 'The one who knows the

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[147] For a comprehensive treatment of the composition history of the *Epic of Gilgamesh,* see Tigay (1982).

[148] Denning-Bolle (1987) has noted the presence of "stylistic devices used in Mesopotamian narrative literature that are also present in dialogic contexts. These include repetition, parallelism, metaphor, simile, and stories-within-stories." (225-6). She points out that, for example, the flood narrative in the *Epic of Gilgamesh* is contained within the direct speech of Utnapishtim to Gilgamesh; that Gilgamesh rejects the advances of Ishtar in a speech that "repeats an earlier dialogue of hers with another prospective lover;" and that Enkidu "recounts his dream of the gods' dialogic counsel in his dialogue with Gilgamesh." (226-7) But although each of these phenomena of embedded direct speech "jolts the reader or listener for a moment," in the words of Denning-Bolle, none of them is actually used for *persuasive* purposes. That is, none of these stories or dialogues within character speech in the *Epic of Gilgamesh* is part of an effort to convince the internal audience of something, in the way that Homeric rhetorical speeches do.

Wills (1970) identifies some aspects of rhetorical speech in ancient Mesopotamian literary and historical texts, part of his contention that there were assemblies in early Mesopotamian history that "seem to have had both deliberative and judicial functions and to have served as arenas for public address. (405)

[149] Translation of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* from Kovacs (1989).

route protects his friend.' Let Enkidu go ahead of you..."). Tablet V contains fragments of Enkidu's hortatory speech to Gilgamesh, which includes words intended to shame the hero into action. And Kennedy observes that "the debate of the gods [over whether Gilgamesh or Enkidu should die in punishment for their offenses, Tablet VII], which is really a trial of the two warriors, shows some awareness of what in Western rhetorical theory is called 'stasis theory,' the determination of the question at issue."[150] This "debate," however, merely consists of three gods making progressive declarations: Anu asserts that "one of them must die;" Enlil says "Let Enkidu die;" Shamash then unsuccessfully protests punishment of the "innocent" Enkidu, pointing out that he himself was responsible for motivating the warriors' actions. Other than this final point, which incorporates a brief enthymeme and does not lead to any change in the decision to punish Enkidu, the gods' "debate" does not involve any persuasive techniques.

Few other works of Near Eastern literature offer an exact comparison with Homer by containing represented persuasive speech.[151] Elements of a rhetorical voice do appear in the Egyptian epistolary tradition, however. In surviving letters from fourteenth-century B.C.E. Egypt, for example—a collection known as the "Amarna Letters," addressed to the king of Egypt from various correspondents in Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine and treating official, business, and personal topics—Kennedy notes

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[150] Kennedy (1998) 122.

[151] But see Denning-Bolle (1987) on the importance of dialogue in Near Eastern wisdom literature. She observes that "in Sumerian literature, the ancients termed one particular genre, *adaman-dug-ga*, which refers specifically to the contest literature. In this literature, two or more parties engage in a dispute, vying with each other over which is the superior object or creature." (225) Although this term is relatively rare in lexical lists, Denning-Bolle sees it as a parallel to ancient Greek phenomena: "The Mesopotamian enjoyed the art of verbal sparring as much as the Greeks reveled in the debater's techniques of the *agora*." (225)

Kennedy (1998) discusses Near Eastern rhetorical instruction, centered on the virtues of keeping silent, restraining one's tongue, and waiting for the right moment to speak, and illustrated in surviving writings such as the Egyptian *Instructions of Ptahhotep* (on which see also Fox (1983)) and the Hebrew book of Proverbs. Since these correspond more closely to Greek rhetorical handbooks of the fifth and fourth centuries than to the represented speech found in Homer, however, they do not fit into my immediate category of comparison. The Near Eastern tradition of wisdom literature offers robust and interesting ground for comparison with Greek concepts of rhetoric (although not an exact parallel with either Homeric speech or later theoretical handbooks/treatises). I discuss the relationship between wisdom literature and Greek rhetoric in connection with Hesiod specifically (below, section II.C), and hope to visit this subject in greater depth in a future project.

that "ethos, pathos, and logical argument are all used as means of persuasion."[152] *Êthos* is demonstrated in the letters, for example, by means of letter-writers "citing honorable actions of the past" to demonstrate their good character; *pathos* by writers describing their terrible circumstances in pleas for assistance from the king; logical argument by enthymeme, as when writers accompany their requests to the king with a rehearsal of their prior deeds of service.[153] Identifying such neat Aristotelian categories within Egyptian rhetoric may be misleading, however; Fox argues that *êthos* alone is "the major mode of persuasion in Egyptian rhetoric," and that "didactic wisdom literature gives no thought to argumentation as such and shows no awareness of the possibility that argumentation could operate independently of ethos."[154]

Although it is beyond my capacity to discuss them in any depth here, China and India also have literary traditions that are traceable as far back as the sixth century B.C.E. Both of these ancient cultures possessed literary forms in which direct speech was embedded into narrative: the Chinese *Shu Jing* (*Book of History*), a compilation of documents that record the deeds and sayings of ancient emperors; and the Sanskrit epics *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*, which recount tales of wars, heroes, and gods from an earlier age. Because of the length of these three works, the difficulties of accessing full English translations of the *Shu Jing* and *Mahabharata*, and the paucity of scholarship in English on the subject of rhetoric or speech in these works, I believe it prudent to defer to Kennedy's useful, if limited, examinations of rhetoric in these works in his *Comparative Rhetoric* in general, and to the works of Mary Garrett ("*Pathos* reconsidered from the perspective of classical Chinese rhetorical theories") and Kevin McGrath (*The Sanskrit Hero: Karna in Epic Mahabharata*) in particular.[155] On rhetoric in ancient China, Kennedy observes that persuasion in the *Shu Jing* makes little use of arguments from *pathos*, more of arguments from *êthos*, and tends to employ inductive rather than deductive argumentation (i.e. favoring appeals to example, precedent, and authority,

[152] Kennedy (1998) 124.
[153] *Ibid*, 124.
[154] Fox (1983) 16.
[155] Kennedy (1998), Garrett (1993), McGrath (2004).

but rarely employing enthymemes or the argument from probability).[156] Garrett is not concerned with literary representations of rhetoric in Chinese literature so much as with a broad comparison Western and Chinese rhetorical theories, particularly concerning the emotions. The differences between the two are stark, according to Garrett: in Classical China, "what those in power desired was not assent to one proposal, but a deep imprinting of particular attitudes, loyalties, and predilections in the entire population so that pleading or coercion on specific occasions would not be necessary, only the issuance of directives and occasional exhortations."[157] A closer analogue for Homeric rhetoric may be found in the ancient Sanskrit epics; the *Mahabharata*, according to Kennedy, "describes a society in which debate among nobles on political issues was frequent, important, sophisticated, and popular," and the *Ramayana* likewise depicts political proposals (such as the speech of King Dasa-ratha to an assembly of chiefs and citizens, proposing his son Rama as successor) and debate amongst characters in situations that resemble those of the *Iliad*.[158] McGrath offers a detailed study of six major dialogues in the *Mahabharata* involving the hero Karna, and the speeches contained therein demonstrate admonition, prediction, and some commands.[159] But while those aspects are shared with rhetorical speech in Homer (and McGrath notes that Karna is characterized as the "best of speakers," *vadatam vara*), I do not detect from McGrath's analysis that the character speeches involve sustained rhetorical argumentation aimed at persuasion; they are conversational and dialogic interactions—all but one of them conducted in private—in contrast to the long, rhetorically complex public speeches of the *Iliad*.

This brief look at comparative data offers some context for judging whether Homeric persuasive speech represents a universally-practiced phenomenon (one that later came to be labeled "rhetoric"), whether that phenomenon is an unlearned or a learned mode of human communication, and whether, if learned, it differs in a significant and innovative way from contemporary and even later literatures. The

[156] Kennedy (1998) 151.
[157] Garrett (1993) 22.
[158] Kennedy (1998) 176-8.
[159] McGrath (2004) 133-77.

comparative texts show some rhetorical features, often differing in emphasis and generally less wide-ranging and systematic than the Greek conception of the subject that I have been working from. These rhetorical features (such as simple enthymematic patterns) generally occur in isolation rather than in combination, and do not evince the sophisticated level of argumentation found in Homeric speech. The unique place of Homeric speech within the history of rhetoric is further illustrated in what follows, an examination of Greek literature after Homer but before Aristotle (section II). While some rhetorical features appear in these works, this examination leads me to conclude that the scale and scope of Homeric rhetoric remains unmatched in the pre-Classical era.

A final comment on the distinction between universal and conscious or rule-governed rhetoric comes from Aristotle himself, who at the beginning of his *Rhetoric* observes that

> All [people], up to a point, try both to test and uphold an argument and to defend themselves and attack. Now among the general public, some do these things at random (εἰκῇ) and others through an ability acquired by habit (διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως), but since both ways are possible, it is clear that it would also be possible to do the same by [following] a path; for it is possible to observe (θεωρεῖν) the cause why some succeed by habit and others accidentally, and all would at once agree that such observation is the activity of an art (τέχνη).[160] (1.1.1-2)

Aristotle here presents two different ways of conceptualizing rhetoric: as something that can occur universally, randomly, and without calculation or practice; or as something systematic that must be cultivated by habit and consciously practiced. It is this latter conception of rhetoric that I believe to be in evidence in the speeches of the *Iliad*. Aristotle then makes a further distinction, that between practice and theory of rhetoric. His description of theoretical activity—the observation and analysis of the "habit" of cultivated rhetoric—describes his own program in the *Rhetoric*. Consciously rhetorical speech (such as that practiced by Homeric speakers) and meta-rhetorical instruction (such as Aristotle's) are simply two sides of the same coin in opposition to universal, uncalculated persuasion in Aristotle's most basic dichotomy.

[160] Translation of Aristotle from Kennedy (2007).

C. The rhetorical legacy of Homer

A final possibility that would explain the close correspondence between the details of Homeric persuasive speech and Aristotle's rhetorical theory is that the former informed the latter. Aristotle does not acknowledge Homer as an inventor or precursor of rhetorical theory and practice (he cites Homer in the *Rhetoric* to illustrate mostly minor figures of style, such as metaphor and asyndeton). The possible reasons for this neglect will be explored in Chapter 4. Perhaps Aristotle was aware of Homer's use of *êthos*, *diathesis*, enthymeme, topics, and the like and chose to ignore this fact in his treatise (which admittedly offers little credit to rhetorical predecessors); perhaps he was genuinely blind to the possibility that the earliest Greek poetry provided clear illustrations of the *technê* he was describing. Regardless, it is indisputable that Aristotle had a deep familiarity with the Homeric epics, a familiarity arising from cultural tradition as well as personal investigation (for which the *Poetics* is clear evidence). I would contend that it is unlikely that the rhetorical sophistication and the consistent patterns of argumentation found in Homer's direct speeches went undetected by such a keen critic as Aristotle, or failed to provide a template for the Sophists and handbook-writers that preceded him.[161]

II. Between Homer and Aristotle: tracing a literary lineage of rhetoric

If indeed Homeric speech is a significant (and largely unacknowledged) source for later rhetorical theory, how was the notion of rhetorical persuasion transmitted from Homer to Aristotle—crossing lines of time, genre, and medium (oral to written)?[162] Did it

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[161] For more on the role of the Sophists in the development of rhetorical theory, and the relationship between the Sophists and Homer, see section II.F below.

[162] The composition process and date of the Homeric epics is, of course, still a subject of scholarly debate, due to the fluidity of the oral tradition. For those who adhere to an early textualization model, such as Powell and Janko, the epics were dictated as text in the early eighth century B.C.E. (see Janko (1982), Powell (1991)). By contrast, Nagy's "evolutionary model" describes a progression from fluid oral tradition to textual canon that stretches from the second millennium B.C.E. and the mid-second century B.C.E.. Nagy locates the "definitive period" within this evolution—the time when Homeric poetry began to crystallize into a more stable textual version—in the sixth and fifth centuries (see Nagy (1996b) 29-63, (2003) 2-3, etc.). Historical tradition claims that the sixth-century Athenian tyrant Peisistratus (or his son Hipparchus) had overseen the

find its way into other forms of Archaic literature along the way? In an attempt to answer these questions, I have surveyed the role of rhetorical speech at representative moments in the chronologically intervening literature: the Homeric Hymns, Hesiod, varieties of Archaic lyric, tragedy, and sophistic oratory. This survey, necessarily brief though it must be, brings to light noteworthy points of comparison between Homeric poetry and the literature that follows it with regard to the understanding and portrayal of rhetoric. Insofar as it is possible to trace a "literary lineage" for rhetoric in the Archaic age—that is, pointing to the use of persuasive techniques in Archaic poetry, and evaluating the techniques' similarity and possible indebtedness to those found in Homer—I have attempted to do so. Two basic observations emerge from this survey. First, no representation of rhetoric within Archaic literature approaches Homer's in terms of its detailed and wide-ranging employment of rhetorical techniques. Second, when complex rhetoric *is* depicted during this period, it tends to be in literature that bears an affinity to the Homeric epics in genre and/or narrative content. Thus, as we will see, certain *Homeric Hymns* and the military exhortation elegies of Callinus and Tyrtaeus are the only Archaic works that contain rhetorical speech bearing a strong resemblance to Homeric rhetoric. It is these works that might be seen as propagating the "literary lineage" for rhetoric from Homer down through tragedy and certain sophistic works, and thence to the rhetorical theories of Plato and Aristotle. But such examples of complex rhetoric—i.e., speech that involves the range of logical argumentation, *diathesis*, and *êthos* appeals—are few and far between in the Archaic period, a fact that only highlights the innovation and uniqueness of the Homeric poems' representation of rhetorical speech.

textualization of the Homeric poems and a rhapsodic presentation of them at the Panathenaia (See Powell (1991) 216, footnote 156). Whatever the date at which the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* assumed textual form, we can say with certainty that by the time of Aristotle, reasonably stable textual version of the epics were in circulation. Aristotle's quotations of Homer—following the precedent of Plato, Isocrates, and the *artium scriptores*, who in the generation before Aristotle quoted and commented on aspects of the Homeric epics—indicate that something similar to our modern version of the text had already achieved canonical status within Greek literary and cultural consciousness by the fifth century B.C.E.. (For a study of what Plato's version of Homer might have been, based on Homeric quotations in Plato, see LaBarbe (1949). There is no equivalent study of "Aristotle's Homer," as far as I am aware.)

A. Homeric Hymns

The dating and origins of the Homeric Hymns are murky, and even when only the longer poems are considered, their composition likely spans more than a hundred years.[163] We know from a variety of ancient sources (the opening lines of Pindar's *Nemean* 2, for example) that hymns were often performed by rhapsodes as preludes (*prooimia*) to a performance of epic material.[164] There is thus a natural relationship between hymns and epic, and the two genres have certain characteristics in common (e.g. portrayal of the gods, a narrative arc, hexameter form). Indeed, the Homeric Hymns share a number of formulae—and occasionally full verses—with Homer, a fact which "is not surprising in view of the Hymns' creation and transmission among a professional rhapsode class," according to West.[165] For my examination of these poems' representation of persuasive speech, it is not necessary to pinpoint the dating or to resolve questions about composition method. The question I am investigating is whether the Hymns depict a range and combination of persuasive techniques similar to that exhibited by Homer's speakers. Do they partake in and propagate the incipient system of rhetoric first witnessed in the *Iliad*, or fall short of that epic's level of rhetorical sophistication? In drawing such a comparison, it is, of course, important to consider the differences in genre and subject matter between the Hymns and Homeric poetry. As we will see, genre seems to be less of a determining factor than is subject matter: despite the Hymns' inherent religious nature and purpose, which distinguish them from the epic genre, they retain a certain formal similarity to Homeric epic insofar as they are

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[163] The dates proposed by various scholars for the origins of the long hymns range from the late seventh century to the early fifth century B.C.E. (see West (2003), Janko (1982), and Görgemanns (1976)). West and Janko contend that the *Hymn to Aphrodite* is the earliest of the long hymns, based on its lexical and stylistic features; and there is general scholarly consensus that the *Hymn to Hermes* is the latest, likewise based on grounds of diction (see West, Janko, Görgemanns (who argues for a fifth-century dating of the *Hymn to Hermes*), and Allen et al. (1936)).

[164] *Nemean* 2.1-3 reads: Ὅθεν περ καὶ Ὁμηρίδαι/ ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων τὰ πόλλ' ἀοιδοί/ ἄρχονται, Διὸς ἐκ προοιμίου... ("Just as the sons of Homer, those singers of verses stitched together, most often begin with a prelude to Zeus..." (Text and translation from Race (1997)).

[165] West (2003) 5. In contrast to Janko (1982), who argues that the formulae in the *Homeric Hymns* show chronological development from Homer, Cantilena (1982) contends (based on his in-depth cataloguing and analysis of the formulae in the *Homeric Hymns*) that the hymns possess a formular tradition that is independent from Homer's.

narrative hexametric poems containing direct speech and dialogues between characters. Thus there are *opportunities* within the Hymns for the sort of persuasive discourse that we have seen in Homer to be depicted. It would seem to be the subject matter of the individual long hymns, then, that makes some of them more likely to contain rhetorical speech than others.

Only the four longest Homeric Hymns (counting the Delian and Pythian portions of the *Hymn to Apollo* as a unity[166]) are relevant for this investigation, as only they contain instances of persuasive direct speech.[167] Treating them in the order of their traditional numbering, I begin with the direct speeches aimed at persuasion in the *Hymn to Dememter*. This hymn exhibits only modest examples of persuasive techniques: simple commands, sometimes attended by a single reason, none of them complex enough to have qualified the analysis to which I subjected Iliadic speeches in Chapter 2. Typical of such persuasive speeches in the *Hymn to Demeter* are those found in an exchange in which Demeter begs Helios for information on the whereabouts of her daughter:

> Helios, have regard for me, **if ever I have gladdened your heart either by word or deed** (εἴ ποτε δή σεο/ ἢ ἔπει ἢ ἔργωι κραδίην καὶ θυμὸν ἴηνα)...Look down from the sky with your rays over the whole earth and sea: so tell me truly if perchance you have seen who it is, of gods or mortals, that has taken her away from me by force against her will and gone off with her.[168] (64-73)

Helios, in response, offers the following argument:

> So, goddess, end your loud lamenting; there is no call for you to rage for ever like this to no purpose. **Aïdoneus, the Major General, is not an unsuitable son-in-law to have among the gods** (οὔ τοι ἀεικής/ γαμβρὸς ἐν ἀθανάτοις πολυσημάντωρ Ἀϊδωνεύς)... (82-84)

[166] I treat the *Hymn to Apollo* as a unified whole for the purposes of my survey of the poem's persuasive direct speeches, since considering the Delian and Pythian portions separately would not affect my analysis. The question of the *Hymn to Apollo*'s unity has been amply treated elsewhere: see among others Janko (1982), who makes case for the Delian and Pythian halves as separate poems (99-100 *et passim*), and Clay (1989), who argues for its unity (18-19, including a footnote that chronicles the state of scholarship on the issue); West (2003) summarizes the controversy (10), and refers to Karl Förstel (1979), *Untersuchungen zum Homerischen Apollonhymnus* (Diss. Bochum) and Walter Burkert (2001), *Homerica* (*Kleine Schriften* i, Göttingen) on the subject.

[167] The 59-line *Hymn to Dionysus* (Hymn 7) is the only other Hymn to contain any represented direct speech, and its exchange between the Tyrsenian pirates' helmsman and captain in lines 17-31 is a disagreement (over the treatment of the captured god) without any attempt at persuasion.

[168] Text and translation of the *Homeric Hymns* from West (2003).

In both instances, I have emphasized the portion of the speech that could be considered a rhetorical technique; both represent the premise of an enthymeme of which a command (or commands) is the conclusion. Demeter's premise rests on an appeal to her own *êthos* by invoking past favors bestowed upon her addressee; Helios' premise argues the advantage to be derived from *Aïdoneus'* rape of Kore, a reason for Demeter to cease lamenting (compare Achilles' more evocative and sympathetic argument for the same cause, addressed to Priam in *Iliad* 24 and featuring the *paradeigma* of Niobe). This hymn's only other instance of persuasion (that is, a request accompanied by a reason) is the Eleusinian queen Metaneira's proposal to the disguised Demeter:

> Now that you have come here, you shall have as much as I have myself. Just rear this boy for me…If you were to raise him and see him to young manhood's measure, **then any woman who saw you might well envy you, so richly would I repay you for his nurturing** (ἦ ῥά κέ τίς σε ἰδοῦσα γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων/ ζηλώσαι· τόσα κέν τοι ἀπὸ θρεπτήρια δοίην). (218-23)

Metaneira's argument is simple, but it does comprise an enthymeme based upon the topic of incentives: namely, the offer of reward (a common persuasive trope throughout the Homeric Hymns, as we will see). The final description of persuasion in the *Hymn to Demeter* is Hermes' speech to Hades in 347-56, conveying Zeus' demand that he relinquish Persephone to her mother. Zeus instructs Hermes to "persuade [Hades] with soft words" (μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν (336)) using the same formula that we have already seen Hesiod (*Theogony* 90) and Homer use to characterize persuasion. Hermes' speech is straightforward and formal, a single enthymeme comprised of a command ("Zeus the father has instructed me to bring illustrious Persephone out from the Darkness to them") followed by a reason ("so that her mother may set eyes on her and cease from her wrath and her dreadful resentment against the immortals"). Hermes elaborates on this premise with more specific details of Demeter's wrath, turning into an argument from the topic of consequences: she will "destroy the feeble stock of earthborn humankind," which will result in "diminishing the immortals' tribute." Despite the simplicity of Hermes' rhetoric, the fact that the command comes from Zeus is enough to

win Hades' compliance (358). Beyond these examples, there are no other depictions of persuasion in the *Hymn to Demeter*, only pure commands (e.g. Demeter commanding Metaneira to have her people build the goddess a temple (270-74); or Rhea conveying to Demeter Zeus' command to make the earth produce grain once again (467-9)).

In contrast with the *Hymn to Demeter*, the *Hymn to Apollo* contains several speeches that exhibit more complex persuasive argumentation along the lines of Homeric speeches. The first of these speeches is Leto's address to the personified island of Delos, an attempt to convince her to host the birth of Apollo:

> Delos, if only you would be willing to be the seat of my son, Phoibos Apollo, and establish his rich temple on your soil! No one else is ever going to engage with you or honor you, for I do not see you ever being rich in cattle or sheep, nor will you bring forth a harvest or grow abundant fruit trees. But if you have the temple of Apollo the far-shooter, all men will bring you hecatombs as they congregate here, and you will have the savor of the fat ever going up beyond measure, and you will feed your inhabitants from the hand of others, for you do not have richness under your soil. (51-60)

Leto's approach to persuading Delos puts a subtle psychological twist on the straightforward argument from incentives. She builds her case gradually, beginning with a wistful statement of her request, then pointing out Delos' natural disadvantages and needs, and finally proposing a mutually beneficial solution. Along with deploying the topic of incentives, this solution incorporates a measure of *diathesis* in its flattering suggestion that, once Apollo's temple is established on Delos, the island will gain honor and popularity as well as wealth. Leto's proposal meets with some resistance, however, as Delos responds by negotiating, expressing apprehension about Apollo's unpredictable character and requesting the guarantee of an oath from Leto (62-82). Although Delos' request is not itself accompanied by any arguments such as would qualify it as rhetorical by the standards to which I have been adhering, the fact that she negotiates for a favorable "deal" through an exchange of words with Leto reveals her as a canny protector of her own interests. This hymn seems to have a conception of speech-craft that, on a small scale, demonstrates some of the range of the Homeric conception.

In the Pythian portion of the *Hymn to Apollo*, the primary instance of persuasive speech is uttered by the personified fountain Telphousa, in response to Apollo's assertion that he will establish a temple within her locality. The fact that Apollo asserts his intention to appropriate Telphousa for his purposes, rather than requests permission to do so, stands in contrast to the earlier interaction between Leto and Delos in a parallel situation. Whereas Leto had seen it necessary to persuade her audience, Apollo, in Miller's words, "displays an abruptness and apparent insensitivity quite alien to his mother's character. Where Leto first broaches her request hypothetically, next suggests reasons why Delos should be willing to listen, and finally makes an attractive proposal of *quid pro quo*, Apollo issues a flat statement of intent that totally ignores Telphusa's interest in the matter."[169] Such disregard for his audience's feelings and for the efficacy of rhetoric does not serve Apollo well, for Telphousa responds by growing angry (κραδίην ἐχολώσατο (256)) and channeling this anger into a deceptive counter-proposal, couched in respectful and winsome terms. After addressing him as ἄναξ ἑκάεργε to open the speech, she attempts to dissuade him from his plan with several arguments, followed by a counter-proposal:

> I will speak out, and you must take it to heart. You will always be bothered by the clatter of racehorses, and of mules being watered from my divine springs; here people will want to gaze at well-built chariots and the clatter of racing horses, rather than at a big temple with a mass of wealth inside it. **No, if you would take my advice (of course you are nobler and more powerful than I, lord, and your strength is supreme), make it at Crisa** (ἀλλ' εἰ δή τι πίθοιο (σὺ δὲ κρέσσων καὶ ἀρείων/ ἐσσὶ ἄναξ ἐμέθεν, σέο δὲ σθένος ἐστὶ μέγιστον)·/ ἐν Κρίσῃ ποίησαι)...there there will be no noise of chariots or clatter of racing horses round your well-built altar, but just the same the thronging peoples would bring their gifts for Ie-Paieon, and your heart would be glad as you received the fine offerings from the surrounding peoples. (261-74)

Telphousa first offers reasons why Apollo's plan is faulty, which appeal to his desire both for comfort and for honor and attention, and thus constitute an argument from the topic of incentives. She then turns this argument around in her alternative plan. The conclusion of her enthymeme is the suggestion (offered in the deferential tone of a

[169] Miller (1986) 76.

conditional clause), "if you would take my advice, make it at Crisa." Its premise is the topic of incentives that follows, a promise that this new locale would lack the problems of her territory, and that Apollo's "heart would be glad" at the offerings he would receive. In addition, she exerts the technique of *diathesis* through her flattery of Apollo ("of course you are nobler and more powerful than I, lord"), aiming to gain his favor. Miller calls Telphousa's speech "a small masterpiece of rhetoric, for like Leto—and conspicuously unlike Apollo—she speaks unerringly to the interests and desires (as she conceives them) of her auditor."[170] It is accordingly a successful piece of persuasion, for we find out in the line after her speech that "so saying she persuaded the Far-shooter." (275) This completes the account of speeches in the *Hymn to Apollo* that could be considered persuasive. Apollo gives two speeches of command to the Cretan sailors late in the poem (475-501 and 532-44), but they are simple instructions for establishing and tending his temple, with the second speech, as Clay observes, constituting his first oracle.[171] Apollo utters them with the assumption that he will be obeyed and that persuasion is unnecessary (much as he had done in his command to Telphousa).

The *Hymn to Hermes* is, of all the Homeric Hymns, the richest in both rhetorically-constructed direct speech and meta-reference to the persuasive power of speech. It has the greatest number of direct speeches within the narrative (20) of any of the hymns, and a higher proportion of direct speech to narrative than all the other longer hymns save the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (in which a single speech from Aphrodite to Anchises constitutes one-third of the hymn's total lines); 48% of the *Hymn to Hermes* is speech.[172] Such emphasis on speech is, of course, appropriate to the god whose power lies in tricks and clever reasoning, and this power is on abundant display in the hymn.[173]

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[170] Miller (1986) 79.

[171] Clay (1989) 86.

[172] Speech comprises 39% of the *Hymn to Demeter*, 32% of the *Hymn to Apollo*, and 57% of the *Hymn to Aphrodite* (but in only 6 total speeches).

[173] The connection between the *Hymn to Hermes* and rhetoric has been noted by several scholars (e.g. the brief discussion in Kennedy (1963) 40ff.), most notably Görgemanns in "*Rhetorik und Poetik im homerischen Hermeshymnus*" (1976). Görgemanns examines how the *Hymn to Hermes* engages with its historical and cultural context, particularly with regard to the emergence of rhetoric, concluding that "der Hermeshymnos einen Platz in der Geschichte der Rhetorik und Poetik verdient und dass sich in ihm Motive finden, die seit der Sophistenzeit breit entfaltet werden." (128)

Hermes indeed refers to his own power as a τέχνη, boasting to his mother Maia that ἐγὼ **τέχνης** ἐπιβήσομαι ἥ τις ἀρίστη ("I am going to embark on the finest of **arts**" (167)) as he moves to assert his position among the Olympian gods. This τέχνη proves to be skill in both deeds (invention and thievery), and words (glib and beguiling rhetoric). The first portion of the hymn (1-153) primarily chronicles Hermes' deeds, while the remainder (154-580) focuses on his verbal interactions with other characters. Although I will focus primarily on this latter portion of the hymn, there are a few instances of Hermes' speech prior to this which—while not containing as much persuasion as do the later speeches—do establish aspects of the god's speaking prowess. Clay observes that enigmatic rhetoric is characteristic of two of Hermes' early speeches, namely his addresses to the tortoise whose shell he appropriates for constructing a lyre, and to the old farmer from Onchestus who sees him stealing Apollo's cattle:

> Speech, insofar as it involves communication or mediation between individuals, belongs to Hermes' domain. But the rhetoric of Hermes is of a peculiar sort; persuasive, seductive, and deceptive, it is characteristically ambiguous and riddling, concealing as much as revealing, and abounding in double and ulterior meanings...Hermes' domain, then, is not the sphere of language that lays claim to truth, but rather that use of language whose goal extends outside itself and which is a means to an end: persuasion, seductive rhetoric, lies, oaths, perjuries, and even magical incantations.[174]

Hermes' first use of persuasive speech comes when he addresses the farmer from Onchestus (90-93). It is a modest persuasive attempt, perhaps befitting the simplicity of his humble audience, the only mortal character in the poem. Hermes employs the topic of incentives, promising to grant fruitfulness to the farmer's grapevines if he stays quiet about what he has seen. The encounter ends with no authorial comment, and only later will it become clear that Hermes' request was ineffective, as the farmer betrays him to Apollo (187-211).

Hermes' speech to the farmer is only a precursor, however, to the rhetorical outpouring that occurs once Apollo confronts Hermes about the theft of his cattle, with the ensuing quarrel that lasts nearly through the end of the poem. Apollo's initial volley

[174] Clay (1989) 106, 110-11.

is a short enthymematic speech comprised of a command plus a threat: "Tell me where my cows are, double quick, otherwise we two shall quarrel in no seemly fashion: I shall take you and hurl you into misty Tartarus, into the dismal Darkness past help..." (254-7). Hermes' response to this threat and Apollo's implied accusation of theft is a poetic version of Classical forensic oratory, a boldly-argued defense speech. Even the narrator's introduction heralds it as crafty (τὸν δ' Ἑρμῆς μύθοισιν ἀμείβετο κερδαλέοισιν, 260). Hermes' contention centers around the probability (or lack thereof) of Apollo's claim:

> I couldn't tell you where they are, or earn a reward for it. **I don't look like a cattle rustler, a strong man** (οὔ τι βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῶι φωτὶ ἔοικα). That isn't my business, I'm more interested in other things: what I'm interested in is sleeping, and my mother's milk, and having wrappings round my shoulders, and warm baths. I hope no one comes to hear what this dispute was about; it would astonish the immortals, the idea of a newborn child coming through the porch with cattle that dwell in the fields. That's nonsense you're talking. I was born yesterday, my feet are tender, and it's rough ground beneath. If you like, I'll swear a big oath, by my father's head: I promise I'm not to blame personally... (264-75)

This neat piece of persuasion incorporates an appeal to *êthos* at the same time as an argument from *eikos*, with Hermes citing his own youthful age and innocent character as reasons why Apollo's accusation is preposterous. He also employs the topic of consequence (Aristotle topic #13, *Rhet.* 2.23.14) by invoking the threat of the other gods' mockery; this topic serves as the premise for an enthymeme whose implied conclusion is that Apollo should drop his accusation.

Hermes ends the speech by volunteering to swear an oath—a rhetorical gesture that caps his overall protestation of innocence (albeit with a thinly-veiled undertone of mockery, which is not lost on Apollo, as his response (282-92) reveals). In this speech, Hermes has exemplified the argument from *eikos* that would become central to later forensic oratory, as we know from several references in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Among these references is his claim at 2.25.8 that *eikos* is one of the four sources of enthymemes (along with paradigm, necessary signs (*tekmêria*), and fallible signs (*sêmeia*)). Aristotle also cites the *Art* of Corax and its well-known example (which Plato attributes to Tisias in *Phaedrus* 273a-b) of the varying uses of the argument from probability:

> If a weak man were charged with assault, he should be acquitted as not being a likely suspect for the charge; for it is not probable [that a weak man would attack another]. And if he *is* a likely suspect, for example, if he is strong, [he should be acquitted]; for it is not likely [that he would start a fight] for the very reason that it was going to seem probable. (*Rhet.* 2.24.11)

Apollo shows his appreciation for Hermes' crafty speech with his response: "My dear sly swindler (ὦ πέπον ἠπεροπευτὰ δολοφραδές), by the way you talk (οἷ' ἀγορεύεις), I reckon you will often be burgling prosperous houses by night..." (282-85). The narrator furthers this characterization of Hermes with the comment that "the Cyllenian was hoping to deceive Silverbow with his arts and his wily words" (ὁ τέχνῃσίν τε καὶ αἱμυλίοισι λόγοισιν/ ἤθελεν ἐξαπατᾶν Κυλλήνιος Ἀργυρότοξον, 317-18).

The clash between Hermes and Apollo reaches its rhetorical climax in the courtroom drama on Olympus, in which both appeal to Zeus to arbitrate their dispute. Both combatants offer speeches that resemble later forensic oratory: first Apollo for the prosecution, then Hermes for the defense. Apollo's speech (334-64) is a straightforward (and correct) account of Hermes' fraudulent actions, with no argument adduced—a pure accusation. Hermes' speech, however, is a variation on his earlier protestation to Apollo, along with several new elements of argumentation:

> Father Zeus, I shall tell you it as it was, for I am truthful and do not know how to tell a lie. He came into our place in search of his shambling cattle today as the sun was just rising. He didn't bring witnesses or observers from the blessed gods, but insisted on disclosure with much duress...because he has the delicate bloom of his glorious prime, while I was born yesterday, as he well knows, and I don't look like a cattle rustler, a strong man. Believe me (since you call yourself my dear father) that I didn't drive his cows home...I am in awe of Helios and the other gods, and I love you, and I respect him. You yourself know I'm not to blame. I'll give you a great oath too... (368-83)

Once again, Hermes' defense contains a wealth of rhetorical techniques. His first line is a blatant claim to a trustworthy character (an appeal to *êthos*); next he attempts to discredit his accuser by portraying him as a bully. The contrasting picture that Hermes paints between Apollo, in the strength of his prime, and himself, a newborn, serves both to put Zeus in a sympathetic frame of mind (*diathesis*) and to revisit the argument from *eikos*. To

drive home this argument, Hermes repeats a line from his earlier speech, claiming that "I don't look like a cattle rustler, a strong man" (οὔ τι βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῶι φωτὶ ἐοικώς (377)). He thus invites his audience to view the evidence that his appearance presents. After this, Hermes employs *diathesis* again, first by reminding Zeus that he is his father in order to dispose him favorably; then by flattery, as he professes awe, love, and respect for the gods. Finally, he promises to swear an oath, as he had done in the speech to Apollo, in order to increase his credibility. Despite the fact that Zeus is not convinced of Hermes' innocence as a result of the speech, he is nevertheless entertained; the narrator characterizes Hermes' defense as "expertly" presented ("Zeus laughed out loud when he saw the wicked boy making his fine, expert denials (εὖ καὶ ἐπισταμένως ἀρνεόμενον) about the cows" (389-90)). Zeus then commands Hermes to lead Apollo "and without deceit to show the place where he had hidden the sturdy cattle." Hermes makes no further attempt to argue his innocence; as Clay points out, he has already achieved his aim. "After all, he had never expected to refute Apollo's charges but, instead, had manipulated the situation to gain access to Olympus and thereby to win official recognition of his divine status and the paternity of Zeus."[175]

A final example of Hermes' rhetorical prowess occurs in his exchange with Apollo regarding the lyre that Hermes has fashioned, which Apollo requests in return for a guarantee: "I shall introduce you to the immortals, to enjoy prestige and fortune. I shall give you fine gifts, and never deceive you." (460-62) This simple offer of incentives is met by "crafty words" (μύθοισιν κερδαλέοισιν (463)) from Hermes, who flatters his brother by citing his status and skill at learning any art before expressing his interest in what Apollo has offered:

> And they say you have the privilege of prophetic knowledge from Zeus' utterance, Far-shooter, the complete revelation of Zeus' will; in which I myself have now learned that you are richly endowed. You can help yourself to the knowledge you want. But as your heart is set on playing the lyre, play it, make music, and be festive, accept it from me; and you, dear friend, give me prestige in turn. (471-77)

[175] Clay (1989) 136.

Having put Apollo in a favorable state of mind through flattery (*diathesis*) and acquiesced to his request for the lyre (argument from the topic of incentives), Hermes then casually inserts his own demand. "In passing, the wily Hermes hints broadly at the nature of the gift he would like to receive from Apollo," observes Clay—namely, the *timai* enjoyed by the gods.[176] Of all the Homeric Hymns, the *Hymn to Hermes* is particularly rich in the technical features of rhetoric that would later be identified in Aristotle's theory. Hermes' defense speeches are a match for some of the Iliadic speeches I have analyzed in terms of their range of argumentation and their canny employment of techniques such as *ethos*, *diathesis* and *eikos*.

The final long Homeric hymn in the traditional ordering is the *Hymn to Aphrodite*. Although it contains several speeches intended to persuade, none of these speeches moves beyond simple prayer or command attached to a single reason or threat—much the same as the persuasive speeches in the *Hymn to Demeter*. The first such speech is Anchises' address and prayer to Aphrodite in 92-106, in which he promises to build her an altar in return for her blessing:

> I will build you an altar on a hilltop, in a conspicuous place, and make goodly sacrifices to you at every due season. Only have a kindly heart, and grant that I may be a man outstanding among the Trojans, and make my future offspring healthy, and myself to live long and well, seeing the light of the sun and enjoying good fortune among the peoples, and to reach the doorstep of old age. (100-106)

This enthymeme is comprised of a simple premise from the topic of incentives followed by a series of requests/commands—in essence, a prayer formula.[177] Aphrodite's response contains the next instance of simple persuasion; her case is aided by the fact that, as Clay notes, Anchises desires to believe her.[178] First she claims that Anchises was mistaken in taking her for a goddess, and then she responds to his offer to build her an altar with a counter-proposal, based on her claim to be a Phrygian princess:

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[176] Clay (1989) 141-2.

[177] *Ibid*, 174: "Anchises...promises her an altar in a conspicuous place and fine sacrifices in all seasons (100-2). Upon this promise, in accordance with the normal sequence of prayer, follows a request...It is the prayer of a moderate and sensible man who recognizes the superiority of the gods and the limitations of the human condition."

[178] *Ibid*, 175.

> Now I beseech you by Zeus and your noble parents (**no humble people would have produced such a child as you** (οὐ μὲν γάρ κε κακοὶ τοιόνδε τέκοιεν)): take me, a virgin with no experience of love, and show me to your father and your dutiful mother...[My father and mother] will send you gold in plenty and woven cloth, and you must accept the many fine dowry gifts. When you have done that, hold a delightful wedding-feast that will impress men and immortal gods. (131-42)

Again we see an enthymeme based on a premise using the topic of incentives. While this topic is a simple rhetorical technique in itself, Aphrodite elaborates upon it through an emphasis on her own biography and situation. "In the course of her speech, Aphrodite manages to allude to her virginity, which makes her more desirable as a wife, her elevated social status, and the wealth that marriage to her will bring to Anchises—all in all, a masterful selling job on someone who hardly needs to be sold," Clay observes.[179] In addition to this enthymeme, Aphrodite's flattering parenthetical remark—that Anchises appears to be the child of noble parents—shows an attempt to dispose him favorably to her request (*diathesis*).

A final speech of persuasion in this hymn occurs at the end of Aphrodite's long speech to Anchises (192-290) in which she reveals her true identity, gives him mythical background on the consequences of a goddess loving a mortal man, and informs him that she will bear him a son. The final ten lines of the speech turn from informative to demanding:

> You will take him straight away to windy Ilios. If anyone asks you who was the mother that got your dear son under her girdle, be sure to answer him as I tell you: say he is the child of a nymph...But if you speak out and foolishly boast of having united in love with fair-garlanded Cytherea, Zeus will be angry and will strike you with a smoking bolt. There, I have told you everything. Take note of it, restrain yourself from mentioning me, and have regard for the gods' wrath. (280-90)

As a whole, this speech from Aphrodite shows remarkable range of subject matter, and compared to other speeches in the *Homeric Hymns* is "of a remarkable length," observes Walcot. "Its contents are more than sufficiently varied to maintain interest—

[179] Clay (1989) 178.

encouragement to Anchises, the stories of Ganymedes and Tithonos, an admission of her own sense of shame, instructions for the child's concealment from the world, and a final order, reinforced with a threat, to keep their mutual secret."[180] But for all this, the only element of persuasion in the speech is the simple enthymeme formed by a request combined with a threat. Invoking the lightning bolt of Zeus as a deterrent, Aphrodite effectively bullies her way to a promise of compliance from Anchises, and it is here that the hymn ends.

Clearly, some notion of rhetoric—that is, what makes for effective persuasion—is taken up by the *Homeric Hymns;* manifestations of persuasive technique range from the relatively simple in the *Hymn to Aphrodite* and *Hymn to Demeter* to the more complex in the *Hymn to Apollo* and especially the *Hymn to Hermes*. The narrative situations depicted in each hymn are, of course, one reason for the differing amounts of persuasive speech that they contain. The *Hymn to Hermes* focuses on a string of confrontations between characters that involve accusation, defense, and supplication; in addition, crafty speech is the hallmark of the god it celebrates. The *Hymn to Demeter*, in contrast, focuses on the often solitary grief and endeavors of Demeter, and the cultic and ritual aspects of the goddess that are integral to her worship; speech is accordingly deemphasized. Along with subject matter as a determining factor for the widely varying amounts and sophistication of rhetorical speech within the longer hymns, chronological development may also play a role. Since the *Hymn to Hermes* is widely believed to be the latest of the long hymns, we might speculate that the understanding and practice of rhetorical techniques generally increased over time in Archaic Greece.[181] The persuasive speeches

[180] Walcot (1991) 152.

[181] Although there is less scholarly consensus on which of the other long hymns is the earliest, and it is probably impossible to have certainty on this question given the fluid nature of the hymns' early development via oral tradition, several scholars (e.g. West (2003) and Janko (1982)) believe that the *Hymn to Aphrodite* is earliest based on its vocabulary (though that could be explained as intentional borrowing or archaizing) and the fact that the *Hymn to Demeter* seems to "make use" of the *Hymn to Aprhodite* (see West (2003) 9. While I am cautious about the dangers of attempting to date the hymns based on diction and otherwise scant evidence, I do find it suggestive that the *Hymn to Aphrodite* contains the least rhetorical speech among the long hymns, followed by the *Hymn to Demeter*, the *Hymn to Apollo*, and finally the *Hymn to Hermes*. Further investigation into a possible connection between the sophistication of direct speech within the hymns and a relative chronology (cf. Görgemanns' (1976) investigation into the relationship between the

represented in the hymns *to Apollo* and particularly *to Hermes* at times nearly match those found in Homer in terms of their argumentative quality and the diversity of techniques used; they thus help to propagate the "literary lineage" of rhetoric in Archaic Greece.

B. Military Exhortation: Callinus, Tyrtaeus

What is the place of Archaic lyric poetry, with its variety of forms and performance occasions, in the transmission of rhetoric from its systematic literary representation in Homer to its systematic theoretical representation in the fifth and fourth centuries?[182] This question is a difficult one to answer because of the vastly different generic terrain presented by epic and lyric. To deal in generalizations: among the formal characteristics of lyric poetry is a tendency to eschew linear narrative, with its alternation of authorial voice and character speech; thus relatively few lyric poems contain instances of direct speech. Complicating the investigation of lyric instances of direct speech aimed at persuasion is the difficulty of determining what exactly constitutes "direct speech" in lyric poetry. Namely, what is the place of the self-identified, first-person voice that characterizes much of Archaic lyric; does this count as represented speech? In such cases the poet could be seen as speaking "in character" (whether that character is a *prima facie* representation of the poet him/herself, or an assumed persona), although the poetic situation differs from that of narrative-embedded speech in not possessing a narrative frame for and an omniscient perspective on direct speech between characters. In tracing the literary lineage of rhetorical speech, I believe it is useful to consider certain examples of this lyric phenomenon, within parameters that keep the terms of my investigation as consistent as possible. I will therefore look at several poems in which the first-person authorial voice acts as one character trying to

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Hymn to Hermes and the fifth-century development of rhetoric under the sophists) might be the subject of a future project.

[182] The word "lyric" is, of course, merely a cover term for poetry that has immense variety in form, occasion, and subject matter. I use it as a convention for referring to the typically short, non-hexametric poetry of the Archaic period, but I acknowledge the unsatisfactory nature of the term.

persuade another (i.e., a specific audience) to take some action or attitude. The intersection of this type of lyric voice with rhetorical elements occurs primarily in two forms: exhortation poetry and advice poetry. The former would include the hortatory elegies of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, which attempt to motivate their countrymen to military action; the latter bears much in common with the wisdom-literature genre, and will be treated in section II.C below. I begin with Callinus and Tyrtaeus, both because they are among the earliest of all lyric poets, and because they echo Iliadic battlefield speeches more closely than do any other speeches from Archaic poetry.

Callinus 1 is a hortatory elegy bearing striking rhetorical similarity to some of the exhortation speeches in the *Iliad*.[183] This is perhaps not surprising, given the subject matter of Callinus' poem. It is a fierce indictment of his audience's cowardice, and a call to arms:

> How long will you lie idle? When will you young men
> take courage? Don't our neighbours make you feel
> ashamed, so much at ease? You look to sit at peace,
> but all the country's in the grip of war!
>
> . . . . .
>
> and throw your last spear even as you die.
> For proud it is and precious for a man to fight
> defending country, children, wedded wife
> against the foe. Death comes no sooner than the Fates
> have spun the thread; so charge, turn not aside,
> with leveled spear and brave heart in behind the shield
> from the first moment that the armies meet.
> A man has no escape from his appointed death,
> not though his blood be of immortal stock.
> Men sometimes flee the carnage and the clattering
> of spears, and meet their destiny at home,
> but such as these the people do not love or miss:
> the hero's fate is mourned by high and low.
> Everyone feels the loss of the stout-hearted man
> who dies; alive, he ranks with demigods,
> for in the people's eyes he is a tower of strength,
> his single efforts worth a company's.[184]

[183] Callinus can be dated to the mid-seventh century (see Gerber (1997) 99-100). On similarities between Homeric exhortation speeches and the poems of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, see Latacz (1977).
[184] Text of Callinus from West (1972); translation from West (1993).

The rhetorical scheme of this poem could be simply stated as *pathos-logos* (enthymeme)-*diathesis*. The opening two couplets, with their insistent and scornful questions, plunge immediately into the technique of shaming the audience (a play on their emotions, *pathos*). This technique is made explicit with the question "Don't our neighbours make you feel ashamed, so much at ease?" (οὐδ' αἰδεῖσθ' ἀμφιπερικτίονας/ ὧδε λίην μεθιέντες; (2-3)), which adds the fuel of external sources to the indictment. In addition, Callinus' contrast between the comfortable situation of his intended audience—young men reclining at a symposium, as suggested by the opening-line κατάκεισθε—and the desperate straits of their country gripped by war (3-4) combines an appeal to pity with the one to shame.

After a lacuna, we find the apparent end of a command: to "throw your last spear even as you die." (5) This imperative sets in motion a series of enthymemes in which command-conclusions alternate with reason-premises. Following the fragmentary command are two premises in the form of *gnômai*, offering reasons for heeding the commands between which they are sandwiched: "For (γάρ) proud it is and precious for a man to fight defending country, children, wedded wife" (6-7); and "Death comes no sooner than the Fates have spun the thread" (8-9). Of the argument contained in the first *gnômê*, Gerber, among others, notes that Callinus' emphasis on children and wife as a motivation for fighting is a departure from Homer's emphasis on personal glory.[185] But the second contains a sentiment that we have seen from Iliadic speakers: since fate controls our destiny, we have nothing to lose in fighting boldly (compare Sarpedon's battlefield exhortation to Glaucus in *Iliad* 12.326-8: "seeing that the spirits of death stand close about us in their thousands, no man can turn aside nor escape them, let us go on"). Another enthymematic conclusion—"so charge, turn not aside"(9)—is followed by a restatement of the *gnômê* about destiny governing mortal life: "a man has no escape from his appointed death..."(12-13). This premise brings the *logos* portion of the poem to a close.

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[185] Gerber (1997) 100.

To conclude his elegy (14-21), Callinus turns away from his previous techniques and offers a fictional *paradeigma,* one intended to dispose his audience favorably toward his cause (*diathesis*). This is the tale of two soldiers, the first a deserter whom "the people do not love or miss" (16). The second soldier is described as "stout-hearted" (κρατερόφρονος), a warrior who is revered in life, mourned in death (17-21). The implied offer of status within the community for anyone who fights courageously resembles the Homeric incentive of κλέος ἄφθιτον, but again with the emphasis on civic protection rather than on individual glory. Rather than restate his command that the audience rise and fight, Callinus ends the elegy with a strong image of the model that they should emulate: a "tower of strength" who alone does the work of many men. Within a short space, Callinus' rhetoric has incorporated accusation, logical reasoning, and an appeal to his audience's disposition and (presumably) desires. Although the elegy has no context by which we can judge its effectiveness, Callinus appears to be familiar with many of the same persuasive tactics that Homer's characters had employed.[186]

C. Wisdom Literature: Hesiod, Solon, Theognis

Nothing in Hesiod's poems approaches the degree of complexity and diversity in persuasive argumentation that is found in Homer.[187] There are, however, several passages in *Theogony* and *Works and Days* that are worth comparing with what we have seen of Homer's treatment of persuasive speech. Like Homer, Hesiod incorporates into his poetry both meta-references to the craft of speech and representation of direct persuasive speech. In the *Theogony,* this representation takes the form of character speeches; in the *Works and Days,* however, it takes the form of the narrator's first-person voice—a phenomenon we do not see in Homer.

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[186] This poem stands as representative of a rhetorical type also exhibited in Tyrtaeus 10 and 11; I have chosen the Callinus for the fact that he encapsulates a similar variety of techniques within a slightly briefer span.

[187] On the vexed issue of dating Hesiod in relation to Homer, see West (1966) for the view that Hesiod antedates Homer; Most (2006) for the agnostic view of their relative dating; and Janko's (2007) review of Most for the most widely-accepted view, i.e. that Hesiod's compositions are slightly later than (the earliest instantiations of) the Homeric epics.

The Muses are a major locus for speech and persuasion in Hesiod's poetry. Solmsen has pointed out Hesiod's conception of a "twofold gift of the Muses": poetry and effective speech. These gifts are not learned but are simply bestowed—on poets such as himself through an "awakening" or "calling"; and on kings from birth.[188] We can see this idea displayed at the end of Hesiod's catalogue of the Muses in the *Theogony*, where a description of Calliope's role contains a description of persuasive speech practiced by kings:

> ...Calliope (Beautiful Voiced)—she is the greatest of them all, for she attends upon venerated kings too. Whomever among Zeus-nourished kings the daughters of great Zeus honor and behold when he is born, they pour sweet dew upon his tongue, **and his words flow soothingly from his mouth** (τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα). All the populace look to him as he decides disputes with straight judgments; and speaking publicly without erring, he quickly ends even a great quarrel by his skill. For this is why kings are wise, because when the populace is being harmed in the assembly they easily manage to turn the deeds around, **effecting persuasion with mild words** (μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι ἐπέεσσιν)...For it is from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo that men are poets upon the earth and lyre-players, but it is from Zeus that they are kings; and **that man is blessed, whomever the Muses love, for the speech flows sweet from his mouth** (ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὅντινα Μοῦσαι/ φίλωνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή).[189] (79-97)

Several phrases in this passage have parallels in Homer, as has been noted by Solmsen, West, and others. The image of "honeyed words" flowing from the mouth of a king (τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ῥεῖ μείλιχα) recalls the first description of Nestor in the *Iliad*: τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή (1.249). This description introduces Nestor's speech of conciliation and arbitration between the disputing Achilles and Agamemnon (*Il.* 1.254-91), which places him in much the same role as is here described in the Hesiodic passage: that of an arbiter-king. West observes that this passage (84ff.)

[188] Solmsen (1954) 7ff.

[189] Text and translation of Hesiod from Most (2006).

"is closely similar to *Od.* 8.170-73, and most commentators have assumed that one passage is modeled on the other."[190] The phrase μαλακοῖσι παραιφάμενοι επέεσσιν (90) is also similar to a Homeric formula denoting the beguiling power of speech. Hector uses it as an accusation against Polydamas in *Il.* 12.248-9 ("If you...turn back some other man from the fighting, beguiling him with your words (παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν)..."); Eurymachus uses it in *Od.* 2.188-9 to rebuke the seer Halitherses for inciting anger and false hope in Telemachus ("If you...stir up a younger man to anger, beguiling him with your words (παρφάμενος ἐπέεσσιν)..."). And in a different context, Helen uses the phrase ἐπέεσσι παραιφάμενος during her lament for Hector in *Il.* 24.771, as she recalls his characteristic gentleness of speech. Hesiod's attention to the gift of speech shows that he and his audience prized persuasive and eloquent words; this is no great revelation. In comparisons with Homer, however, it is interesting to note that Hesiod does not depict the technique or cultivation of this eloquence, or mention the necessity of practice or even skill. For Hesiod, honeyed and persuasive words are simply granted to kings by the Muses (an instance of what Detienne would call "magicoreligious" speech, characteristic of Archaic poetry and ritual; that is, speech that derives its efficacy from religious power).

Among the *Theogony*'s rare instances of direct speech, only two speeches could be considered parallel to the speeches we examined in the *Iliad*—that is, attempts to persuade. The first of these occurs during the *Theogony*'s first succession myth, when Gaia begs her children to help her take revenge on Ouranos for sequestering them all in a cavern inside of her:

> And she spoke, encouraging them while she grieved in her dear heart: "Sons of mine and of a wicked father, obey me, if you wish (αἴ κ' ἐθέλητε/ πείθεσθαι): we would avenge your father's evil outrage (τεισαίμεθα λώβην). **For** (γὰρ) he was the first to devise unseemly deeds." (163-66)

[190] West (1966) 183. *Od.* 8.167-73 reads: "Thus the gods do not give gifts to all men the same—neither natural ability nor mind nor eloquence in the assembly (ἀγορητύς). For one man may be weaker in appearance, but god crowns his words with beauty, and everyone delights to watch him. He speaks forcefully, with winsome modesty (ἀσφαλέως ἀγορεύει/ αἰδοῖ μειλιχίῃ); he is conspicuous among those gathered around, and people look at him as a god when he comes to the city." (Translation my own.)

Gaia's appeal for aid is framed as a conditional, with the reward of revenge held forth tentatively through the use of a potential optative (τεισαίμεθα λώβην), and the request for obedience softened by the deferential "if you wish." It is worth noting that Gaia takes this tack with her children, rather than simply issuing commands. Clearly, she does not possess the authority to force them to obey her; it is necessary to persuade them. In order to do this, she must offer an appealing incentive for the proposed action—in this case, revenge. Gaia reminds them of why this should be an incentive with her final statement, a reason for action which turns the request into an enthymeme: "For he was the first to devise unseemly deeds." That this is an enthymematic premise is signaled by the conjunction γὰρ, which, as we have seen, is a typical marker of enthymemes in Homeric persuasive speeches as well. Gaia also makes use of *diathesis*: she stirs up emotion and a sympathetic disposition in her audience by simultaneously painting a negative picture of Ouranos (calling him ἀτάσθαλος and accusing him of κακὴ λώβη) and creating affinity between herself and her children with the suggestion that they have all been wronged together, using the first-person plural τεισαίμεθα. A further rhetorical characteristic of this speech is noted by West, who comments that the word πρότερος in line 166 constitutes "an almost juristic use, meaning not so much 'he did it before you did' as 'he did it when you had done nothing', 'he started it'."[191] Gaia is, in a sense, bringing Ouranos to trial before his and her offspring. Her case is ultimately successful in its call to action, although only with the bravest member of the audience, namely Kronos (167-72).

The other persuasive direct speech in the *Theogony* is Zeus' appeal to the hundred-handed monster children of Gaia and Ouranos (Obriareos, Kottos, and Gyges) to be allies in the Olympians' fight against the Titans. Although lengthier than Gaia's speech, it is still short in comparison to many of the oratorical displays found in Homer; it does, however, contain some of the same rhetorical elements that occur in Homeric speeches. Its battlefield context resembles that of many of the *Iliad*'s hortatory speeches:

[191] West (1966) 216.

> The father of men and of gods spoke among them: "Listen to me, splendid children of Earth and Sky, so that I can say what the spirit in my breast bids me. We have already been fighting every day for a very long time, facing one another for the sake of victory and supremacy, the Titan gods and all of us who were born from Cronus. **So manifest your great strength and your untouchable hands** (ὑμεῖς δὲ μεγάλην τε βίην καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους/ φαίνετε), facing the Titans in baleful conflict, **mindful of our kind friendship, how after so many sufferings you have come up to the light once again out from under a deadly bond, by our plans** (μνησάμενοι φιλότητος ἐνέος, ὅσσα παθόντες/ ἐς φάος ἂψ ἵκεσθε δυσηλεγέος ὑπὸ δεσμοῦ/ ἡμετέρας διὰ βουλάς)..." (643-53)

This speech has a number of Homeric resonances in its vocabulary and phrasing, as West details in his commentary on the passage; line 645 ("so that I can say what the spirit in my breast bids me" (ὄφρ' εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει)), in fact, appears nine times in the Homeric poems.[192] The subject matter and construction of Zeus' attempt at persuasion also bear a strong resemblance to some of the Iliadic speeches analyzed in Chapter 2. After opening the speech with a command, and then establishing the gods' situation and need, Zeus employs a rhetorical argument, the enthymeme that closes the speech. First comes the conclusion in the form of another command ("So manifest your great strength and your untouchable hands, facing the Titans in baleful conflict"); it is followed by a reason that invokes the past and relies upon the audience's sense of obligation to the speaker ("mindful of our kind friendship, how after so many sufferings you have come up to the light once again out from under a deadly bond, by our plans"). In addition, Zeus' mention of the Olympians' "faithful friendship" to the hundred-handed also emphasizes the trustworthiness of the speaker (an appeal to *êthos*). The speech meets with success, as Kottos gives a speech of assent (654-63) and the hundred-handed join the Olympians in battle.

While the *Theogony* contains only these very brief and rhetorically simple parallels to persuasive speech in Homer, Hesiod's other poem, the *Works and Days*, displays a different kind of persuasive speech altogether: a didactic first-person authorial voice. The *Works and Days* is the first instantiation in Greek of a long tradition

[192] West (1966) 343-44.

of wisdom literature that originated in the Near East and is marked by exhortation and instruction addressed to a specific person or group—in Hesiod's case, to both his brother Perses and unjust kings.[193] The hortatory or didactic mode in which much of the *Works and Days* is couched bears certain resemblances to the persuasive rhetoric of direct speeches that has been the subject of this study, though there are also differences. In his recent dissertation *The Rhetoric of Instruction in Archaic Greek Didactic Poetry,* Prince argues that

> The *Works and Days* is not a literal law-court transcript but a crafted poetic world, and as such the text is imbued with artifice and rhetoric. The dynamics of poetic self-fashioning herein are complex and such rhetorical devices cannot either be read literally or be ignored entirely by historians—or by literary critics. The extent to which Hesiod analyzes claims to authority is one of the hallmarks of his poetry.[194]

While I agree with Prince's assessment of Hesiod's complex claims to authority and poetic self-fashioning, I hasten to point out that he is using the term "rhetoric" to mean something somewhat different from my working definition of the term. Hesiod does cast his *Works and Days* in the form of persuasive discourse, and as such he inhabits a middle ground between the explicit and technical type of rhetoric displayed in persuasive speeches between characters in, for example, the *Iliad,* and the broader sense of rhetoric as it is commonly used in modern literary criticism—that is, an author's attempt to convince his listening or reading audience of the reality of the literary world he has created. It is this latter sense that Prince is particularly concerned with; I, of course, am interested in Hesiod's use of specific rhetorical techniques (in the manner of Homer or Aristotle) within the "crafted poetic world" where he directly addresses his brother and the kings. In his commentary on the *Works and Days,* West identifies the

[193] For an extended discussion of the Near Eastern and Greek traditions of wisdom literature, see West (1978) 3ff. West offers three possible explanations for the presence of wisdom literature (most notably the *Works and Days*) in the Greek tradition: "that it is an autochthonous growth; that it descends directly from an original Indo-European tradition; or that it came to Greece from the Near East in or after the Mycenaean age." (26) He concludes that, in all likelihood, "the Hesiodic poem stands in a tradition cognate with or influenced by oriental wisdom literature," and gives evidence for "an Ionian tradition of paraenetic poetry" as a possible link. (26-7)

[194] Prince (2002) 129.

following features of the authorial voice: "Hesiod uses a variety of means to diversify and strengthen his sermon: myth, parable, allegory, proverbial maxims, threats of divine anger."[195] Such features are by now familiar from our examination of both Aristotle's rhetorical theory and Homeric direct speeches. In terms of rhetorical technique, however, these features are all variations on the same note. The didactic portion of the *Works and Days* is essentially a series of enthymemes whose conclusions (commands to work hard, follow justice (*Dikê*), and cultivate the earth in various ways) are followed by sententious maxims or threats, often similar to each other and usually involving the gods.

The hortatory/didactic mode shows up briefly near the beginning of the poem (27-36) with a preview of the chiding tone that Hesiod will take in earnest with Perses later: "Perses, lay this down in your heart, and may the Strife who exults in misfortune not keep your heart from work..." (27-8). A closer analysis of several passages from the later section (213ff.)—rebuke and exhortation which subsequently blends into the less personal, more didactic second half of the poem—will reveal the characteristics of this mode of "persuasive" speech. Lines 213-47 are representative of Hesiod's tone towards Perses, as they involve an exhortation followed by a series of *gnômai* (signaled at several points by the word γάϱ), forming an extended enthymeme:

> As for you, Perses, give heed to Justice (δίκη) and do not foster Outrageousness (ὕβϱις). For (γάϱ) Outrageousness is evil in a worthless mortal; and even a fine man cannot bear her easily, but encounters calamities (ἄτησιν) and then is weighed down under her. The better road is the one towards what is just, passing her by on the other side. Justice wins out over Outrageousness when she arrives at the end; but the fool only knows this after he has suffered. For (γάϱ) at once Oath starts to run along beside crooked judgments, and there is a clamor when Justice is dragged where men, gift-eaters, carry her off and pronounce verdicts with crooked judgments; but she stays, weeping, with the city and the people's abodes, clad in invisibility, bearing evil to the human beings who driver her out and do not deal straight. But those who give straight judgments to foreigners and fellow-citizens and do not turn aside from justice at all, their city blooms and the people in it flower...But to those who care only for evil outrageousness and cruel deeds, far-seeing Zeus, Cronus' son, marks out

[195] West (1978) 1.

> justice...Upon them, Cronus' son brings forth woe from the sky, famine together with pestilence, and the people die away... (213-43)

Although Hesiod gives several different reasons for why Perses should "hearken to Right and not promote violence," they all make the same essential point: that it is in Perses' best interests to follow δίκη and abandon ὕβρις. The enthymematic premise alternates between stock incentives and threats, resting on the assumption that the gods—both Zeus and personified Right—are active in dispensing reward and punishment to humans. Hesiod makes no attempt to tailor his argument to Perses specifically—that is, to employ *diathesis*; nor does he appeal to his own *êthos* or try to incite Perses' emotions (unless one deems the vague threats of divine punishment enough to instill fear). The *gnômai* he employs are generalized enough to apply to a much broader audience, as is typical of wisdom literature.

Hesiod then turns his attention and rebuke to the "kings" whom he accuses of treating him unjustly:

> As for you kings, too, ponder this justice (δίκη) yourselves. For (γάρ) among human beings there are immortals nearby, who take notice of all those who grind one another down with crooked judgments and have no care for the gods' retribution...Bear this in mind, kings, and straighten your discourses, you gift-eaters, and put crooked judgments quite out of your minds. A man contrives evil for himself when he contrives evil for someone else, and the evil plan is most evil for the planner. (248-66)

Not only is the enthymeme pattern the same here as it was in Hesiod's exhortation to Perses, the argument is the same as well: commands followed by threats of divine retribution. This is, indeed, the extent of persuasive technique in the *Works and Days*. There is more of the same type of argumentation in subsequent passages addressed to Perses (274ff.), but there is nothing any more rhetorically complex or varied (judging by Aristotelian criteria of *ethos, diathesis, logos,* and the numerous sub-categories thereof, which Iliadic speakers exercise in their persuasion attempts). As West puts it, "Hesiod's arguments for Dike and for work are essentially of a very simple form. Dike is good because the gods reward it. Hybris is bad because the gods punish it. Work is good

because it brings prosperity, independence, and hence social status."[196] While Martin has argued convincingly that a highly complex authorial strategy lies behind this "simple form," the complexity is rather on the global, narrative level than on the patent level of rhetorical arguments (*pisteis*, to use Aristotle's term).[197]

Regardless of the dating of Hesiod's compositions relative to the Homeric poems, one thing is clear: there is some overlap in the methods of persuasion used and represented by the composers of both, but there is even more difference. Hesiod and his characters, like Homer's characters, use commands, threats, and basic enthymematic argumentation featuring *paradeigmata* and *gnômai* in their attempts to persuade. All of these methods can be identified in the wisdom literature of contemporary, as well as earlier, Near Eastern societies.[198] This would imply that these rhetorical elements are either borrowed by both Homer and Hesiod from an older and geographically broad tradition; or that all of these authors are drawing on universally-recognized and natural or instinctive methods for persuading others. I will go no further in trying to decide between these two possibilities for explaining the widespread existence of the persuasive methods that I have just listed, because my aim is to highlight the fact of their difference—namely, their limited scope and complexity—when compared with the techniques found in Homeric speech. Of course, Homeric speech *includes* commands, threats, and basic enthymematic argumentation. But Homer's significance for the origins of the technical discipline of rhetoric is found in those speeches (detailed in Chapter 2) that in detail of argumentation (e.g. the use of what Aristotle would call "topics of demonstrative enthymemes"), tailoring to their audience, and combination of techniques set them apart from the litany of commands and proverbs found in Hesiod or in Sumerian, Akkadian, Baylonian, Egyptian, and Hebrew wisdom literature.

Ultimately, I would argue that Homer's conception and presentation of persuasive speech cannot be lumped in with that of other Archaic authors, and described as "arhetorical" (Cole), "native vigor" (Kennedy), or "magicoreligious," the

[196] West (1978) 47.
[197] See Martin (2004).
[198] Again, see West (1978) 3-25 on wisdom literature in the ancient world.

term that Detienne uses to describe the characteristic mode of speech in the Archaic world.[199] Detienne posits a boundary between magicoreligious speech in the Archaic era and the secularized, philosophized speech that arose in the Classical era:

> For philosophy to pose the problem of the relation between speech and reality, and for sophistry and rhetoric to construct a theory of language as an instrument of persuasion, it was first necessary for the Greeks to supersede the system of thought in which speech was intermeshed in a network of symbolic values and was itself regarded as a natural power or dynamic reality acting spontaneously on its listeners.[200]

While I grant that a "system of thought in which speech...was itself regarded as a natural power or dynamic reality acting spontaneously" may describe the attitude of Hesiod, I challenge the placement of Homer completely within this system. I believe that there is sufficient evidence (as seen in Chapter 2) for asserting that the conception of speech in the Homeric epics is different from that in most other Archaic authors in this respect. Speech in Homer is not primarily depicted as a "natural power or dynamic reality," divinely bestowed to (deserving) speakers in the form of uncontrolled inspiration. Iliadic speakers cultivate speaking as a skill that is learned and taught; they employ logical argumentation in the service of persuasion; and they practice speaking with varying degrees of talent and effectiveness (sometimes even disputing each others' speaking prowess, as Polydamas and Hector do in *Iliad* 12.211-50). In many ways, the characterization and practice of speech in Homer would better fit under Detienne's notion of "secular" discourse than under the "magicoreligious" heading into which he places Homer as an Archaic poet.[201]

Greek wisdom literature continues to have a life in Archaic lyric (primarily elegiac) poetry. The political and wisdom poetry of Solon and Theognis contains a great

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[199] Cole (1991) 41; Kennedy (1963) 39; Detienne (1996) 70ff. *et passim*.

[200] Detienne (1996) 88.

[201] As I will argue in Chapter 4, Detienne is, in a very general sense, promoting an idea of the ancient Greek world that has Aristotelian origins: namely, that there is a stark dichotomy between the poetry-located, magicoreligious authoritative discourse of the Archaic age and the prose-located, philosophical-technical authoritative discourse of the Classical era. This line of thinking—though it is a generalization that may hold true in the case of many Archaic authors, such as Hesiod—has produced, I believe, an unfortunate conceptual barrier to the recognition that technical discourse and a system such as rhetoric might be depicted within Archaic poetry.

deal of instruction, occasionally attended by maxims about the state of society or the way the world operates. West characterizes what we might call gnomic or paraentic lyric thus:

> Besides Hesiod, the two names most associated with early Greek gnomic poetry are Phocylides and Theognis…The elegiac metre was widely used for admonitory poems of modest compass (up to a hundred lines or so). The advice might be for a particular political situation, or of general and lasting applicability. It might be addressed to the people of a city, to some sector of them, or to an individual; Theognis constantly addresses his younger friend, Cyrnus. Or the poet might turn from one group to another, as Hesiod turns from Perses to the kings. Solon did this in the elegy of which fr. 4a is the beginning…Another feature common to Hesiod and paraenetic elegy is the combination of injunctions with reasoning, complaints about the existing state of affairs, and warnings that the gods punish wickedness.[202]

These characteristics of gnomic lyric that West describes indeed have much in common with the instructive tone of Hesiod's *Works and Days.* As was the case with Hesiod, the poetry of Theognis and Solon exhibits limited rhetorical features: what few enthymematic arguments are present depend on incentives or threats; the speakers' generalized tones of address lack audience-sensitive *diathesis;* and they do not make reference to their own character (*êthos*) as part of their argument. This is largely due to the fact that the audience to these poets is a generalized one (even Cyrnus, Theognis' addressee, has no discernible personality to which Theognis can tailor his rhetoric—much like Perses for Hesiod). Typical of this type of lyric voice is Solon 4c:

> And as for you, who now have all the wealth you want, make the stern spirit gentler in your hearts, adjust to moderation.[203] (1-3)

This admonition is loosely structured as an enthymeme, with the relative clause "who now have all the wealth you want" acting as a premise. Because his addressees are prospering, Solon reasons, they can afford to be magnanimous. No further elaboration of or arguments for the demand are presented; no appeals are made to the speaker's

[202] West (1978) 23-4.

[203] Translations of Solon and Theognis from West (1993).

authority or the audience's goodwill. Similarly straightforward and generalized advice occurs in the corpus of Theognis:

> Next, do not consort with knaves, but hold fast always to the men of worth: drink among those, and eat, and sit with those, and seek their favour, who have wealth and influence. From sound men you will learn sound lessons: if you mix with rogues, you'll even lose what sense you have... (31-36)

This passage, highly representative of Theognis' entire corpus, is a prosaic enthymeme based on the gnomic premise that one becomes like one's friends. There is neither subtlety of argument nor tailoring to the individual addressed.

It is interesting to compare the differences between the rhetorical speech of characters within a narrative (such as Homeric epic) and the authorial voice in wisdom literature. One might expect to see certain affinities between these two types of speech, in that both aim to persuade their audience. And, in fact, there are some points of commonality—primarily in the use of the enthymeme structure and *gnômai*. On the whole, however, the rhetoric found in wisdom literature is relatively limited and simplistic compared to that of Homeric speakers. Wisdom literature makes only limited use of *logos* techniques (e.g. almost none of the topics of demonstrative enthymemes are used, and the enthymemes are rarely expanded, elaborated, or strung together with other techniques), and *êthos* and *diathesis* are essentially nonexistent. It seems likely that there are, in fact, generic reasons for this: authors of wisdom literature by definition speak from a position of authority. Hesiod, for example, is the responsible and experienced brother of Perses, wise in the ways of *Dikê*; his authority to instruct is assumed throughout the *Works and Days*.[204] Likewise Solon, as the Athenian statesman, and Theognis, as Cyrnus' teacher/mentor, have no need to explicitly establish their authority as they instruct—or even to exert much persuasive argumentation. Their authorial status, implicit in the wisdom genre, removes the necessity for highly rhetorical speech. We will now turn to lyric poetry that contains represented character

[204] Although, as Martin (2004) has observed, this authority is reinforced throughout by the myths and parables that he recounts (the two Erides, Prometheus and Epimetheus, the hawk and the nightingale). Martin argues that "the choice of the brother-figure enables the poet to approach as an equal and persuade his addressee in a way that the more familiar guise of tutor or father-figure prevents." (18)

speech, which bears a closer formal parallel to Homer than does the lyric poetry couched exclusively in the authorial voice that we have examined thus far.

D. Lyric representations of direct speech: Stesichorus, Bacchylides, Pindar

The instances of represented speech in lyric poetry are relatively few, given the tendency of lyric poems to be short in length (compared with other poetic genres) and non-narrative in form. The instances of rhetorical persuasion occurring in lyric direct speech are even fewer. But there are occasional examples, such as those I discuss below. It is surely no coincidence that these examples come from three poets—Stesichorus, Bacchylides, and Pindar—who share more qualities with Homer than do most lyric poets, having composed lengthy choral lyrics treating heroic themes and characters.

Stesichorus, purported by the *Suda* to have lived from c. 632 to c. 556 B.C.E., treated primarily epic themes in a variety of meters, including the dactylo-epitrite. This meter, notes Robbins, "lends itself especially well to narration, and the poetry of Stesichorus was classified in antiquity as ἔπη, for it was suited to epic themes."[205] In the 33-line fragment of the Lille papyrus which constitutes the largest continuous fragment of Stesichorus' poetry published to date, we encounter a remarkable, possibly complete speech delivered by Jocasta to an audience of the prophet Teiresias and her sons Eteocles and Polynices:

> "Do not add to my woes the burden of worry, or raise grim prospects for my future life. For (γάρ) the immortal gods have not ordained for men on this holy earth unchanging enmity for all their days, no more than changeless love; they set men's outlook for the day. As to your prophecies, I pray the lord Apollo will not fulfill them all; but if I am destined to see my sons slain by each other, if the Fates have so dispensed, then may death's ghastly close be mine straightway before I can ever behold the terrible moaning and tears of such woes, my sons killed in the house or the city fallen. But come, dear sons, and hearken to my words. Here's how I declare the outcome for you: one to have the palace and live by [the streams of Dirce], the other to go hence, taking all your dear father's gold and property—whichever of you two draws the first lot by Destiny's design. This, I think, should prove the way to free you from an evil fate as this godly seer foretells, if truly Kronos' son [is to preserve] King Cadmus' people and city, and

[205] Robbins (1997) 233.

> put off to later times whatever ill is fated for our clan." So spoke the lady with appeasing words, seeking to check her sons from combat in the house, and the seer Teiresias supported her. They agreed...[206] (PMGF 222(b) = *P.Lille* 76 Aii + 73i, 201-234)

Jocasta's argument, as we have it, begins with an enthymeme: a command/conclusion ("do not add to my woes the burden of worry") presumably directed at Teiresias, followed by a gnomic premise about the variability of the gods in ordaining human relations. Then comes an appeal to pity from her audience in the form of a death-wish (a particularly manipulative incarnation of the technique of πάθος). Bremer notes that this conditional argument—a wish to die in the event of some disaster occurring—constitutes "a specific variation on a Homeric theme," of which he cites as Homeric examples Priam's address to the Trojans in *Il.* 24.244-46, Andromache's to Hector in 6.464-65, and Odysseus' to Telemachus in *Od.* 16.106-111, among others.[207] More than simply a "theme," I would argue that it is a rhetorical trope shared by these speakers, calculated both to express their abhorrence of a situation and to engender pity leading to action in their audience (e.g. Andromache to convince Hector to stay out of battle; Odysseus to incite Telemachus to fight the suitors). The action that Jocasta seeks her audience to take is stated in the next and final portion of her speech. This proposal takes the form of an enthymeme, a conclusion that the two brothers should draw lots over distribution of their father's kingdom and property followed by the premise that in so doing they will avoid, or at least postpone, their prophesied doom (an argument from the topic of incentives).

Jocasta's speech is declared a success by the narrator, who describes her as a δῖα γυνά, μύθοις ἀγ[α]νοῖς ἐνέποισα (232). A similar formula, ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσιν, occurs several times in the *Iliad* (2.164, 180, 189; 24.772) to describe persuasive speech. This only strengthens the rhetorical affinities between this direct speech and many of the Iliadic speeches we have examined. In his commentary on Jocasta's speech, Bremer

[206] Text of Stesichorus from Hutchinson (2001), translation from West (1993).
[207] Bremer (1987) 145ff.

acknowledges its "psychological" acuity—a close corollary to the rhetorical sophistication that I find in it:

> In the first part (as far back as we can read it: 201-210) she resists the impact of Teiresias' words...In the second part (211-217) she almost surrenders to the prophecy...In the third (218-231) she pulls herself together, addresses her sons and puts them on to a course of action which will, so she persuades herself to think, be a way out of the evil fate foretold by T...from a psychological point of view, this ῥῆσις is a splendid piece; especially how at the nadir of despair (217-18) she switches from the minor into the major key.[208]

It is a pity that so little of Stesichorus' corpus survives; the fragments that we do possess suggest material that is rich in represented direct speech. In his depiction of one character's rhetoric, Stesichorus shows more similarity with the rhetoric depicted by Homer than does any other lyric poet. But this passage also serves as a bridge of sorts in the transmission of rhetorical consciousness to a later genre of poetry: Robbins observes that this fragment is remarkable in "the way it, like the *Oresteia* [of Stesichorus], anticipates tragedy."[209]

The epinician odes of Baccylides and Pindar (late sixth-early fifth centuries B.C.E.) often entail mythical narratives that embed direct speech. "The longer poems of Pindar and of Bacchylides in particular show the same fondness [as Stesichorus] for dramatic confrontation and for speeches," says Robbins, who identifies Bacchylides epinician 5 and Pindar's fourth *Pythian* as primary examples of these phenomena.[210] While Bacchylides 5 does contain an exchange between Heracles and Meleager in direct speech, neither character is exerting persuasion on the other. In fact, the speeches in Bacchylides' odes (always found within the mythical portion) generally serve to provide information to or praise another character, but do not involve persuasion. This is, perhaps, fitting for the genre of epinician poetry; its general purpose is epideictic rather than deliberative. The only direct speech within the surviving works of Bacchylides that seeks to persuade with a significant use of rhetorical technique occurs in dithyramb 17.

[208] Bremer (1987) 151.
[209] Robbins (1997) 241.
[210] *Ibid*, 242.

It is the opening gambit of a heated exchange between Theseus and Minos, a rebuke from Theseus aimed at making Minos desist from his rape of Eriboea.[211]

> "Son of Strongest Zeus," he called, "You guide an unclean thought within your mind. A hero curbs his violence! What regal Moira ratifies as mine from god—what Justice weighs out as my fated share I will fulfill, when it may come, but you must check the outrage you intend! Perhaps the child of Phoenix (she of lovely name) did lie with Zeus once under Ida's crag, did give you birth, a strong man among men; yet I was born to wealthy Pittheus' child who slept beside Poseidon Water-Lord....So, Captain of the Cnossians, I now demand from you cessation of this violence. I would not choose to see the holy light of dawn if insult came from you to any of this company. I'd sooner show you what this hand can do. All to come is shaped by god."[212] (20-46)

Theseus first accuses Minos of an outrage, and contrasts his actions with those of a hero (ἴσχε μεγάλαυχον ἥρως βίαν). In doing so, he both suggests that Minos is capable of a hero's behavior and indicts him for falling short; it is the sort of antagonistic call to a higher standard that we saw in the rhetoric of Hector and Polydamas at several points in the *Iliad* (12.211-250, 13.726-47). Theseus then begins an argument based on *êthos* that will extend throughout the speech. To highlight his own trustworthy character, he contrasts his pious obedience to fate (ὅ τι μ[έ]ν ἐκ θεῶν μοῖρα παγκρατὴς/ ἄμμι κατένευσε...[ἐ]κπλήσομεν (24-27))—which puts him at Minos' mercy—with Minos' "outrage" (lit. "unbearable plan," βαρεῖαν...μῆτιν (28-9)). He takes a bolder tone in his next argument, which is a claim to equal footing with Minos in the area of paternity. He refers flatteringly to Minos as βροτῶν φέρτατον (32-3); both the choice of the adjective φέρτατος and the context of comparing two heroes in terms of virtue and breeding are, as Maehler notes, reminiscent of Nestor's conciliatory speech to Agamemnon and Achilles in *Iliad* 1.280-81: εἰ δέ σὺ καρτερός ἐσσι, θεὰ δὲ σὲ γείνατο μήτηρ, / ἀλλ' ὅ γε φέρτερός ἐστιν).[213] Theseus uses the adjective not so much to placate Minos as to show him respect, which he in turn demands Minos show him as being likewise the son of a

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[211] For further analysis of this dithyramb (sometimes categorized as a paean in view of its address to Apollo and its description of the Athenian youths "singing a paian" (παιάνιξαν, 129)), see, among others, Burnett (1985) 15-37 and Maehler (2004) 172-89.

[212] Text of Bacchylides from Maehler (2004); translation from Burnett (1985).

[213] See Maehler (2004) 180.

god (a deft combination of the techniques of *diathesis* and *êthos*). Having summoned the reasons (or enthymematic premises) why Minos should behave in a manner befitting his kingly and heroic status Theseus finally makes his demand (the enthymematic conclusion): τῶ σε, πολέμαρχε Κνωσίων,/ κέλομαι πολύστονον/ ἐρύκεν ὕβριν (39-41). He ends the speech on a threatening note, promising to show Minos the strength of his hand (χειρῶν βίαν) should he continue his hubristic behavior. The speech has the effect of dumbfounding the listening sailors with its "proud boldness" (Maehler's rendering of ὑπεράφανον [θ]άρσος (49-50)); it is not well received, however, by its primary audience. Minos responds with an angry challenge for Theseus in a speech (52-66) that is pugnacious rather than persuasive. It sets in motion the remaining action of the poem.

The extant corpus of Pindar, considerably larger than that of Bacchylides and remarkable in that it preserves four complete books of epinician odes, nevertheless contains only a handful of speeches which depict persuasion between characters. By my reckoning, only the speeches of Pelops to Poseidon (*Olympian* 1.75-85), Jason to Pelias (*Pythian* 4.138-55), Pelias to Jason (*Pythian* 4.156-67), and Themis to the assembled Olympians (*Isthmian* 8.35-45) qualify as attempts to persuade in the vein of Homeric persuasion, or Aristotelian theory.[214] I will examine more closely the first two of these as representative of Pindar's use of the rhetorical techniques that we have been tracing. In *Olympian* 1, Pelops approaches Poseidon—his former paramour (36-45)—with a request for aid in winning a chariot race set up as a hurdle to attaining the hand of Hippodameia in marriage. His opening tactic is to remind Poseidon of the romantic favors he had granted the god in the past: "If the loving gifts of Kypris count at all for gratitude (χάρις), Poseidon, come! Hold back the bronze spear of Oinomaos and speed me in the swiftest of chariots to Elis and bring me to victorious power."[215] (75-8) The desperation

[214] Of course, persuasion within character speech is only a small part of the picture when it comes to Pindar's relationship to rhetoric. This relationship is a complex one for many reasons: Pindar's (much discussed) idiosyncratic but elusive authorial persona, which fits neatly into neither a "narrator" nor a "character" box and is intertwined with the aspects of choral performance and occasion; and the fact that the authorial voice encompasses both rhetorical (i.e. attempts to persuade the audience) and meta-rhetorical (i.e. reflections on persuasion) discourse. On this much broader subject of rhetoric in the authorial voice of Pindar, I defer to the work of Race (1990), Pratt (1993), Pelliccia (1995), and of course Bundy (1962).
[215] Text of Pindar from Snell (1987); translation from Race (1997).

of Pelops' situation leads him to make a fairly explicit attempt at putting his audience in a frame of mind favorable to his request (*diathesis*) by hinting at Poseidon's obligation to him. Mention of this obligation also serves as the premise to an enthymematic argument, which finds its conclusion in the three imperative commands ἄγε, πέδασον, and πόρευσον. After detailing to Poseidon the dire odds of survival in the competition for Hippodameia's hand (thirteen would-be suitors have already been killed), Pelops makes his closing argument, based on an appeal to his own *êthos*. Two gnomic statements, followed by a rhetorical question, illustrate his courageous character:

> Great risk does not take hold of a cowardly (ἄναλκις) man. But since men must die, why would anyone sit in darkness and coddle a nameless old age (ἀνώνυμον γῆρας) to no use, deprived of all noble deeds? No! that contest shall be mine to undertake; you grant the success I desire. (81-85)

Pelops' scornful mention of a "cowardly man" and "nameless old age" contrast with his own willingness to risk his life. Although he gives no explicit premise for the final command to Poseidon to grant him success, he relies on the assumption that the god will reward him for his bravery. An additional subtext of Pelops' bravado is the threat of his death; perhaps he counts on this to motivate his lover to protect him. In all, it is a successful piece of argumentation; his words are "not unfulfilled" (οὐδ' ἄκραντοι, 86), and with Poseidon's aid he goes on to win the race.

Jason's address to Pelias, contained in the myth of the Argonauts that dominates the uniquely lengthy *Pythian* 4, is an attempt to negotiate a peaceful distribution of power between two parties. In this respect, it is similar to Jocasta's speech to her sons in Stesichorus PMGF 222(b), examined above. As a stranger to the land of Argos, Jason does not yet have the resources to reclaim by force the throne that Pelias had usurped from Jason's father Aison; he must persuade Pelias to relinquish it. The narrator introduces his speech with the following description:

> πραῢν δ' Ἰάσων
> μαλθακᾷ φωνᾷ ποτιστάζων ὄαρον
> βάλλετο κρηπῖδα σοφῶν ἐπέων...

> In a soft voice Jason distilled soothing speech and laid the foundation of wise words. (136-8)

Jason begins by addressing his rival respectfully as the son of Poseidon, and then offers a *gnômê* concerning human behavior: "The minds of mortals are all too swift to commend deceitful gain above justice, even though they are headed for a rough reckoning the day after." (139-40) Somewhat unusually, the *gnômê* is used not to emphasize the inevitability of an outcome, but to spur Pelias on to a different, and nobler, course. "You and I, however, must rule our tempers with law and weave our future happiness" (141), Jason continues, stating his first demand. He refers to the joint duties of himself and Pelias are an attempt to engender camaraderie (*diathesis*); this technique is developed in the subsequent lines as he invokes their common ancestry from Enarea (142-45). The central proposition of the speech hinges on an appeal to propriety and reason, and marks a change in Jason's tone:

> It is not proper (οὐ πρέπει) for the two of us to divide the great honor of our forefathers (μεγάλαν προγόνων τιμὰν) with bronze-piercing swords or javelins. For I give over to you the sheep, the tawny herds of cattle, and all the fields which you stole from my parents and administer to fatten your wealth—I do not mind if these overly enrich your house—but, as for the scepter of sole rule and the throne upon which Kretheus' son [Aison] once sat and rendered straight justice to his people of horsemen, these you must give up without grief on both sides, lest some more troubling evil arise for us from them. (147-55)

Having established a bond between Pelias and himself through reminders of their kinship, Jason now uses this bond to invoke the μεγάλαν προγόνων τιμὰν as a reason for the two men not to be at odds (in anticipation of Pelias' objection to what he is about to say). Jason makes another attempt at *diathesis* by invoking their shared forefathers, and his suggestion that any dispute would be οὐ πρέπει appeals to his listener's sense of shame (*pathos*), albeit peremptorily. His subsequent statement of power distribution—couched as a demand more than a request—reveals Jason to be somewhat conflicted in his persuasive tactics. He has just been cultivating camaraderie between Pelias and himself, but now peppers his demands with accusation. The final summary of his demand ("These you must give up without grief on both sides, lest some more troubling

evil arise for us from them") constitutes an enthymeme; the topic of incentives, in the form of a veiled threat of harm, is the premise. On the whole, Jason's speech—although it uses persuasive techniques—is too antagonistic to be effective, in the tradition of various rhetorical speeches by Agamemnon, Hector, and Achilles (among others) in the *Iliad*. Although Pelias responds "calmly" (156 ff.), he has no intention of complying with Jason. His ingratiating reply, with its suggestion that Jason recover the golden fleece before assuming the kingship, is another example of persuasive speech (although I refrain from discussing it here).

In general, Pindar is highly concerned with one particular aspect of rhetoric, namely truth and falsehood in speech—both his own speech and that of others.[216] In *Olympian* 1, for example, he reflects that "wonders are many, but then too, I think, in men's talk (φάτις) stories (μῦθοι) are embellished beyond the true account (τὸν ἀλαθῆ λόγον) and deceive by means of elaborate lies (ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις). For Charis, who fashions all things pleasant for mortals, by bestowing honor makes even what is unbelievable often believed..." (28-32) This passage shows Pindar's understanding of the power of "speech" (for which he uses no fewer than three different terms in this dense four-line passage) as a tool, which can be used either in service of or in opposition to the truth—an observation that will become a common criticism of the discipline of rhetoric. Another meta-rhetorical comment occurs in *Nemean* 7, where Pindar notes the convincingly deceptive power of poetic speech: "I believe that Odysseus' story has become greater than his actual suffering because of Homer's sweet verse, for upon his fictions and soaring craft rests great majesty, and his skill deceives with misleading tales." (20-23) The "skill [that] deceives with misleading tales" (σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις) could apply equally to Homer, the author of a fictional narrative, or to Odysseus, the character famous for his cunning μῆτις, displayed so often in his speeches.

[216] See Pratt (1993), who connects Pindar's concern for truth with his epinician mission to praise the victor in an accurate and reliable manner. Conversely, Pratt notes, "most liars that appear in Pindar's poetry [such as Odysseus in *Nemean* 7 and 8] are envious slanderers, because Pindar is particularly anxious to condemn and reject this type of lying." (122)

E. Tragedy

The emergence of tragedy in fifth-century Athens provides a dramatic increase in the body of pre-Aristotelian poetry that represents speech. Already by the time that Aeschylus was producing his last plays in the 450s, the Sophistic movement had begun in Athens. Euripides' language was thought by his own contemporaries to be influenced by sophistry, a reputation most famously caricatured in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Tragedy's contact with the trends toward professional rhetorical instruction in Classical Athens makes it a less "pristine" case than is Archaic poetry for examining the development of rhetoric within literature prior to the rise of theoretical treatises. In addition, there are the obvious differences of genre: tragedy does not provide a narrative frame for character speech, a fact that Plato observes in *Republic* 3.392d-394c, where he compares the diction (λέξις) of epic to that of tragedy by distinguishing between poetry that consists solely of "narrative" (διήγησις), such as dithyramb; poetry that consists solely of "imitation" (μίμησις), such as tragedy; and poetry that mixes the two, such as epic. As I have discussed before, the contextualization of speech within a narrative framework is the phenomenon that I am particularly interested in for this project, as this "mixture" of dictions offers the reader opportunity to assess the ways that the narrator characterizes, and other characters react to, persuasive attempts. Another difficulty in comparing tragic persuasive speeches with those of epic is that in tragedy, persuasion of one character by another only rarely occurs in the course of a single, self-contained speech, as happens in epic. More often, tragic persuasion is wrought through an extended dialogue scene and involves a series of challenges and responses by the interested parties. Interaction, or dialectic, is integral to the rhetoric of tragedy in a way that it is not, and cannot, be in the epic genre. While tragedy presents a fascinating manifestation of rhetorical speech, then (and one that has received considerable scholarly treatment), it is not feasible for this project to treat it in depth.[217]

[217] On the subject of rhetoric and tragedy, see for example Pelling (2005).

Such qualifications aside, it is impossible to ignore entirely the breadth of examples of represented speech found in tragedy, and the fact that many of these speeches can be considered "rhetorical" (by my working definition) at a time before Aristotle's manual had arrived on the scene. I will therefore briefly examine three examples of rhetorical speeches in tragedy—one from each tragedian—to see how this new literary genre incorporated a by-now familiar set of persuasive speech techniques. There are, of course, numerous other speeches that could be fruitful subjects in an analysis of the relationship between tragedy and rhetoric; the lawcourt scene in the *Eumenides* comes to mind as an example of forensic rhetoric, as do Creon's prosecution and Antigone's defense speeches in the *Antigone*. But since the relationship between tragedy and rhetoric is not my primary focus, but rather—for me—a link in the genealogy of rhetoric between Homer and Aristotle, I have had to limit my examination to three speeches which must serve as representatives for an entire genre. I conceive of these as the rhetorical descendents of Homeric speeches: on a par with the argumentative complexity of the *Iliad*'s speeches, but less remarkable in terms of innovation for having the benefit of a tradition of literary rhetoric preceding them, and a burgeoning sophistic tradition surrounding their composition.

The first tragic speech whose rhetorical features I will examine occurs in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: Clytemnestra's speech to the elders of Argos (who comprise the chorus) and to Agamemnon in 855-913. This is only one persuasive moment in a trilogy that is fraught with attempts at persuasion, ranging from the insidiously personal (as here) to the publicly formal (as in the forensic arguments of Orestes' trial in the *Eumenides*). In the *Oresteia,* Kirby observes, "a nauseous pendulum swings between peitho and bia...It is not until the *Eumenides* that the conflict is resolved: the bia of the avenging Furies is assuaged in a triumph of peitho, when Athena persuades them to relent."[218] In this speech, Clytemnestra's persuasive gambit is not voiced until near the end, when she turns to Agamemnon with an ostensibly gracious suggestion to tread on

[218] Kirby (1990) 220-21.

the tapestries. She spends much time at the beginning of the speech establishing her own *êthos* and stirring up her listeners' pity and sympathy (*diathesis*):

> Men of the city, honored lords of Argos here, I shall feel no shame to speak to you of the love I bear my husband; for in time timidity dies away for human kind.[219] (855-58)

Clytemnestra begins with an address designed to demonstrate her humility and lack of guile in the face of her affection for her husband (appealing to her own *êthos*). She moves on to a description of her misery during the Trojan war years, a vivid tale full of *pathos*-evoking details:

> It is not from others that I have learned; I shall speak of my own life of sorrow so long as this man was beneath Ilium. First, for a woman far from her husband to sit in her house alone is a fearful grief, hearing many a malignant rumor; as one messenger follows another bringing yet worse tidings, uttering sorrow for the house...Because of such malignant rumors as these many nooses were knotted for my neck and hung on high, untied by others by force after they had seized me against my will. (858-76)

Clytemnestra here fashions an enthymeme out of the gnomic premise "for a woman far from her husband to sit in her house alone is a fearful grief..." and the individualized premise "because of such malignant rumors as these many nooses were knotted for my neck..." But rather than serving as an argument for some action on the audience's part, these enthymematic premises set up Clytemnestra's larger purpose: to build up overwhelming sympathy and support for her person, and to dispose her audience favorably to any action she will propose later in the speech. Clytemnestra's next strategy is to misdirect any suspicion of treachery on her part by suggesting its presence as an external threat. All of her claims contribute to the picture of a dutiful wife, concerned only for her husband's safety and the preservation of his kingdom. She is now engaged in persuasion by deception:

> This, I say, is why our son does not stand here, the warrant of your pledges and of mine, as he should have stood, Orestes; do not be surprised at this. For he is the guest of a kindly ally, Strophius the Phocian, who warned me of trouble on two accounts, of your peril before Ilium, and of how the people's lawless clamor

[219] Text of *Agamemnon* from Page (1972); translation from Lloyd-Jones (1979).

> might overthrow the council, since it is inbred in mortals to kick the man who has fallen. Such a pretext carries no deceit. (877-86)

Clytemnestra next reprises her earlier appeals to *pathos* before launching into an expression of joy over Agamemnon's return. Her pitiable anecdotes affirm her earlier self-portrayal as a faithful and loving wife (*êthos*):

> For me the gushing fountains of my tears have run dry, and no drop is left in them; and my late-watching eyes are sore with weeping for the beacon-fires for you left ever unattended. And in my dreams the light sound of a gnat's trumpeting would wake me, since I saw more sufferings concerning you than the time through which I slept had room for. (887-94)

Reaching a crescendo in her roundabout rhetorical strategy (the contention of her speech has not yet been revealed), Clytemnestra turns towards her approaching husband for the first time with a torrent of blatant and excessive flattery. This strategy bespeaks her intimate knowledge of Agamemnon's character and weaknesses, which she exploits to dispose him favorably towards her cause (*diathesis*):

> Now, having endured all this, with a heart free from mourning I can call my husband here the watchdog of the fold, the forestay that preserves the ship, the firmly grounded pillar of the lofty roofs, only-begotten child to a father, land appearing to sailors beyond hope, fair weather seen after the storm, for the thirsty traveler the water of a fountain; it is a joy to escape any manner of constraint. Such are the appellations of which I hold him worthy. But let envy be absent; for many are the sufferings which I bore in time past. (895-905)

In the final lines of her speech, Clytemnestra finally states the object of her persuasive attempt, for which she has been preparing the ground (so to speak) throughout:

> And now, dear one, descend from this your chariot, not setting upon the ground your foot, O king, the foot that conquered Troy! Handmaids, why do you delay, you who have assigned to you the task of strewing the ground he walks on with tapestries? At once let his path be spread with purple, that Justice may lead him to the home he never hoped to see! And for the rest, may forethought not overcome by sleep accomplish all justly with the gods' aid as it is fated! (905-13)

Clytemnestra ends her speech with a double flourish of flattery for Agamemnon and piety on her own part. "Justice" is said to accompany Agamemnon's triumphal return, hinting that the lavish welcome is no more than Agamemnon deserves as a conquering

hero (although "the home he never hoped to see" serves the additional meaning of hinting at Clytemnestra's true intentions[220]). By deferring to the gods and fate in the final line, Clytemnestra completes the elaborate picture of her unimpeachable *êthos* that she has been spinning out over the course of the speech.

The effectiveness of Clytemnestra's rhetoric is not revealed immediately, but emerges over the course of the ensuing stichomythia with an initially- and weakly-reluctant Agamemnon. During this exchange, Clytemnestra continues to ply the technique of *diathesis*-via-flattery, until she wears down his feeble defenses. Agamemnon yields with telling references to Clytemnestra's argumentative power, speaking of her persuasiveness in terms of coercion: "Well, if this is your pleasure..." (944) and "Since I am constrained to defer to you in this, I will go..." (956-7). Clytemnestra's speech resembles some of the Iliadic speeches analyzed earlier in its long and detailed construction of the speaker's *êthos* and its attention to *diathesis* through a variety of means (primarily pity and flattery, in this case). There is less emphasis on logical argumentation here than in many of the speeches in Homer, although Clytemnestra introduces several brief enthymemes in the stichomythia that follow this speech (e.g. the gnomic premises "He of whom none is jealous is not envied" (939) and "For the fortunate even to yield up victory is becoming" (941), which both lead to the enthymematic conclusion "be persuaded" (943)). All in all, the rhetoric of Clytemnestra's speech is well-developed and demonstrates a mastery of many techniques that Aristotle will identify in his treatise.

My second brief case-study for rhetoric in tragedy comes from the corpus of Sophocles: Neoptolemus' address to Philoctetes in *Philoctetes* 1314-47. This tragedy stands out—even amidst a genre teeming with attempts to persuade—as being almost entirely preoccupied with the persuasion of a character. Its plot is reminiscent of *Iliad* 9, with Philoctetes instead of Achilles being the object of successive persuasion attempts taking a variety of forms (from trickery to coercion and finally, at the end of the play, to rhetorical appeal—unsuccessful by Neoptolemus, finally successful by Heracles). In

[220] See Denniston and Page (157) 148.

1314-47, Neoptolemus—having just returned Philoctetes' bow to him, thereby demonstrating his refusal to use force or "bargaining chips" against the wounded hero—makes a final effort to gain Philoctetes' compliance through persuasion. He begins with a nod to Philoctetes' recently rehabilitated view of his (Neoptolemus') *êthos*, but quickly shifts to criticism, perhaps suggesting a contrast between the nobility and courage shown by his father and himself and the self-pitying obstinacy of Philoctetes:

> I am pleased to hear you speak well of my father—of him and of myself. But now, listen to what I ask of you. Men must bear the fortune given them by the gods. But those who are set upon by damage that is of their own doing, such as yourself, it is just neither to have sympathy for them, nor to pity them. You have become an animal, and refuse all advice: if someone, thinking on your behalf, does give advice, you hate him, you consider him an enemy.[221] (1314-23)

Neoptolemus' first rhetorical technique—arousing his listener's emotions (*pathos*)—comes in the form of a strident rebuke. This rebuke uses *gnômai* ("Men must bear the fortune given them by the gods" and "Those who are set upon by damage that is of their own doing...") and an argument illustrating the unreasonable nature of Philoctetes' hostility to stir up his sense of shame. Neoptolemus next turns to a positive argument, offering hope to Philoctetes of an improvement in his condition. An appeal to *êthos* is implicit here, as Neoptolemus cites divine authority to gain credibility for his claims:

> Nevertheless, I shall speak, calling upon the Zeus of oath-making. Consider this—and write it deeply into your mind. You are sick with this disease by divine will...There is never to be any respite from this grave infection—so long as the same sun rises here, and sets there—until you come willingly to Troy, and, meeting the sons of Asklepios, you will be cured of disease, and will be proven with me and with your bow to be Troy's destruction. As to how I know these things are the case, I shall tell you. A man from Troy was captured by us—Helenos, the best of seers—who has said clearly these things must happen. And more—that all Troy must be taken this summer. He has agreed to be put to death, should he prove to be a liar. Therefore, knowing this, come willingly. (1324-43)

Neoptolemus makes an appeal to oaths and invokes the evidence of a prophet as part of his argument, much as Odysseus did in *Iliad* 2.284-332 in his speech recalling the

[221] Text of *Philoctetes* from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson (1990); translation from Phillips (2003).

prophecy of Calchas and pointing to its fulfillment as evidence for the action that he was urging. This passage relies on an enthymeme for which the premise is the topic of consideration of incentives—namely, the promise of healing for Philoctetes' "grave infection"—and the conclusion is the imperative command to consent willingly. A second enthymematic premise follows, concluding the speech:

> For it is wonderful, to be judged the best of the Greeks (Ἑλλήνων...ἄριστον), to come into healing hands, and then, in sacking Troy, to bring upon yourself the highest fame. (1344-47)

This premise includes a *gnomê* ("It is wonderful, to be judged the *best of the Greeks*," a phrase which recalls the oft-used Iliadic designation ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν) and another appeal to the topic of consideration of incentives. By his consent, Neoptolemus argues, Philoctetes will win not only respite from his suffering but also glory to replace the disgrace and dehumanization that Neoptolemus had attributed to him earlier in the speech.

This speech gives Philoctetes pause ("How not to believe the words of this man who has advised (παρῄνεσεν) me with my best interests in mind?" (1350-51)), but in the end he holds fast to his original resolve to remain in Lemnos. His reasoning for doing so (1348-72) suggests that the reason for Neoptolemus' failure to convince lies not in the weakness of his rhetoric or even his *êthos* (Philoctetes by now sees him as an ally). Rather, it is a matter in which Philoctetes will *never* be convinced by rhetoric alone, even that of a friend; compare Achilles' response to Phoenix' plea in *Iliad* 9. It is only the introduction of an external, unexpected factor—a *deus ex machina*—that can achieve what no amount of words will. For Achilles that factor was the death of Patroclus; for Philoctetes it is the appearance of Heracles.

A final case-study of tragedy's integration of rhetoric is the speech of Medea in Euripides' *Medea*. Much could be said about the role of persuasion in this play, and Medea addresses many of her rhetorically-heated speeches to herself as she internally debates whether to carry out her destructive plans. Indeed, for all of the rhetoric she displays, Medea actually attempts little *straightforward* persuasion—that is, stating her

claim or command and arguing for the listener to assent (her supplication to Aegeus in 708-18 is an exception). Instead, she persuades obliquely, using manipulation and deception to achieve her aims. The prime instance of this approach comes in her speech to Jason in the fourth episode, her final encounter with Jason before she commits the murders she has been deliberating throughout the play:

> Jason, I beg you to pardon what I said before. It is only reasonable that you should bear with my passionate moods, since we have exchanged many acts of loving kindness. I have debated the matter with myself and have reproached myself...I thought over these things and saw that I was being very foolish and that my rage was needless.[222] (869-83)

Mastronarde compares Medea's rhetorical stance in this speech with Clytemnestra's in the speech to Agamemnon analyzed above—that of "the weak, irrational female."[223] Through much of this speech, Medea concentrates on rebuilding her *êthos* in Jason's eyes (following her earlier diatribes against him) to make herself a credible and sympathetic figure. To do so, she does not shy away from the use of a logical form of argumentation, namely *enthymeme*. The enthymematic conclusion is stated first—it is "reasonable" for Jason to forgive her for her earlier outburst (τὰς δ' ἐμὰς ὀργὰς φέρειν/ εἰκός σ')—and the premise is her reminder of their love and shared past (ἐπεὶ νῷν πόλλ' ὑπείργασται φίλα (870-71)). Then comes a declaration of remorse and self-abasement that effectively conveys the *êthos* that Medea is trying to convey, that of a humbled and deferential wife, ready to comply with Jason's wishes. To this technique she adds *diathesis*, disposing Jason favorably through flattery:

> And so now I applaud you. You seem to me to show good sense in making this marriage in addition to ours—and I seem idiotic. I ought to be sharing in these plans and helping to bring them to fulfillment, standing beside the marriage bed and taking pleasure in waiting upon your bride. (884-88)

Both through flattery and through her offer of support for his new marriage, Medea ingratiates herself back into Jason's good graces. The degree to which Medea has reversed her earlier attitude—now claiming that she ought to "take pleasure" in

[222] Text of the *Medea* from Mastronarde (2002); translation from Morwood (1997).
[223] Mastronarde (2002) 312.

attending her rival's marriage bed—would seem to be so extreme as to arouse Jason's suspicion. But as his reply will make clear, Medea has judged his character and reactions correctly. She ends her speech with an appeal cloaked in self-deprecating sentiments:

> But we are what we are—I won't call us evil—we women. And so you should not be like us in our weaknesses nor match folly with folly. I ask for your good will and admit that I viewed the business wrongly before but now have come to see it with better judgement. (889-93)

Again, Medea uses her intimate knowledge of Jason's character and opinions to gain his trust. Her parenthetical aside that she wouldn't go so far as to call women *evil* (οὐκ ἐρῶ κακόν) recalls Jason's earlier diatribe against women, 569-75, which had ended with the sentiment that, if women did not exist, χοὔτως ἂν οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις κακόν. Aware of Jason's low view of women, Medea turns this to her advantage by implying that a refusal to assent to her request would represent the same petulant "folly" (νήπια) that he decries in women. She subtly reinforces Jason's sense of superiority over women in general (and over herself in particular) by the admission that, after all, he was right about women's "weaknesses" and "folly." The negative *paradeigma* of female character forms the dubious but effective premise to an enthymeme whose conclusion is Medea's request for Jason to show good will—that is, he should show good will to her *because* otherwise he will be behaving like a weak and foolish woman. With a final gesture of humility and feigned repentance ("I admit that I viewed the business wrongly before"), Medea concludes the portion of her speech addressed to Jason. She goes on to address her children with emotional words that betray her internal conflict, although she also takes the opportunity to advance her deceitful persona: "Be like your mother and as you greet him be reconciled from your previous hatred towards one who loves you..." (896-98)). Jason readily grants Medea's request for pardon, and his response—dripping with condescension and a self-satisfied sense of magnanimity—reveals just how accurate was Medea's assessment of his character and weaknesses:

> I approve of what you say, woman, and I find no fault with your former attitude either. It is fair enough that one of your sex, a woman, should fly into a passion with a husband who traffics in contraband love. But your heart now follows a better course... (908-911)

Much like the rhetorical approach Clytemnestra had taken with Agamemnon, Medea's approach succeeds in persuasion-through-deceit predicated on knowledge of how her husband will react to certain "triggers" (in particular, flattery and slavish devotion). Both women provide examples of the successful deployment of *diathesis* on a large scale.

F. From poetry to prose: Sophists, Plato

No survey of pre-Aristotelian developments in rhetoric would be complete without an acknowledgment of the fifth century rise of sophistic practices and the debate surrounding them, for they surely represent the impetus towards a didactic and systematized cataloguing of rhetorical techniques, and a formal theory of rhetoric. Both sophistic speeches and the Socratic dialogues of Plato fall outside the purview of my survey of direct speech in poetry, but they inhabit a moment in which the Homeric tradition is coming into contact with, and exerting influence over, the emergence of a discipline called rhetoric. This intersection and influence is implicit, rather than explicit, in the sophistic writings that survive: in a curious and short-lived phenomenon (which would later be picked up as a method of rhetorical instruction in the Second Sophistic), several Sophists placed deliberative or forensic set-speeches in the mouths of mythological figures, and in situations suggested by the epic tradition. These hybrids of heroic myth and display-oratory are briefly examined below.

From the sophistic era in Greece[224] come our first surviving instances of a "meta-vocabulary," or technical terminology, of rhetoric. The word *rhêtorikê*, for example, is first attested in Plato's *Gorgias;* and the term *eikos*—denoting the argument from probability—was purported to be an invention of Tisias or Corax and gained popularity in the speeches of Antiphon.[225] O'Sullivan articulates the widely accepted account of the

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[224] Roughly following Dillon and Gergel (2003: vii-viii), I am taking the "sophistic era" to stretch chronologically from Gorgias' embassy to Athens in 427 B.C.E. to his death in 375 B.C.E..

[225] On the term *rhêtorikê* and its appearance in the *Gorgias*, see Schiappa (1990), who argues that this term was in fact coined by Plato. On the origins of the argument from probability, see O'Sullivan (1992) 28, Gagarin (1994), and Schiappa (1999) 35ff. Plato is one of our best sources for connecting Tisias with the invention of the argument from probability; see *Phaedrus* 267a and 273a-c.

origins of the argument from probability, saying that "The argument from εἰκός...goes back to Tisias and/or Corax, and its extensive use can be seen in what is perhaps our earliest rhetorical document, Antiphon's *Tetralogies*, as well as in tragedy and Thucydides."[226] Interestingly, although this view acknowledges the appearance of *eikos* in tragedy and Thucydides, it says nothing of its presence in Homeric speeches and in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (where the *eikos* argument features prominently, as noted in section II.A above). Both Schiappa and Cole rightly call into question what Schiappa calls "the standard account of rhetoric's beginnings," which places Corax and Tisias at the head of the rhetorical tradition and attributes the invention of various rhetorical techniques to the fifth-century Sophists (little of whose work survives) and the fabled *technai* (none of which survive, supposedly due to fact that they were rendered obsolete by the comprehensive nature of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*).[227] I differ from these two historians of rhetoric, however, in the direction that I take in moving away from this standard account. While Schiappa and Cole conclude that a systematized notion of rhetoric does not develop until *later* than the fifth-century Sophistic movement—namely, with Plato and Aristotle—I have tried to demonstrate that nearly all the specific techniques that constitute rhetoric (by a fourth-century, i.e. Aristotelian, definition) were present in Homeric epic. O'Sullivan's neglect of the technique of *eikos* in Homer, while noting it in tragedy and Thucydides, is a telling example of the consequences of a scholarly history that has written out the possibility of rhetoric in Homer. Another example is Cole's assertion that "Greek literature before Plato is largely 'arhetorical' in character"[228]; instead, "What does come out in Homeric speech is eloquence: a combination of volubility, native gift for holding the attention of an audience, and a mind well stocked with accurate memories and sound counsels."[229] This attitude is, I would suggest, the legacy of Aristotle's attitude towards Homer with regard to rhetoric (which will be discussed in Chapter 4).

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[226] O'Sullivan (1992) 28.

[227] See Schiappa (1999) 3-65, *et passim*.

[228] Cole (1991) x, see also 40-41.

[229] *Ibid*, 40.

Of the Sophists whose work survives to us, many combine their experiments in ornate language and intricate display-argumentation with subject matter drawn straight from mythology and epic.[230] Surviving speeches of Gorgias (c. 483-376 B.C.E.), Antisthenes (c. 445-365) and Alcidamas (c. 420-360) place orations in the mouth of Homeric heroes in Homeric situations: Gorgias has Palamedes deliver an impassioned defense against Odysseus, who has accused him of treason, in the *Defense of Palamedes*; Antisthenes produces opposing speeches by Ajax and Odysseus in which each puts in his claim to the arms of Achilles; and Alcidamas (a pupil of Gorgias) provides what is perhaps a retort to his mentor by composing Odysseus' speech prosecuting Palamedes. In addition to these examples of what I will call "mytho-forensic" model speeches, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*—while not couched in Helen's own voice—is a loosely-forensic, largely-epideictic defense of the Homeric heroine/villainess.[231] Although these speeches might seem to bear little resemblance to actual speeches in Homer because of formal properties (their length and the fact that they are in prose), a closer examination of their persuasive techniques reveals a rhetorical connection to go along with their characters' connection to the epics. These speeches represent lines of argumentation in the process of being crystallized into the fifth-century Athenian social institutions of forensic oratory, philosophical debate, and rhetorical instruction, and as such they comprise a sort of hybrid form linking the rhetoric of Homeric characters and that of formal theory and practice in Classical Athens.[232]

Gorgias' *Defense of Palamedes* is a work that exemplifies this link. Gorgias has created an epideictic speech (as is his wont) that is actually a forensic defense-speech within the composition's internal, mythological reality. Palamedes, the ostensible speaker, relies on two major rhetorical strategies: the argument from *eikos*, to which he appeals in citing numerous improbabilities of his accuser's claim; and appeals to *êthos* as

[230] See Morgan (2000) 89-131.

[231] On the Sophists, see Dillon and Gergel (2003), Pernot (2000) 24-59, Kennedy (1994) 17-29.

[232] Morgan (2000) observes: "The sophists...occupy a position that mediates between what we consider the realm of philosophy and that of the poets and other public performers...Their concerns with language, and their manipulations of myth to express these concerns place them in the philosophical camp, but they also display their expertise in a more freewheeling and extrovert manner, as befits the performers of public display orations." (11)

he continually reminds the army of his upright character and former benefactions towards them ("To the truth of this claim I offer my past life as witness, and to this you yourselves can be witnesses." (15))[233]. Toward the end of the speech, though, Palamedes turns to *diathesis*. He draws attention to his own strategies of persuasion as a means of flattering his audience, assuring them that he respects their intelligence (a trope that will become familiar through Socrates' use of it in the *Apology*):

> Appeals to pity and entreaties and the intercession of friends are of use when the trial takes place before a mob; but among you, the most distinguished of the Greeks, and deservedly so regarded, it is not proper to resort to persuasion by [these] means...but it is right for me to escape this charge by relying on the most perspicuous justice, explaining the truth, not seeking to deceive you. (33)

The use of flattery to increase the audience's receptivity is a strategy familiar from the *Iliad* in such instances as Nestor's appeal to Achilles and Agamemnon (1.275-84) or Hera's protestation of innocence to Zeus (15.36-45). Further shades of the heroic and Homeric world from which Palamedes has been appropriated can be seen in his culminating argument, an elaborate enthymeme. He begins the enthymeme with the conclusion, a *gnomê*: "In all cases good men must take great care not to make mistakes" (the implied extension being that they must not make the mistake of wrongly convicting him). As a premise, Palamedes introduces the threat of public reprobation when the truth ultimately emerges—availing himself of the topic of incentives and disincentives:

> For you run the great risk, through appearing unjust, of losing one reputation and gaining a different one...If you kill me unjustly, it will become obvious to many; for I am not unknown, and your wickedness will become known and perspicuous to the whole of Greece. (35-36)

This argument recalls Phoenix' appeal to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, in which he warned Achilles (by means of the Meleager *paradeigma*) not to wait to help the Greek army until it is too late. Phoenix, like Palamedes, cited the potential loss of reputation and honor as an incentive:

> It would be worse to defend the ships after they are burning. No, with gifts promised go forth. The Achaians will honour you as they would an immortal.

[233] Text of the *Defense of Palamedes* from Càffaro; translation from Dillon and Gergel (2003).

> But if without gifts you go into the fighting where men perish, your honour will no longer be as great... (*Iliad* 9.601-605)

Palamedes then cites a second and final premise to this enthymeme, an even more pressing reason for sparing his life: the religious implications of an unjust verdict. "You will have on your consciences the commission of a dreadful, godless, unjust, lawless deed, in having put to death a man who was an ally, useful to you, a benefactor of Greece, and a fellow Greek," (36) he says, using the opportunity to renew his appeal to his own *êthos*.

Along with the other mytho-forensic speeches mentioned above, the *Defense of Palamedes* represents an intriguing link between an Archaic—particularly Homeric—literary tradition (thanks to its mythological subject matter), and trends in fifth-century Athenian society (thanks to its displays of sophistic technique and hints of logography). But given the complex strategies of argumentation we have seen from speakers in the *Iliad*, I would argue that these sophistic speeches owe more to the Homeric tradition than simply their mythological identities. The legacy of Homeric speech no doubt informed, and was channeled through, these examples of rhetorical pedagogy and display, which in turn gave rise to the formalized rhetoric of the following generations.

A final pre-Aristotelian link in the literary transmission of rhetoric is the work of Plato, whose wide-ranging, complex, and at times seemingly contradictory relationship with rhetoric has been the subject of much scholarly work.[234] Unlike Aristotle's treatment of rhetoric, which is patently systematic and as such can serve as a measuring stick for evaluating rhetoric in speech or literature, Plato's treatment (which spans numerous dialogues, but appears most prominently in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*) is diffuse, inquisitive, and ultimately aporetic. Aristotle is concerned with the nature of rhetoric only to a limited extent; once he has dispensed with a definition early in the *Rhetoric* ("an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (1.2.1)), he briskly moves on to discussing the components of rhetoric and how to practice it

[234] To name just a few: Ferrari (1987), White (1993), Schiappa (1999) and (2003), McCoy (2008). For further bibliography on Plato and rhetoric, see Nienkamp (1999), 215-217.

effectively, the subjects which comprise most of his treatise. In contrast, the discussions of rhetoric that Plato depicts have little to say about the mechanics of rhetorical practice, instead concerning themselves with what rhetoric is, and whether or not it leads its practitioners—and audience—closer to the truth. One further distinction I will mention (out of the many that could be noted) between Aristotle and Plato with regard to rhetoric is their respective views on the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic. While Aristotle defines rhetoric as the *antistrophos*, or counterpart, to dialectic (*Rhetoric* 1.1.1), Plato sees these two pursuits as separate, even opposite. For Plato, dialectic is an essential component of the philosophical process (see *Phaedrus* 276a-278b) that produces a "living, breathing discourse" (276a) in contrast to what Nightingale has termed the "alien discourse[s]" of memorized or written-down rhetorical speeches.[235] With such a perspective on rhetoric, Plato holds the "conventional" understanding of rhetoric (i.e., a system of techniques and arguments to be exerted in persuasion of another)—an understanding shared by Iliadic speakers, the sophists, Aristotle, and modern society alike—always at arm's length.

Nienkamp has observed that "part of the difficulty in extracting positions on rhetoric from the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus* is that the dialogues are about much more than rhetoric—in fact, they situate rhetoric in larger philosophical, societal, and interpersonal contexts, a rendering that colors the specific positions on rhetoric offered in each...These dialogues add an emphasis on ethics and language use."[236] Such an emphasis means that pinning down any notion of "Platonic rhetorical theory" is difficult, if not impossible; Plato's "views" on rhetoric, as expressed through the mouth of Socrates, have constant recourse to the broader requirements of his philosophical and ethical principles. Additionally, these views seem to unfold and evolve between dialogues, and even within a single dialogue, depending on the identity and opinions of Socrates' interlocutors and on the course of discussion. The early dialogue *Gorgias*

[235] See Nightingale (1995) 133-71 on "alien and authentic discourse" in the *Phaedrus*, Plato's notion that the philosopher must not simply passively assimilate, but must actively engage with, "alien discourse"—such as rhetorical speeches or writings—and make them "authentic" by "measuring them against the truths he has discovered by dialectical investigation." (134)

[236] Nienkamp (1999) 13.

(composed around 385 B.C.E.) contains Socrates' famous denotation of rhetoric as a "knack" (ἐμπειρία) rather than a "skill" (τέχνη)—that is, something that mimics other subjects such as politics, medicine, and the like, but without having any actual expertise.[237] In Socrates' view, this "knack" is no more than a type of flattery (κολακεία, *Gorgias* 466a), in that it tells the listener whatever he wants to hear. This harsh view of rhetoric's nature is borne out in the subsequent evaluation of rhetoric that Socrates offers in the *Gorgias*: that "for the person who has no intention of behaving unjustly it doesn't seem to me to have much use—if in fact it has any use at all" (481b).[238] Throughout most of the dialogue, Socrates argues that rhetoric stands in opposition to justice and virtue and the life of philosophy because it tends to be used unscrupulously by those who wish to exercise power unjustly. But near the end, he hints at the possibility that rhetoric might be practiced in an ethically acceptable fashion:

> But among so many arguments this one alone survives refutation and remains steady:...that every form of flattery, both the form concerned with oneself and that concerned with others, whether they're few or many, is to be avoided, and that *oratory and every other activity is always to be used in support of what's just.* (527b-c) (Italics added)

This receptivity to rhetoric is more fully developed in the *Phaedrus*, which dates to between 375 and 365 B.C.E. (see Nehamas & Woodruff xiii). The *Phaedrus* is a complex dialogue encompassing a variety of types of discourse, as Nightingale has observed—including different literary genres and types of rhetoric.[239] And it is in the *Phaedrus* that Plato gives an account of rhetoric that links aspects of rhetorical practice that we see in Homeric speech to aspects of rhetorical theory that we see in Aristotle—albeit in a distinctly Platonic idiom. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates rests his case for a philosophically-based rhetoric on the premise that "the nature of speech is in fact to direct the soul"

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[237] *Gorgias* 462b-466a.

[238] Text of the *Gorgias* from Burnet (1903); translation from Zeyl (1987).

[239] Nightingale (1995) 133-71. In the course of Plato's wide-ranging treatment of different types of discourse in the *Phaedrus*, Nightingale notes, he has the characters of Phaedrus and Socrates perform contemporary genres of rhetoric (especially encomiastic) within the three speeches embedded in the dialogue (154ff.). Each of the speeches is intended to be persuasive in its own right, but each speech progressively changes and challenges the internal audience's (Phaedrus') interpretation of the speech(es) that preceded it—thus enacting the process of what Nightingale calls "authentic discourse" that Plato is striving for.

(*Phaedrus* 271d), and it is this concept of *psychagôgia* that constitutes an acceptable manner of practicing rhetoric for Socrates.[240] Towards the end of the *Phaedrus* (260a-262c), he builds the argument that to practice rhetoric successfully—as a τέχνη, not a τριβή (synonymous with ἐμπειρία)—it is necessary to know the truth about every subject upon which the course of persuasion touches: "There is no genuine art of speaking (τοῦ δὲ λέγειν...ἔτυμος τέχνη) without a grasp of truth, and there never will be" (260e). This notion that persuasion must be grounded in truth leads Socrates to make a distinction between the formal properties of rhetoric—which are the sole concern of Sophists and handbook-writers, but which Socrates calls "a little threadbare" (268a)—and the content or subject matter of rhetoric. Along with possessing true knowledge of the subject under debate in any speech, Socrates says, the speaker must possess true knowledge of the *souls* of the audience:

> Anyone who teaches the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision (πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει...ψυχήν)...Second, he will explain how, in virtue of its nature, it acts and is acted upon by certain things...Third, he will classify the kinds of speech and of soul there are, as well as the various ways in which they are affected, and explain what causes each. He will then coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it. (271a-b)

Socrates had given attention to the nature and aetiology of souls earlier in the *Phaedrus*, during his so-called "Great Speech" on *erôs* (*Phaedrus* 244a-257b). What he means in speaking of different "kinds of soul" is extraordinarily complex and intertwined with the whole of Plato's philosophical thought; suffice it to say that for the purposes of *rhetoric*, Plato sees it as essential—and, indeed, the only valid practice—for instructors to describe, and speakers to get to know, the souls of those whom they are attempting to persuade. "Otherwise," argues Socrates, "all we'll have will be an empirical and artless practice (τριβῇ μόνον καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀλλὰ τέχνῃ). We won't be able to supply, on the basis of an art,...a soul with the reasons and customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we want" (270b).

[240] Text of the *Phaedrus* from Burnet (1903); translation from Nehamas and Woodruff (1995).

Focusing on the *souls* of the audience would seem to be a uniquely Platonic approach to rhetorical effectiveness, but it is worth comparing this idea to aspects of both Homeric and Aristotelian rhetoric. As we saw in Chapter 2, Homeric speakers often tailor their rhetoric to the particular audience: Nestor attempts to appease Achilles and Agamemnon with individualized flattery, claiming that the former is "stronger," the latter "greater" (*Iliad* 1.280-81); Hera cannily approaches Zeus with arguments about the respect demanded by her status as queen of the gods and his wife, and with flattering words about his ultimate authority (see *Il.* 4.51-67 and 15.36-45). Moreover, Homeric speakers make explicit reference to the effectiveness of such attention to the particular character of their audience, as when Nestor tells Patroclus that he is the only one who can persuade Achilles to return to battle, since "the persuasion of a friend is a strong thing" (*Il.* 11.793). The speaker-audience dynamic plays a large role in determining the rhetorical tacks taken by speakers in the *Iliad*—whether the parties in question are acquainted with each other (as they are in most of the *Iliad*'s persuasive speeches) or not (as in the case of the speeches between Achilles and Priam). What we see represented in the *Iliad,* then, is a strategy for persuasion that looks not unlike Socrates' description of the well-trained orator:

> On meeting someone he will be able to discern what he is like and make clear to himself that the person actually standing in front of him is of just this particular sort of nature (φύσις) he had learned about in school—to that he must now apply speeches of such-and-such a kind in this particular way in order to secure conviction about such-and-such an issue.[241] (*Phaedrus* 271e-272a)

Likewise, Plato's theory has certain affinities with Aristotle's notion of *diathesis*—literally, "disposing the listener" favorably based on an assessment of the listener's character and points of susceptibility to emotional appeal (see *Rhetoric* 1.2.3, 2.12-17). As is his wont, Aristotle takes a pragmatic approach to assessing an audience's character and tailoring one's rhetoric accordingly. In *Rhetoric* 2.12-17, he details different types of

[241] I have changed Nehamas' and Woodruff's translation in one regard here, substituting the word "nature" where they have "character" to translate φύσις. In my opinion this is a necessary change to avoid confusion with the Greek word more frequently translated as "character," namely ἦθος (φύσις in this context likely signifies something similar to ἦθος, but it possesses valences that I believe are different enough to justify retaining a distinct translation).

audience character (the young, the old, those in the prime of life) and the effects on audience character of various circumstances (good birth, wealth, and power) in an attempt to create a calculus for *diathesis*. The young, for example, are "prone to desires," and "impulsive and quick-tempered and inclined to follow up their anger [by action]," according to Aristotle (*Rh.* 2.12.3ff.). His implication is that an effective approach to persuading the young is to play upon their desires and stir them to anger (among other things), whereas the old will be persuaded by what is advantageous for themselves, and are susceptible to appeals to pity, since "they think that all kinds of sufferings are close to hand for themselves" (*Rh.* 2.13.15).

What we see in tracking rhetorical notions from Homer to Plato to Aristotle is a common awareness of the need for a successful orator to understand the identity (variously termed the nature (φύσις), the soul (ψυχή), or the character (ἦθος)) of the audience, and to match his speech to that particular identity. Homeric characters represent this practice in fictional deliberative contexts; Plato articulates an approach to the practice whereby philosophy and rhetoric intersect in the contemplation of the soul and the leading of the soul towards the Good (*psychagôgia*); Aristotle presents it in terms of character classifications and the application of persuasive strategies based on these classifications. While the systematic nature of Aristotle's rhetorical theory lends itself to comparison with Homeric practice, Plato's discursive style makes his work less suited for the type of analysis that I have conducted. Plato does, of course, engage with Homer on numerous occasions throughout his works (a subject too large and too distinct from this project for me to treat), but Homer does *not* come up in any significant way during the dialogues on rhetoric—with one interesting exception. There is a hint in the *Phaedrus* that Homeric *exempla* may have provided some background—whether in a specific or a more broadly cultural sense—for Plato's rhetorical theory. That hint is to be found during Socrates' discussion of rhetoric as *psychagôgia*. As Socrates explains to Phaedrus, rhetoric understood in this way can occur not only in the contexts of the lawcourt or the assembly, but also in private interactions, and can address any number of subjects (261a-b). When Phaedrus expresses surprise at this broad notion of rhetoric, Socrates responds

> Well, have you only heard of the rhetorical treatises of Nestor and Odysseus—those they wrote in their spare time in Troy? Haven't you also heard of the works of Palamedes? (261b)

This passage (also discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 12-13) suggests one or both of the following: that Socrates is referring to a contemporary tradition of putting "rhetorical treatises" (τέχναι) in the mouths of Homeric characters for the purposes of instruction or display; and/or that Plato is invoking the example of Homeric speakers as models for the type of rhetoric that he is theorizing—namely, one whose definition and application reach beyond the formal and occasional strictures in which the handbook-writers of the day typically presented it. Indeed, Plato—like Aristotle—is largely dismissive of his rhetorical predecessors, the figures who by the late fifth century had begun to be associated with the invention of the discipline.[242] Rhetoric, as both Plato and Aristotle envision it, is about far more than tropes and flourishes; it is about leading the soul (as Plato puts it), or finding the available means of persuasion for each case (as Aristotle puts it). In this sense, the two philosophers' perspectives on rhetoric have more in common with each other than either of them has with the handbook-writers. As Cole sees it, Aristotle made

> a consistent effort to develop some workable means of realizing the rhetorical program laid down by Plato—a program calling for knowledge of all the relevant facts and principles involved in a given case and all the potentially useful ways of presenting them as well...Narrowed range and increased specificity and practicality do not, however, prevent the discipline set forth at length in the *Rhetoric* from being essentially the same one envisioned in the *Phaedrus*.[243]

[242] In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates gives a litany of sophistic figures associated with the invention of various (mostly minor) rhetorical devices: Thrasymachus (266c), Theodorus (266e), Evenus of Paros (267a), Tisias (267a, 273a-c), Gorgias (267a), Prodicus (267b), Hippias (267b), Polus (267b), Licymnius (267c), and Protagoras (267c). Far from receiving genuine credit for inventing rhetoric, however, these figures are the target of Socratic irony; he calls their art "a little threadbare" (268a), and cautions Phaedrus that they "teach these preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in rhetoric" (269c). Aristotle's mostly critical account of his rhetorical predecessors, the anonymous "handbook writers," will be treated in Chapter 4.

[243] Cole (1991) 11-12.

I agree with Cole's assessment of the relationship between Plato's and Aristotle's rhetorical programs. What I would add to Cole's view is that both Plato and Aristotle, whether they recognized it or not, likely drew from the well of the most culturally pervasive literature of their time—Homeric poetry—for examples of their ideas in practice.

III. Conclusions about the innovation and impact of Homeric rhetoric

As we saw in Chapter 2, many of these fourth-century theoretical ideas about persuasion (particularly Aristotle's) were present in the speeches of Homeric characters. As we have seen throughout this chapter, far fewer examples of an Aristotelian level of rhetoric show up in non-Homeric Archaic poetry than were present in Homer. The Archaic compositions in which rhetoric does occur with more concentration and sophistication—the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* and the exhortations of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, for example—tend to be those which bear the closest resemblance to Homer in their subject matter and/or in their genre (that is, their formal characteristics). The elegiac battle exhortations of Callinus and Tyrtaeus are contextually similar to many of the persuasive speeches in the *Iliad*; the Homeric Hymns have formal similarities to Homeric rhetoric in terms of their narrative structure and embedded direct speech; and Pindaric and Stesichorean poems which treat mythical/heroic subjects and embed direct speech have some elements of both content and formal features in common with Homeric rhetoric. In much the same way that Herodotus claimed Homer and Hesiod taught the Greeks their gods (*Histories* 2.53), I am proposing that Homer, by means of his pervasive cultural influence, taught the Greeks their rhetoric.

Chapter 4: Aristotle and the Separation of Poetry and Rhetoric

I. Making sense of the relationship between Homeric speech and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

A. Homer's position within the *Rhetoric*

In the course of examining the possibility of Homeric origins of rhetoric, I have had frequent recourse to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as the earliest surviving, clearest, and most comprehensive systematic explication of rhetoric as *technê* in ancient Greece. As such, the *Rhetoric* is a useful tool for identifying the rhetorical content of utterances (textual or oral) both before and after the treatise itself was written in the mid-fourth century. But Aristotle gives little credit to Homer for contributions to the art of rhetoric, despite the fact that the persuasion represented in Homeric speeches often accords closely with Aristotle's standards. Homer serves a somewhat uneasy dual role within Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: he is both a larger-than-life cultural icon, and a source of *exempla* and *gnômai* for Aristotle's analytical study. The former role is apparent when, for example, Aristotle asserts that one way of identifying "the good" is to observe "what any of the wise or good men or women has shown preference for, as Athena [for] Odysseus and Theseus [for] Helen and the goddesses [for] Paris **and Homer [for] Achilles**" (1.6.25, emphasis added); or when, speaking of invoking ancient witnesses in judicial rhetoric, he notes that "the Athenians used Homer as a witness in their claim to Salamis" (1.15.13). The latter role—Homer as a source of textual *exempla* for the *Rhetoric*—is more complicated. Aristotle cites the Homeric poems with some frequency (as we shall see below), but seldom do these citations illustrate rhetorical techniques. More often they serve as illustrations of tangential points, or confirmation of the groundwork that Aristotle lays before he offers actual rhetorical instruction. Homer is one among many poets and orators that Aristotle cites seeming offhand throughout the treatise,[244] including

[244] I say "offhand" because at times Aristotle's quotations are slightly different from our received text; see Kennedy (2007) 70, note 144.

tragedians (most prominently Euripides, but also Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Agathon), lyric poets (Sappho, Pindar, Simonides, Stesichorus), and sophists/orators (Gorgias, Pericles, Alcidamas, Demosthenes). The place and use of Homeric material within the *Rhetoric* raises several questions. Why does Aristotle fail to treat Homer as an inventor or predecessor in his account (cursory though it is) of the history of rhetoric? Given that he does occasionally cite lines of Homeric speech as examples of rhetorical tropes, why doesn't Aristotle ever acknowledge that Homeric speakers (or the Homeric composer) were utilizing a system of persuasion similar to the one he explicates? Is it reasonable to claim that Aristotelian rhetorical theory was influenced or even informed by the example of Homeric speech, despite the fact that he does not include Homer in his discussion of predecessors? Which sources for rhetoric *does* Aristotle acknowledge?

As a first step toward answering these questions, I present in brief the instances of Homeric reference in the *Rhetoric.* Aristotle quotes or refers to the Homeric epics 34 times in the *Rhetoric.*[245] The 24 Aristotelian passages containing these quotes are listed below (some of the Homeric citations are grouped together by Aristotle as part of the same illustration). Of these 34 citations, 10 are relevant as illustrations of rhetorical principles, while the other 24 simply use Homer to illustrate either minor stylistic phenomena, or concepts not directly related to rhetoric. I have included all of Aristotle's Homeric citations below, highlighting in bold type those that treat Homer as a model for rhetorical persuasion:

On the definition of "the good" as an ethical topic useful for persuasion:

1) *Rhetoric* 1.6.20: "In general, the opposite of what enemies want or [of] what makes them happy seems advantageous; thus, it was well said, 'Yea, Priam would rejoice...' [*Il.* 1.255]" (This quote, from Nestor's speech to Achilles and Agamemnon, illustrates how the notion of supplying "good" to the enemy is used to dissuade the addressees from quarreling.)

[245] There are three additional mentions of Homer in the *Rhetoric* (1.6.25, 1.15.13, and 2.23.11), but they refer to Homer the person rather than to the Homeric poems, and have no relevance to Aristotle's rhetorical analysis. For example, in the passage defining what "the good" is, Aristotle says that it is "what any of the wise or good men or women has shown preference for, as Athena for Odysseus and Theseus [for] Helen and the goddesses [for] Paris and Homer [for] Achilles." (1.6.25)

2, 3) *Rhetoric* 1.6.22: "And what has cost much labor and expense [is good]; for it is an apparent good already, and such a thing is regarded as an 'end' and an end of many [efforts]; and the 'end' is a good. This is the source of the following: 'And it would be a boast left to Priam...' [*Il.* 2.160] And 'It is a disgrace for you to have stayed long...' [*Il.* 2.298]" (The first quote, spoken by Hera to Athene, decries the possibility of the Greeks leaving Troy without the prize (Helen) for which they have expended so much effort. The second quote, spoken by Odysseus to the Greek troops, expresses much the same sentiment.)

On what is greater and what is lesser in a general discussion of persuasive topics:

4) *Rhetoric* 1.7.31: "And the same things when divided into their parts seem greater; for there seems to be an excess of more things present. As a result, the poet also says that [the following words] persuaded Meleager to rise up [and fight]:

Whatsoever ills are to men whose city is taken:
Folk perish, and fire levels the city to the dust,
And others led off children... [*Il.* 9.592-4]" (Spoken by Phoenix in an attempt to persuade Achilles to rejoin battle)

5) *Rhetoric* 1.7.33: "And what is self-generated [is greater] than what is acquired. Thus, the poet, too, says, 'But I am self-taught'. [*Od.* 22.347]" (Spoken by Phemius in an attempt to persuade Odysseus to spare his life)

On what things are pleasurable in a general discussion of persuasive topics:

6) 1.11.8: "Thus, too, it has been said...'For when he remembers later, a man rejoices at his pains,/ He who suffers much and does much.'" [*Od.* 15.400-401] (Spoken by Eumaius to Odysseus; reflective)

7) 1.11.9: "Thus, even anger is pleasurable as Homer also [said in the verse he] composed about anger, 'Which is much sweeter than honey dripping from the comb'." [*Il.* 18.109] (Spoken by Achilles to Thetis; reflective)

8, 9) 1.11.12: "And similarly, a certain pleasure is felt in mourning and lamentation...Thus, too, it has been reasonably said, 'Thus he spoke, and raised in them all the sweet longing of tears.'" [*Il.* 23.108, *Od.* 4.183] (Narrator)

On the emotion of anger: when and how it becomes aroused:

10) 2.2.6: "Dishonor is a feature of insult, and one who dishonors belittles...Thus, Achilles, when angered, says, '[Agamemnon] dishonored me; for taking my prize, he keeps it himself.'" [*Il.* 1.356] (Spoken by Achilles to Thetis; this *describes* the process and reasons for Achilles' anger, but it is not itself serving rhetorically to arouse anger.)

11, 12) And 2.2.7-8: "And people think they are entitled to be treated with respect by those inferior in birth, in power, in virtue, and generally in whatever they themselves have much of...Thus, it has been said, 'Great is the rage of Zeus-nurtured kings.' [*Il.* 2.196] And 'But still, even afterward, he has resentment.' [*Il.*

1.82] For they are vexed by their sense of [ignored] superiority." (The first example is spoken by Odysseus to the Greek chieftains; the second by Calchas to the Greeks in the assembly)

On the emotion of calmness: when and how it occurs:

13) 2.3.16: "[People are calm] when they think that [their victims] will not perceive who is the cause of their suffering and that it is retribution for what they have suffered; for anger is a personal thing...Thus, the verse 'Say it was Odysseus, sacker of cities,' [*Od.* 9.504] was rightly composed, since [Odysseus] would not have been avenged if [Polyphemus the Cyclops] had not realized both from whom and why revenge came." (Spoken by Odysseus to identify himself to the blind Cyclops)

14) And 2.3.16: "People do not vent their anger on others who are not aware of it nor continue it against the dead, since the latter have suffered the ultimate and will not suffer nor will they have perception...Thus, in wanting Achilles to cease his anger against Hector once he was dead, the poet spoke well: 'For it is unseemly to rage at senseless clay.'" [*Il.* 24.54] (Spoken by Apollo to a council of the gods)

On the emotion of indignation: when and how it becomes aroused:

15) 2.9.11: "[It is] also [a source of indignation] for a lesser person to dispute with a greater one, especially those engaged in the same activity, whence, too, this has been said, 'But he avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,' [*Il.* 11.542] for Zeus was angry at him when he fought with a better man." (Narrator)

On the appropriate uses for *gnômai* in rhetorical persuasion:

16, 17) *Rhetoric* 2.21.11: "One should even use trite and common maxims if they are applicable; for because they are common, they seem true, as though everyone agreed; for example, [it is useful] for one who is exhorting [troops] to face danger without first sacrificing to the gods [to say,] 'One omen [literally, one bird] is best, to fight for one's country." [*Il.* 12.243] And if they are outnumbered, [to say,] 'The War God is impartial.'" [*Il.* 18.309] (Both examples spoken by Hector, the first to Polydamas, the second to the Trojan troops)

On the difference between similes and metaphors in the discussion of style:

18) 3.4.1: "When the poet says 'He rushed as a lion,' [*Il.* 20.164] it is a simile, but 'The lion rushed' [with 'lion' referring to a man] would be a metaphor; for since both are brave, he used a metaphor [i.e., a simile] and spoke of Achilles as a lion." (Narrator)

On examples of figures of speech in the discussion of style:

19) 3.9.9: "*Paromoiosis* [occurs] if each colon has similar extremities. This must occur either at the beginning or at the end [of the colon.]...At the beginning are found such things as...'***Dōrētoi*** *t'epelontos* ***pararrētoi*** *t'epeesin*.' ["**Ready for gifts** they were and **ready for persuasion** by words," *Il.* 9.526] (Spoken by Phoenix to Achilles)

On metaphor in the discussion of style:

20) 3.10.2: "Metaphor most brings about learning; for when he (Homer) calls old age 'stubble,' [*Od.* 4.213] he creates understanding and knowledge through the genus, since old age and stubble are [species of the genus of] things that have lost their bloom." (Narrator)

On *energeia,* or "activity," in the discussion of style:

21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26) 3.11.2-4: "And [*energeia*], as Homer often uses it, is making the lifeless living through the metaphor. In all his work he gains his fame by creating activity, for example, in the following: 'Then to the plain rolled the ruthless stone,' [*Od.* 11.598] and 'the arrow flew' [*Il.* 13.587] and [also of an arrow] 'eager to fly' [*Il.* 4.126] and [of spears] 'They stood in the ground longing to take their fill of flesh,' [*Il.* 11.574] and 'The point sped eagerly through his breast.' [*Il.* 15.541] In all of these something seems living through being actualized...He does the same to lifeless things in his much admired similes: 'Arched, foam-crested, some in front, but others upon others.'" [*Il.* 13.799] (The first example is spoken by Odysseus during his narration to the Phaeacians; the rest by the narrator)

On hyperbole in the discussion of style:

27) 3.11.15: "Hyperboles are adolescent; for they exhibit vehemence. (Therefore those in anger mostly speak them:

Not even if he gave me as much as the sand and the dust...
But I will not marry the daughter of Agamemnon, son of Atreus,
Not even if she rivals golden Aphrodite in beauty,
And Athene in workmanship.) [*Il.* 9.385-89]" (Spoken by Achilles in response to Odysseus' embassy speech)

On the creation of amplification (*auxēsis*) through asyndeton and repetition in the discussion of style:

28) 3.12.4: "Asyndeton thus creates amplification (*auxēsis*)...this is Homer's intention also in the passage 'Nereus, again, from Syme...Nereus, son of Aglaïa...Nereus who, as the handsomest man...' [*Il.* 2.671-73]; for a man about whom many things are said must necessarily often be named. [Conversely,] people think that if someone is often named there must also be many things to

say; thus [Homer] amplified [the importance of Nereus] (through mentioning him only in this passage) and by this fallacy made him memorable." (Narrator)

On the function of prooemia in the discussion of arrangement:

29, 30) 3.14.6: "In [judicial] speeches and in epic there is a sample of the argument in order that [the audience] may know what the speech is about...The unlimited leads astray; he who gives, as it were, the beginning into the hand [of the hearer] allows him, by holding on, to follow the speech. This is the reason for 'Sing, Goddess, the wrath...' [*Il.* 1.1] [and] 'Speak to me, Muse, of the man...' [*Od.* 1.1]" (Both examples narrator)

On the aim of persuasive speeches to create good will among the audience in the discussion of arrangement:

31) *Rhetoric* 3.14.11: "The sources of creating good will have been mentioned and each of the other similar [states of mind]. But since it is well said, 'Grant me to find among the Phaeacians friendship or compassion,' [*Od.* 6.327] these are the two things one should aim at." (Spoken by Odysseus in a prayer to Athena. While Aristotle cites this example to illustrate the importance of *diathesis* to persuasive speeches, the quote is not in itself an example of *diathesis*, nor do Odysseus' words imply necessarily that speech will be the avenue through which he will "find among the Phaeacians friendship and compassion." But as it turns out in the narrative, of course—and as Aristotle is surely aware—Odysseus' speech *will* play a large role in his acceptance by the Phaeacians.)

On dramatic narration and gestures as a persuasive device in the discussion of arrangement (perhaps more proper to the Book 2 discussion of arousing emotions):

32) *Rhetoric* 3.16.7: "Actions should be spoken of in past tenses except for what brings in either pity or indignation when it is dramatized. The account of [what was told to] Alcinous is an example, in that it has been compressed into sixty verses for Penelope. [referring to *Od.* 9-12 in comparison with *Od.* 23.264-84 and 310-43]" (Referring to two accounts of his travels spoken by Odysseus)

33) *Rhetoric* 3.16.10: "Further, speak from the emotions, narrating both the results [of emotion] and things the audience knows and what are special characteristics of the speaker or the opponents...Many such things are to be found in Homer: 'Thus she spoke, and the old nurse covered her face with her hands.' [*Od.* 19.361] For those who begin to cry place their hands over their eyes." (Narrator)

On limits for the number of enthymemes to be used in the discussion of arrangement:

> **34) *Rhetoric* 3.17.6: "Enthymemes should be mixed in and not spoken continuously; otherwise they get in each other's way. (There is a limit to how much an audience can take, [as in the line] 'Oh friend, since you have spoken as much as a wise man would' [*Od.* 4.204] *as much as*, not *such things as*.)" (Spoken by Menelaus to Peisistratus)[246]**

Here and there, Aristotle points to Homeric speakers to illustrate certain rhetorical *pisteis*—that is, the "crafted" (ἔντεχνος) methods of persuasion, which he considers the most essential component of rhetoric (see *Rhetoric* 1.1.3, 1.1.9, 1.1.11, 1.2.2). Homer provides a convenient store of examples with a common cultural currency, just as Euripides and Pindar do. But Aristotle does not remark upon the number of Homeric illustrations of certain *pisteis*, nor does he connect these quotations together or suggest that they reflect a systematic understanding of rhetoric within the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that would qualify them as contributors to the invention of rhetoric. For Aristotle, the Homeric epics may provide examples, but they are not predecessors. Aristotle has a different idea of who his rhetorical predecessors are—though he is loath to give credit to any of them. At the beginning of his treatise, while introducing the state of rhetoric "as things are now" (νῦν μὲν οὖν, 1.1.3), Aristotle discusses the work of earlier handbook-writers (οἱ τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες, 1.1.3) on the subject. He dismisses these anonymous predecessors as having produced unsatisfactory treatments of rhetoric, claiming that they

> *have worked on a small part of the subject*; for only *pisteis* are artistic (other things are supplementary), and *these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the "body" of persuasion, while they give most of their attention to matters external to the subject.* (1.1.3)...For example, why it is necessary to have the introduction [*prooemion*] or the narration [*diēgēsis*] and each of the other parts; for [in treating these matters] *they concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind, while they explain nothing about artistic proofs*; and that is the question of how one may become *enthymematic*. It is for this reason that although the method of deliberative and judicial speaking is the same and though deliberative subjects are finer and more important to the state than private transactions, [the

246 Of the 34 distinct Homeric passages cited by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, 23 come from the *Iliad* and eleven from the *Odyssey*. Twenty come from direct speech and fourteen from the narrative voice.

handbook-writers] have nothing to say about the former, and all try to describe the art of speaking in a law court. (1.1.9-10; italics added)

It is Aristotle's intention to shift the focus of rhetorical instruction from structural to "artistic" considerations (that is, argumentative strategies), and to broaden its scope from techniques primarily relevant to judicial oratory to those relevant to deliberative as well. At various other points in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes similarly disdainful mention of the handbook-writers and the inadequacy of their theory.[247] He attempts throughout the treatise to distance himself from his forbears in the sophistic and handbook traditions; indeed, his tendency to speak of these forbears in monolithic terms (as οἱ τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες) serves to distinguish his own rhetorical project all the more starkly from what has come before.

This is a very different approach from the one that Aristotle takes in the *Poetics*. Both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* give analytical accounts of their respective subjects, separating, classifying, and explaining the components of each. But a significant part of the *Poetics* is also devoted to tracing the origins of poetry in Greece and to identifying the inventors of tragedy and epic, whereas the *Rhetoric* is largely devoid of such an "archaeological" project. This may help to explain Aristotle's treatment of Homer within the *Rhetoric*. The purpose of the *Rhetoric* is scientific, not historiographical; it is a treatise intended to analyze and provide instruction in a technical skill. As such, it is fully forward-looking. Aristotle refers to predecessors and sources—to the history of rhetoric—only insofar as he can use the handbook-writers as straw men, and stake his claim to an innovative and definitive presentation of rhetoric. Aristotle's own view of his foundational place in the history of rhetoric gains support in recent works by Cole and Schiappa. Cole attributes to Aristotle and Plato a philosophical approach to rhetoric that sets them apart as "the true founders of rhetoric as well as of philosophy."[248] Schiappa

[247] See 1.2.4-5, 1.2.15, 2.23.21 (referring to the τέχνη of Callipus), 2.23.28 (referring to the τέχνη of Theodorus), 2.24.11 (referring to the τέχνη of Corax), 3.1.7 (referring to the Ἔλεοι (a treatise on the emotions) of Thrasymachus), and 3.13.3-5 (a more extended criticism of the handbook writers' practice of making "laughable divisions" (διαιροῦσι γελοίως, 3.13.3) into detailed categories under the heading of τάξις; Aristotle singles out Theodorus and Licymnius as offenders in this area).

[248] Cole (1991) 29.

argues that there is little or no real evidence of a tradition of "technical rhetoric," or rhetorical handbooks, before the fourth century, and that the *technai* to which Aristotle refers were simply exemplary speeches by sophists such as Gorgias and Antiphon.[249] In Schiappa's opinion, "the careful development of logical theory, including the categorization (based on epistemological criteria) of genuine and spurious arguments from probability, originated no sooner than Aristotle."[250]

B. Classification, generic boundaries, and the loss of poetic-rhetorical continuity

All of this suggests a reason for Aristotle's silence about the possibility that a system for effective persuasion was understood and represented by the Homeric composer(s), and the possibility that the Homeric epics informed the fourth-century *technê* of rhetoric. In such an innovative and techno-philosophical approach to rhetoric, there was no place for anything that smacked of the archaic. Whether fairly or not, by the fourth century Homer had come to be associated with a religious and mythical past, and though Aristotle might cite the epics for the odd example, these associations likely made it difficult for him to see Homer as a contributor to the discipline of rhetoric. This mindset reflects a socio-cultural shift in Greek views of language and authority that has been explained by (among others) Detienne in *Les Maîtres de vérité dans la grèce archaïque* and Goldhill in *The Invention of Prose*. Detienne describes "a gradual secularization of speech" attendant to the rise of the Greek city-state, in which *logos* took on an autonomous authority no longer moored to divine inspiration and to the figures of the seer, bard, and king.[251] Similarly, Goldhill speaks of a "profound shift in institutional and intellectual practice" centered around the rise of prose in fifth century B.C.E. Greece—a shift from viewing poetry as the locus for authoritative discourse to viewing prose treatments of philosophy, history, and science as authoritative.[252]

[249] Schiappa (1999) 45.
[250] *Ibid*, 39.
[251] Detienne (1996) 15-17.
[252] Goldhill (2002) 4-5.

> This shift could be expressed in its most simple and dramatic form as the move from the scene of a divinely inspired bard singing the poetry of the Muses for a spell-bound audience, to the scene of two orators, arguing a legal case in front of an appointed group of judging citizens...The invention of prose involves a *contest of authority* [with poetry]...The new writers of the new form of prose need to compete for (discursive) space in the city.[253]

For Aristotle and the analytical tradition that he inaugurated, poetry is a subject of analysis; it is not in itself a source of authoritative knowledge.

The separation of discourse into prose and poetry during the fifth and fourth centuries is indicative of a trend toward classification that grows along with the philosophical and scientific investigations of the era. Aristotle, of course, is the classifier *par excellence*. The *Rhetoric* alone contains 17 instances of the noun διαίρεσις ("division" or "classification") or the verbs διαιρέω/προσδιαιρέομαι ("to divide/divide further"), most of them referring to Aristotle's methodology. In fact, διαίρεσις is an enthymematic topic in itself (2.23.10). Aristotle's fondness for categories and generic separation is another barrier to his seeing Homer as a rhetorical predecessor. While he draws upon poetry for certain examples, he conceives of the rhetorical techniques that he prescribes as applying strictly to the prose realm of oratory. Aristotle explicitly emphasizes the distinction between poetry and prose (which he refers to as ψιλοὶ λόγοι) in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, in his discussion of rhetorical style (λέξις). He disapproves of the importation of poetic devices into rhetoric, a practice among early sophists:

> Since the poets, while speaking sweet nothings, seemed to acquire their reputation through their *lexis*, a poetic style came into existence [in prose as well], for example, that of Gorgias. Even now, the majority of the uneducated think such speakers speak most beautifully. This is not the case, but the [proper] *lexis* of prose differs from that of poetry. (*Rh.* 3.1.9)

The problem with mixing poetry and rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is that effective persuasion requires clarity and natural-sounding language—two elements that generally do not characterize poetry (although he cites Euripides as an example of tragedy's move toward using natural speech, *Rh.* 3.2.5):

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[253] Goldhill (2002) 5.

> Authors should compose without being noticed and should seem to speak not artificially (πεπλασμένως) but naturally (πεφυκότως). (The latter is persuasive, the former the opposite)...A word in its prevailing and native meaning and metaphor are alone useful in the *lexis* of prose. (*Rh.* 3.2.4-6)

An additional difference between poetry and rhetoric that Aristotle identifies is the use of an emotional manner of speaking (λεγεῖν παθητικῶς). In oratory, impassioned utterances are appropriate only on certain occasions and when certain conditions have been met—namely, "when a speaker already holds the audience in his control and causes them to be stirred either by praise or blame or hate or love" (*Rh.* 3.7.11) Such an emotional style is, however, normal and appropriate to poetry (*Ibid.*).

Poetry in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* serves several purposes. First, it populates his store of (perhaps interchangeable) examples of speech that hold common cultural currency—thus Homer appears alongside Simonides, Pericles, Agathon, and others—and that can be inserted into his theory at various points as practical illustrations. Secondly, it provides a category that can be contrasted with the category of rhetoric, setting the supposed distinctives of rhetorical diction into greater relief. What poetry does *not* do, in Aristotle's account of rhetoric, is represent or inform the *technê* that he sets forth. Only the handbook-writers are eligible for this role, for their genre and aims are roughly the same as his (though their execution leaves much to be desired). The discontinuity that Aristotle perceives between poetry and rhetoric brings us back to the socio-cultural "shift" described by Detienne and Goldhill. Such a shift from viewing authoritative discourse as embodied in "magicoreligious" poetic utterance on the one hand, and philosophical/technical prose texts on the other, undoubtedly did occur in the centuries between "Homer" and Aristotle. But perhaps something has been lost with regard to at least one aspect of authoritative discourse—rhetoric—in the promotion of this shift (a promotion that indeed may have begun with Aristotle, and that has filtered down from his influential treatise through the centuries of scholarship on rhetoric). I would argue that the practice of rhetoric represents an area of continuity between Homer and the "enlightenment" of the fifth century. The generic and disciplinary compartmentalization of Aristotle's work obscures the possibility that the techniques of persuasive speech on

display in Homer might be continuous with the techniques of persuasive speech practiced by speakers in the Athenian assembly or lawcourts, and taught by sophists, handbook-writers, and Aristotle himself.

Coda: Apollonius' *Argonautica* and the post-Aristotelian Dynamic between Poetry and Rhetoric

I have argued that the Homeric epics exhibit an awareness and use of rhetoric—that is, a systematic, learned set of techniques for persuasion—well before rhetoric is presented in theoretical form by the handbook-writers, Plato, and Aristotle. When rhetoric is theorized in fifth- and fourth-century B.C.E. Greece, most comprehensively and influentially by Aristotle, generic and categorical barriers between poetry and oratory begin to take shape. Among the questions raised by this investigation into the relationship between poetry and rhetoric in early Greece is one with which I will conclude: what were the implications of a codified rhetorical theory for poetic representations of speech *after* Aristotle? One implication, I hypothesize, is that poetry and rhetoric, which had been intertwined (as in Homer) prior to the theorization of rhetoric in Classical Athens, subsequently became compartmentalized. The rise of formal oratory and the development of rhetoric as a discipline, as well as the shift from oral to written modes of composition, may have contributed to a change in post-Classical poets' handling of character speech—namely, a perception (absent from Homer) that representing rhetoric was outside of their purview. Represented character speech is a phenomenon that is readily apparent in epic, of course, so in the remaining pages of this chapter I will take a brief look at Apollonius' *Argonautica*, as it provides the most obvious and symmetrical counterpart to Homer for comparing the depiction of speech in epic before and after the publication of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. This is only an incipient gesture toward a subject that deserves fuller treatment elsewhere: namely, manifestations of the perceived boundaries between poetry and rhetoric in post-Aristotelian literature.

A rise in scholarly treatment of the *Argonautica* since the 1980s has led to valuable insights into various aspects of this epic, with attention collecting especially around the

poem's relationship to its Alexandrian/Ptolemaic context,[254] its reflection of philosophical and scholarly currents of the time,[255] and of course its position within literary history, most notably with respect to Homer and Vergil.[256] I will make particular reference to Hunter's excellent study of the *Argonautica* (1993a), which (along with Berkowitz (2004) and Cuypers (2005)) examines the idiosyncracies of speech representation in our only complete surviving example of Hellenistic epic. My intention is not to cover the same ground as Hunter, but rather to pick up on his observations about Apollonius' handling of the narrative voice and direct speech, and the differences between Apollonius and Homer in this regard. I believe that speech phenomena in Apollonius may be explained, at least in part, by the new dynamic between poetry and formal rhetoric that Aristotle (and theoretical treatments of rhetoric generally) had established in the Classical era.

Even a preliminary look at the *Argonautica* reveals that there is far less direct speech in this poem than in either of the Homeric epics; Cuypers gives the percentages of direct speech in the three epics as 45.7% in the *Iliad*, 68.6% in the *Odyssey* (the high figure due to Odysseus' account of his travels in Books 9-12), and only 29.6% in the *Argonautica*.[257] Hunter notes "the greatly reduced prominence from Homer of direct speech; characters in fact speak 'for themselves' much less than in Homer. The epic has become much less 'dramatic.'"[258] Corresponding to this decline in the amount of direct speech within the *Argonautica*, however, is a rise in certain features within the narrative voice. These are features that, in Homer, are typically associated with direct speech: emotional and judgmental vocabulary[259] and *gnomai* ("The majority of generalising *gnomai* in Homer are in the mouth of characters, not the poet himself," Hunter

[254] See for example Stephens (2000) and (2003), Hunter (1991) and (1993a).
[255] E.g. Clayman (2000) on the Sceptic worldview of the *Argonautica*, Meyer (2001) on Apollonius as a Hellenistic geographer.
[256] E.g. Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004) and Hunter (1993a) on Apollonius and Homer; Nelis (2001) on Apollonius and Vergil. For further bibliography on Apollonius, see Reinhold F. Glei's chapter "Outlines of Apollonian Scholarship 1955-1999" in Papanghelis and Rengakos.
[257] Cuypers (2005) 37; cf. Hunter (1993a) 138.
[258] Hunter (1993a) 13.
[259] An observation about Homeric speech made by Griffin (1986) and compared with Apollonius' usage by Hunter (1993a) 109-111.

remarks.).[260] In contrast, Apollonius assimilates such language into a narrative voice that asserts opinions, and even, we might say, possesses a "personality": Apollonius puts greater "emphasis on the poet's mental effort," says Hunter, and he

> goes well beyond Homer in the tone and style of these authorial utterances. There is...a far greater prominence for the poet's person, the narrating *ego,* than is found in Homer...Different too is the poet's explicit inclusion of himself in general statements and *gnomai* in the first person.[261]

These observations lead Hunter to conclude that in the *Argonautica,* "very strict stylistic distinctions between the two modes [narrative and direct speech] are no longer valid" and "the Homeric division between the lexicon of speech and that of narrative is blurred and weakened, but not entirely abandoned."[262] Cuypers comes to a similar conclusion via his comparison of the use of interactional particles in Homer and Apollonius: "in the *Argonautica* the particle usage of the narrator is much closer to that of his characters, and...he uses interactional particles to engage his narratees' expectations in ways that are unparalleled in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey.*"[263]

Hunter's complex explanation for the trend toward convergence between the narrative voice and character speech in Apollonius (also illustrated through the greater reliance on indirect speech and suppressed speech in the epic) includes reference to Aristotle's *Poetics.* "In the *Poetics* Aristotle praises Homer for recognizing that, as poetry is mimetic, 'the poet himself must say as little as possible' (*Poetics* 1460a5ff.). In wanting epic to be like drama...Aristotle privileged the mode of 'letting characters speak for themselves.'"[264] But Apollonius is far different from Homer in this regard. "Apollonius' procedure here is strikingly un-Aristotelian," Hunter observes, considering that Apollonius seems to avoid direct speech on many occasions, preferring to narrate the action and use indirect speech. Based on his documentation and analysis of the use of direct speech versus authorial voice in the *Argonautica,* Hunter argues that "it becomes

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[260] Hunter (1993a) 105.
[261] *Ibid,* 106.
[262] *Ibid,* 110-11.
[263] Cuypers (2005) 65.
[264] Hunter (1993a) 139.

harder to believe that we are not dealing with a deliberate revision of the epic manner." In Apollonius, we encounter "the self-conscious presence of the narrator's voice, always demanding our recognition and admiration, contrasted with Homer's submerging of himself within his characters."[265] But perhaps there is more at work here than simply a "deliberate revision of the epic manner." Perhaps rhetoric (in the technical sense) is also part of the picture. The paucity of direct speech in the *Argonautica* could be the result of a reflex, conditioned by Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, to view the *technê* of rhetoric as an area of specialization reserved for oratory or theoretical/instructional treatises. Apollonius may have been de-emphasizing representations of speech (whether in deliberate or in unconscious response to the prevailing trends of literary specialization and demarcation of discourse genres) so as to distinguish his epic simultaneously from Homer and from the work of orators and rhetorical theorists.

A brief overview of direct speeches intended to persuade in the *Argonautica* will help to illustrate the degree to which they embody the rhetoric that Aristotle espouses, in comparison with the speeches from the *Iliad* analyzed in Chapter 2. The *Argonautica*, like the *Iliad*, contains speeches that aim to spur their audience to action but that are nevertheless "non-rhetorical"—that is, they involve simply instruction, commands, or requests, unsupported by argumentation or other persuasive techniques (for example, Jason's instructions to the crew upon being named leader in 1.351-62, Hera's request to Kypris in 3.84-9, or Thetis' speech to Peleus in 4.856-64). Speeches that employ Aristotelian rhetorical techniques are few; those that employ more than one technique within a single speech even fewer. In Phineus' speech at 2.209-39 and Argus' at 2.1123-33, both addressed to the Argonauts, only one rhetorical technique, *pathos*, supports the speakers' requests for aid. These supplications contain no enthymemes or appeals to *êthos*. It is primarily books 3 and 4 of the *Argonautica* that contain the handful of persuasive speeches whose rhetorical complexity approaches that of the Iliadic speeches

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[265] Hunter (1993a) 139.

analyzed in Chapter 2.[266] I will take a closer look at two speeches from Book 3, as well as a passage of indirect speech in Book 4, that convey the ambivalent state of rhetoric in the *Argonautica*.

The first speech I will examine is Jason's address to the Argonauts upon reaching Colchis in Book 3, in a situation which mirrors that of many rhetorical speeches in the *Iliad*: a hero addressing the assembly of warriors and attempting to convince them of a strategy for dealing with the enemy. In this case, Jason proposes a plan for approaching Aietes, King of Colchis, in hopes of acquiring the Golden Fleece:

> Friends, I shall tell you the plan I myself favour, but it is for you to give it your assent. Common is our need, and common to all alike the right to speak. The man who holds back his view and opinion in silence should know that he alone deprives our expedition of its chance for safe return. I suggest that you all remain quietly in the ship, your arms at the ready. I shall go to Aietes' palace...and I shall first speak to him to test whether he is willing in friendship to grant us the golden fleece or prefers to refuse and, trusting in his might, reject our quest...Before testing him with words, let us not try simply to deprive him of his possession by force: it is better first to approach him and seek to win him over by arguments. In tight corners arguments have often smoothed the way and achieved what manly strength could hardly accomplish. Even Aietes once received the blameless Phrixos as he fled from his stepmother's deceit and the sacrifice designed by his father; all men, even the most outrageously shameless, always respect and observe the ordinances of Zeus, Protector of Guests.[267] (*Argonautica* 3.171-93)

The first rhetorical position Jason takes is to encourage audience input. The mildly-stated enthymematic conclusion asserts that "it is for you to give it your assent," followed by the premise, "The man who holds back his view and opinion in silence should know that he alone deprives our expedition of its chance for safe return." This

[266] Using the same Aristotelian-derived definition of rhetoric that I have maintained throughout this project, I count the following speeches in the *Argonautica* as having significant rhetorical content (i.e. they contain more than one technique): Jason's speech of consolation to his mother Alkimede at 1.295-305; Polyxo's speech urging the Lemnian women to take Argonaut husbands at 1.675-96; Herakles' speech urging the Argonauts to leave Lemnos at 1.865-74; Jason's proposal to the Argonauts of a plan for approaching Aietes at 3.171-93; Jason's conciliatory speech to Aietes at 3.386-95; Jason's request for aid from Medea at 3.975-1007; Jason's exhortation to the Argonauts before embarking on the return voyage to Greece at 4.190-205; Medea's supplication to Queen Arete at 4.1014-28; Arete's speech of supplication on behalf of Medea to Alcinoos at 4.1073-95.

[267] Translation of Apollonius from Hunter (1993b); text from Vian (1974-81).

premise utilizes both the topic of incentives and disincentives and a *pathos*-based incitement of guilt in anyone who might be suppressing his opinion. From the start, Jason reaches out to his audience with language of friendship and camaraderie (e.g. the opening form of address, ὦ φίλοι, and the sentiment ξυνὴ γὰρ χρειώ, ξυνοὶ δέ τε μῦθοι ἔασι/ πᾶσιν ὁμῶς (3.173-4)). He takes pains not to come across as a distant or arrogant leader who sees himself as superior to his men—a display of *diathesis* that reflects his delicate leadership position, having taken command of the expedition only after the Argonauts' first choice, Herakles, demurred (see 1.332-62). Deference to his audience will characterize Jason's tone throughout the speech; as well as soliciting others' opinions, he makes use of the less confrontational language of impersonal verbs rather than relying solely on imperatives to convey his requests and proposals (see 3.172, ὔμμι τέλος κρηῆναι ἔοικε; 3.187, λωίτερον μύθῳ μιν ἀρέσσασθαι μετιόντας).

In the latter portion of the speech, Jason employs an extended enthymeme to support his reasoning for a conciliatory approach to Aietes. The enthymematic conclusion "let us not try simply to deprive him of his possession by force" is followed by the premise "it is better first to approach him and seek to win him over by arguments," which in turn is elaborated by the *gnomê* "in tight corners arguments have often smoothed the way and achieved what manly strength could hardly accomplish." There is meta-rhetorical irony in these words, as Jason uses persuasion to advocate persuasion. He then provides additional premises to support his contention that Aietes may be receptive to the Argonauts' quest: a brief *paradeigma* citing Aietes' past behavior towards Phrixos, and a *gnomê* (however naïve) about the respect paid by all men to Zeus *Xenios*. Jason's speech meets with approval (3.194-5), but in a curious addition to the report of the audience's response, the narrator notes in passing that "there was no one who sought to persuade them to any other course of action" (3.195). This remark has the effect of slightly deflating Jason's persuasive powers. After all, he had exhorted the Argonauts to voice their opinions; and the lack of competing viewpoints (so often seen in Iliadic assembly speeches) ensures that Jason's proposal carries the day merely by default. The fact that no other hero speaks at this crucial juncture does highlight the

plight of persuasive speeches in the *Argonautica*: they are infrequent and isolated. Here, as elsewhere, the narrator draws attention to the lack or suppression of speech—a theme that runs throughout the epic, as Hunter has observed.[268] Hunter sees this phenomenon as a way in which Apollonius "call[s] attention to the role of the poet as controller and selector of the material of the poem;" I would argue that it is also a manifestation of the limits of poetically represented speech in a society saturated with disciplinized rhetoric (a factor that complements, rather than competes with, Hunter's interpretation).[269]

Apollonius' ambivalent portrayal of persuasion is visible again in Peleus' quasi-exhortation to the Argonauts (singling out Jason) in 3.506-14. Rather than argue for a course of action, Peleus calls for deliberation (in a speech which is itself deliberative), and then promptly undercuts his own proposal:

> It is time to consider what we will do, though I do not think that deliberation will help us as much as the strength of our arms. (506-7)

The remainder of his speech equivocates by suggesting options based on conditions—a gesture unheard of in the assembly and battlefield exhortations of Iliadic heroes:

> If, heroic son of Aison, you have in mind to yoke Aietes' bulls and are keen for the task, then you should keep your promise and make yourself ready. If, however, your heart does not have very full confidence in its manly courage, then neither stir yourself to it nor sit here seeking some other man from among us: I shall not hold back, since the worst grief that can befall is death. (508-14)

The only Aristotelian rhetorical tactic in this speech is Peleus' oblique reference to his own *êthos* conveyed in the offer to perform the heroic task in Jason's place. He offers no arguments to support his proposals, and indeed no proposals other than the quickly-dismissed "it is time to consider what we will do" and the condition-dependent options for meeting Aietes' demands. Again in this case, a persuasive direct speech in the *Argonautica* exhibits less rhetorical content than was present in Iliadic speeches, as though deliberately shrinking from resonances with Homer or oratory.

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[268] Hunter (1993a) 141-3. See, for example, 1.1286-9, "The son of Aison was so struck by helplessness that he could not speak in favour of any proposal (ἀμηχανίῃσιν ἀτυχθεὶς/ οὐδέ τι τοῖον ἔπος μετεφώνεεν), but sat gnawing at his heart because of the grim disaster which had occurred;" and 3.422-3, "Jason sat silent (σῖγα) where he was, his eyes fixed on the ground before his feet, unable to speak (ἄφθογγος)."
[269] Hunter (1993a) 141.

A final example of the *Argonautica*'s curious treatment of rhetoric occurs at a moment when persuasion takes center stage in the narrative: Medea luring her brother Apsyrtus into an ambush after he pursues the Argonauts in hopes of returning Medea to Colchis. The actual words used to "lure" (θελγέμεν, 4.436) Apsyrtus into meeting with her are, conspicuously, never reported. Medea alludes to them in proposing the plan to Jason ("I shall cajole (μελίξω) that man into coming into your hands," 4.415-6), and further tantalizing reference to this deadly act of persuasion occurs several lines later in a seamless shift between narrative and indirect speech:

> Medea entrusted her message to the heralds, to lure Apsyrtos to come, as soon as she reached the goddess' temple in accordance with the agreement, and the dark gloom of night was spread around; he would help her devise a trick by which she might take the great golden fleece and return again to Aietes' house, for the sons of Phrixos had forcefully compelled her when they handed her over to the strangers. Together with this deceitful message, she sprinkled alluring drugs through the air and breezes... (435-43)

This odd narrative hybrid form (Hunter, following Genette's taxonomy, calls it an example of "transposed speech") never quiet achieves the clear mimetic structure of direct speech.[270] It is possible to pick up snatches of a rhetorical argument here—"the sons of Phrixos had forcefully compelled her" indicates that Medea will be assuming the *êthos* of a wronged innocent and playing on Apsyrtus' sympathies. But the indirect speech format allows Apollonius to keep this fatally persuasive speech—and rhetoric itself—just out of the audience's purview.

There are certainly a number of factors at work in the poetic texture of the *Argonautica*, and I do not mean to suggest that a sense of generic boundaries was the sole governing concern of Apollonius' choice to present speech as he does in his epic. Apollonius creates an ambivalent fictional world in which traditional concepts of heroism are reconstituted, narrative authority is destabilized, and the boundaries between fantasy and reality, time and space, are blurred. In doing so, as Hunter and others have aptly observed, he is reflecting currents in contemporary society,

[270] Hunter (1993a) 144-5.

philosophy, and scholarly practice by (see Hunter 8-25 *et passim*). I would simply add rhetorical (self-)consciousness as an informing factor. It is as though Apollonius has begun to channel rhetorical discourse into the narrative voice—where it has less resemblance to formal rhetoric—rather than through the direct speeches of characters.[271] Apollonius himself is the foremost *rhêtor* of the *Argonautica*; he sets himself the task of persuading his audience of the fantastical and ambiguous poetic world he has created, and lifts the curtain on his own manipulation of the narrative. Whereas the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had presented characters exerting techniques of persuasion on each other—a sort of rhetoric-within-poetry—the *Argonautica* presents a narrator whose voice can hardly be distinguished from the voices of characters—a sort of rhetoric-as-poetry. Apollonius embodies the more general phenomenon, commonly heard in modern literary analysis, of an author's "rhetoric," the voice with which he persuades his audience of the (fictional) world he has created. This retreat in the *Argonautica* from the technical rhetoric portrayed in Homeric poetry, then, is perhaps in part a response to Aristotle's definition and delimitation of rhetoric within the boundaries of prose, specifically oratory; and in part is yet another way for Apollonius to distinguish himself from Homer, the τεχνίτης λόγων.

[271] Hunter (1993a) 138-43, especially 139.

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